Information-Guided Identification of Training Data Imprint in (Proprietary) Large Language Models

High-quality training data has proven crucial for developing performant large language models (LLMs). However, commercial LLM providers disclose few, if any, details about the data used for training. This lack of transparency creates multiple challenges: it limits external oversight and inspection of LLMs for issues such as copyright infringement, it undermines the agency of data authors, and it hinders scientific research on critical issues such as data contamination and data selection. How can we recover what training data is known to LLMs? In this work, we demonstrate a new method to identify training data known to proprietary LLMs like GPT-4 without requiring any access to model weights or token probabilities, by using information-guided probes. Our work builds on a key observation: text passages with high surprisal are good search material for memorization probes. By evaluating a model's ability to successfully reconstruct high-surprisal tokens in text, we can identify a surprising number of texts memorized by LLMs.

Privacy Ripple Effects from Adding or Removing Personal Information in Language Model Training

Due to the sensitive nature of personally identifiable information (PII), its owners may have the authority to control its inclusion or request its removal from large-language model (LLM) training. Beyond this, PII may be added or removed from training datasets due to evolving dataset curation techniques, because they were newly scraped for retraining, or because they were included in a new downstream fine-tuning stage. We find that the amount and ease of PII memorization is a dynamic property of a model that evolves throughout training pipelines and depends on commonly altered design choices. We characterize three such novel phenomena: (1) similar-appearing PII seen later in training can elicit memorization of earlier-seen sequences in what we call assisted memorization, and this is a significant factor (in our settings, up to 1/3); (2) adding PII can increase memorization of other PII significantly (in our settings, as much as $\approx\!7.5\times$); and (3) removing PII can lead to other PII being memorized. Model creators should consider these first- and second-order privacy risks when training models to avoid the risk of new PII regurgitation.

Synthetic Data Can Mislead Evaluations: Membership Inference as Machine Text Detection

Recent work shows membership inference attacks (MIAs) on large language models (LLMs) produce inconclusive results, partly due to difficulties in creating non-member datasets without temporal shifts. While researchers have turned to synthetic data as an alternative, we show this approach can be fundamentally misleading. Our experiments indicate that MIAs function as machine-generated text detectors, incorrectly identifying synthetic data as training samples regardless of the data source. This behavior persists across different model architectures and sizes, from open-source models to commercial ones such as GPT-3.5. Even synthetic text generated by different, potentially larger models is classified as training data by the target model. Our findings highlight a serious concern: using synthetic data in membership evaluations may lead to false conclusions about model memorization and data leakage. We caution that this issue could affect other evaluations using model signals such as loss where synthetic or machine-generated translated data substitutes for real-world samples.

Machine Unlearning Doesn't Do What You Think: Lessons for Generative AI Policy, Research, and Practice

We articulate fundamental mismatches between technical methods for machine unlearning in Generative AI, and documented aspirations for broader impact that these methods could have for law and policy. These aspirations are both numerous and varied, motivated by issues that pertain to privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of targeted information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or in-copyright expression of Spiderman that was included in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for thinking rigorously about these challenges, which enables us to be clear about why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact. We aim for conceptual clarity and to encourage more thoughtful communication among machine learning (ML), law, and policy experts who seek to develop and apply technical methods for compliance with policy objectives.

AI as Humanity's Salieri: Quantifying Linguistic Creativity of Language Models via Systematic Attribution of Machine Text against Web Text

Creativity has long been considered one of the most difficult aspect of human intelligence for AI to mimic. However, the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, has raised questions about whether AI can match or even surpass human creativity. We present CREATIVITY INDEX as the first step to quantify the linguistic creativity of a text by reconstructing it from existing text snippets on the web. CREATIVITY INDEX is motivated by the hypothesis that the seemingly remarkable creativity of LLMs may be attributable in large part to the creativity of human-written texts on the web. To compute CREATIVITY INDEX efficiently, we introduce DJ SEARCH, a novel dynamic programming algorithm that can search verbatim and near-verbatim matches of text snippets from a given document against the web. Experiments reveal that the CREATIVITY INDEX of professional human authors is on average 66.2% higher than that of LLMs, and that alignment reduces the CREATIVITY INDEX of LLMs by an average of 30.1%. In addition, we find that distinguished authors like Hemingway exhibit measurably higher CREATIVITY INDEX compared to other human writers. Finally, we demonstrate that CREATIVITY INDEX can be used as a surprisingly effective criterion for zero-shot machine text detection, surpassing the strongest existing zero-shot system, DetectGPT, by a significant margin of 30.2%, and even outperforming the strongest supervised system, GhostBuster, in five out of six domains.

