Gemma 3 Technical Report

We introduce Gemma 3, a multimodal addition to the Gemma family of lightweight open models, ranging in scale from 1 to 27 billion parameters. This version introduces vision understanding abilities, a wider coverage of languages and longer context - at least 128K tokens. We also change the architecture of the model to reduce the KV-cache memory that tends to explode with long context. This is achieved by increasing the ratio of local to global attention layers, and keeping the span on local attention short. The Gemma 3 models are trained with distillation and achieve superior performance to Gemma 2 for both pre-trained and instruction finetuned versions. In particular, our novel post-training recipe significantly improves the math, chat, instruction-following and multilingual abilities, making Gemma3-4B-IT competitive with Gemma2-27B-IT and Gemma3-27B-IT comparable to Gemini-1.5-Pro across benchmarks. We release all our models to the community.

Privacy Auditing of Large Language Models

Current techniques for privacy auditing of large language models (LLMs) have limited efficacy -- they rely on basic approaches to generate canaries which leads to weak membership inference attacks that in turn give loose lower bounds on the empirical privacy leakage. We develop canaries that are far more effective than those used in prior work under threat models that cover a range of realistic settings. We demonstrate through extensive experiments on multiple families of fine-tuned LLMs that our approach sets a new standard for detection of privacy leakage. For measuring the memorization rate of non-privately trained LLMs, our designed canaries surpass prior approaches. For example, on the Qwen2.5-0.5B model, our designed canaries achieve $49.6\%$ TPR at $1\%$ FPR, vastly surpassing the prior approach's $4.2\%$ TPR at $1\%$ FPR. Our method can be used to provide a privacy audit of $\varepsilon \approx 1$ for a model trained with theoretical $\varepsilon$ of 4. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a privacy audit of LLM training has achieved nontrivial auditing success in the setting where the attacker cannot train shadow models, insert gradient canaries, or access the model at every iteration.

Privacy Ripple Effects from Adding or Removing Personal Information in Language Model Training

Due to the sensitive nature of personally identifiable information (PII), its owners may have the authority to control its inclusion or request its removal from large-language model (LLM) training. Beyond this, PII may be added or removed from training datasets due to evolving dataset curation techniques, because they were newly scraped for retraining, or because they were included in a new downstream fine-tuning stage. We find that the amount and ease of PII memorization is a dynamic property of a model that evolves throughout training pipelines and depends on commonly altered design choices. We characterize three such novel phenomena: (1) similar-appearing PII seen later in training can elicit memorization of earlier-seen sequences in what we call assisted memorization, and this is a significant factor (in our settings, up to 1/3); (2) adding PII can increase memorization of other PII significantly (in our settings, as much as $\approx\!7.5\times$); and (3) removing PII can lead to other PII being memorized. Model creators should consider these first- and second-order privacy risks when training models to avoid the risk of new PII regurgitation.

Scaling Laws for Differentially Private Language Models

Scaling laws have emerged as important components of large language model (LLM) training as they can predict performance gains through scale, and provide guidance on important hyper-parameter choices that would otherwise be expensive. LLMs also rely on large, high-quality training datasets, like those sourced from (sometimes sensitive) user data. Training models on this sensitive user data requires careful privacy protections like differential privacy (DP). However, the dynamics of DP training are significantly different, and consequently their scaling laws are not yet fully understood. In this work, we establish scaling laws that accurately model the intricacies of DP LLM training, providing a complete picture of the compute-privacy-utility tradeoffs and the optimal training configurations in many settings.

Exploring and Mitigating Adversarial Manipulation of Voting-Based Leaderboards

It is now common to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) by having humans manually vote to evaluate model outputs, in contrast to typical benchmarks that evaluate knowledge or skill at some particular task. Chatbot Arena, the most popular benchmark of this type, ranks models by asking users to select the better response between two randomly selected models (without revealing which model was responsible for the generations). These platforms are widely trusted as a fair and accurate measure of LLM capabilities. In this paper, we show that if bot protection and other defenses are not implemented, these voting-based benchmarks are potentially vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Specifically, we show that an attacker can alter the leaderboard (to promote their favorite model or demote competitors) at the cost of roughly a thousand votes (verified in a simulated, offline version of Chatbot Arena). Our attack consists of two steps: first, we show how an attacker can determine which model was used to generate a given reply with more than $95\%$ accuracy; and then, the attacker can use this information to consistently vote for (or against) a target model. Working with the Chatbot Arena developers, we identify, propose, and implement mitigations to improve the robustness of Chatbot Arena against adversarial manipulation, which, based on our analysis, substantially increases the cost of such attacks. Some of these defenses were present before our collaboration, such as bot protection with Cloudflare, malicious user detection, and rate limiting. Others, including reCAPTCHA and login are being integrated to strengthen the security in Chatbot Arena.