HAICOSYSTEM: An Ecosystem for Sandboxing Safety Risks in Human-AI Interactions

AI agents are increasingly autonomous in their interactions with human users and tools, leading to increased interactional safety risks. We present HAICOSYSTEM, a framework examining AI agent safety within diverse and complex social interactions. HAICOSYSTEM features a modular sandbox environment that simulates multi-turn interactions between human users and AI agents, where the AI agents are equipped with a variety of tools (e.g., patient management platforms) to navigate diverse scenarios (e.g., a user attempting to access other patients' profiles). To examine the safety of AI agents in these interactions, we develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional evaluation framework that uses metrics covering operational, content-related, societal, and legal risks. Through running 1840 simulations based on 92 scenarios across seven domains (e.g., healthcare, finance, education), we demonstrate that HAICOSYSTEM can emulate realistic user-AI interactions and complex tool use by AI agents. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs, both proprietary and open-sourced, exhibit safety risks in over 50\% cases, with models generally showing higher risks when interacting with simulated malicious users. Our findings highlight the ongoing challenge of building agents that can safely navigate complex interactions, particularly when faced with malicious users. To foster the AI agent safety ecosystem, we release a code platform that allows practitioners to create custom scenarios, simulate interactions, and evaluate the safety and performance of their agents.

Trust No Bot: Discovering Personal Disclosures in Human-LLM Conversations in the Wild

Measuring personal disclosures made in human-chatbot interactions can provide a better understanding of users' AI literacy and facilitate privacy research for large language models (LLMs). We run an extensive, fine-grained analysis on the personal disclosures made by real users to commercial GPT models, investigating the leakage of personally identifiable and sensitive information. To understand the contexts in which users disclose to chatbots, we develop a taxonomy of tasks and sensitive topics, based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of naturally occurring conversations. We discuss these potential privacy harms and observe that: (1) personally identifiable information (PII) appears in unexpected contexts such as in translation or code editing (48% and 16% of the time, respectively) and (2) PII detection alone is insufficient to capture the sensitive topics that are common in human-chatbot interactions, such as detailed sexual preferences or specific drug use habits. We believe that these high disclosure rates are of significant importance for researchers and data curators, and we call for the design of appropriate nudging mechanisms to help users moderate their interactions.

CopyBench: Measuring Literal and Non-Literal Reproduction of Copyright-Protected Text in Language Model Generation

Evaluating the degree of reproduction of copyright-protected content by language models (LMs) is of significant interest to the AI and legal communities. Although both literal and non-literal similarities are considered by courts when assessing the degree of reproduction, prior research has focused only on literal similarities. To bridge this gap, we introduce CopyBench, a benchmark designed to measure both literal and non-literal copying in LM generations. Using copyrighted fiction books as text sources, we provide automatic evaluation protocols to assess literal and non-literal copying, balanced against the model utility in terms of the ability to recall facts from the copyrighted works and generate fluent completions. We find that, although literal copying is relatively rare, two types of non-literal copying -- event copying and character copying -- occur even in models as small as 7B parameters. Larger models demonstrate significantly more copying, with literal copying rates increasing from 0.2% to 10.5% and non-literal copying from 2.3% to 6.9% when comparing Llama3-8B and 70B models, respectively. We further evaluate the effectiveness of current strategies for mitigating copying and show that (1) training-time alignment can reduce literal copying but may increase non-literal copying, and (2) current inference-time mitigation methods primarily reduce literal but not non-literal copying.

WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Models

We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic exploration of novel jailbreaks. Compared to prior work that performed red-teaming via recruited human workers, gradient-based optimization, or iterative revision with LLMs, our work investigates jailbreaks from chatbot users who were not specifically instructed to break the system. WildTeaming reveals previously unidentified vulnerabilities of frontier LLMs, resulting in up to 4.6x more diverse and successful adversarial attacks compared to state-of-the-art jailbreak methods. While many datasets exist for jailbreak evaluation, very few open-source datasets exist for jailbreak training, as safety training data has been closed even when model weights are open. With WildTeaming we create WildJailbreak, a large-scale open-source synthetic safety dataset with 262K vanilla (direct request) and adversarial (complex jailbreak) prompt-response pairs. To mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors, WildJailbreak provides two contrastive types of queries: 1) harmful queries (vanilla & adversarial) and 2) benign queries that resemble harmful queries in form but contain no harm. As WildJailbreak considerably upgrades the quality and scale of existing safety resources, it uniquely enables us to examine the scaling effects of data and the interplay of data properties and model capabilities during safety training. Through extensive experiments, we identify the training properties that enable an ideal balance of safety behaviors: appropriate safeguarding without over-refusal, effective handling of vanilla and adversarial queries, and minimal, if any, decrease in general capabilities. All components of WildJailbeak contribute to achieving balanced safety behaviors of models.

Breaking News: Case Studies of Generative AI's Use in Journalism

Journalists are among the many users of large language models (LLMs). To better understand the journalist-AI interactions, we conduct a study of LLM usage by two news agencies through browsing the WildChat dataset, identifying candidate interactions, and verifying them by matching to online published articles. Our analysis uncovers instances where journalists provide sensitive material such as confidential correspondence with sources or articles from other agencies to the LLM as stimuli and prompt it to generate articles, and publish these machine-generated articles with limited intervention (median output-publication ROUGE-L of 0.62). Based on our findings, we call for further research into what constitutes responsible use of AI, and the establishment of clear guidelines and best practices on using LLMs in a journalistic context.