Machine Unlearning Doesn't Do What You Think: Lessons for Generative AI Policy, Research, and Practice

We articulate fundamental mismatches between technical methods for machine unlearning in Generative AI, and documented aspirations for broader impact that these methods could have for law and policy. These aspirations are both numerous and varied, motivated by issues that pertain to privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of targeted information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or in-copyright expression of Spiderman that was included in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for thinking rigorously about these challenges, which enables us to be clear about why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact. We aim for conceptual clarity and to encourage more thoughtful communication among machine learning (ML), law, and policy experts who seek to develop and apply technical methods for compliance with policy objectives.

The Last Iterate Advantage: Empirical Auditing and Principled Heuristic Analysis of Differentially Private SGD

We propose a simple heuristic privacy analysis of noisy clipped stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) in the setting where only the last iterate is released and the intermediate iterates remain hidden. Namely, our heuristic assumes a linear structure for the model. We show experimentally that our heuristic is predictive of the outcome of privacy auditing applied to various training procedures. Thus it can be used prior to training as a rough estimate of the final privacy leakage. We also probe the limitations of our heuristic by providing some artificial counterexamples where it underestimates the privacy leakage. The standard composition-based privacy analysis of DP-SGD effectively assumes that the adversary has access to all intermediate iterates, which is often unrealistic. However, this analysis remains the state of the art in practice. While our heuristic does not replace a rigorous privacy analysis, it illustrates the large gap between the best theoretical upper bounds and the privacy auditing lower bounds and sets a target for further work to improve the theoretical privacy analyses. We also empirically support our heuristic and show existing privacy auditing attacks are bounded by our heuristic analysis in both vision and language tasks.

Gemma 2: Improving Open Language Models at a Practical Size

In this work, we introduce Gemma 2, a new addition to the Gemma family of lightweight, state-of-the-art open models, ranging in scale from 2 billion to 27 billion parameters. In this new version, we apply several known technical modifications to the Transformer architecture, such as interleaving local-global attentions (Beltagy et al., 2020a) and group-query attention (Ainslie et al., 2023). We also train the 2B and 9B models with knowledge distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) instead of next token prediction. The resulting models deliver the best performance for their size, and even offer competitive alternatives to models that are 2-3 times bigger. We release all our models to the community.

Recite, Reconstruct, Recollect: Memorization in LMs as a Multifaceted Phenomenon

Memorization in language models is typically treated as a homogenous phenomenon, neglecting the specifics of the memorized data. We instead model memorization as the effect of a set of complex factors that describe each sample and relate it to the model and corpus. To build intuition around these factors, we break memorization down into a taxonomy: recitation of highly duplicated sequences, reconstruction of inherently predictable sequences, and recollection of sequences that are neither. We demonstrate the usefulness of our taxonomy by using it to construct a predictive model for memorization. By analyzing dependencies and inspecting the weights of the predictive model, we find that different factors influence the likelihood of memorization differently depending on the taxonomic category.

Optimal Rates for DP-SCO with a Single Epoch and Large Batches

The most common algorithms for differentially private (DP) machine learning (ML) are all based on stochastic gradient descent, for example, DP-SGD. These algorithms achieve DP by treating each gradient as an independent private query. However, this independence can cause us to overpay in privacy loss because we don't analyze the entire gradient trajectory. In this work, we propose a new DP algorithm, which we call Accelerated-DP-SRGD (DP stochastic recursive gradient descent), that enables us to break this independence and only pay for privacy in the gradient difference, i.e., in the new information at the current step. Our algorithm achieves the optimal DP-stochastic convex optimization (DP-SCO) error (up to polylog factors) using only a single epoch over the dataset, and converges at the Nesterov's accelerated rate. Our algorithm can be run in at most $\sqrt{n}$ batch gradient steps with batch size at least $\sqrt{n}$, unlike prior work which required $O(n)$ queries with mostly constant batch sizes. To achieve this, our algorithm combines three key ingredients, a variant of stochastic recursive gradients (SRG), accelerated gradient descent, and correlated noise generation from DP continual counting. Finally, we also show that our algorithm improves over existing SoTA on multi-class logistic regression on MNIST and CIFAR-10.