Learning to Reason in 13 Parameters

Recent research has shown that language models can learn to \textit{reason}, often via reinforcement learning. Some work even trains low-rank parameterizations for reasoning, but conventional LoRA cannot scale below the model dimension. We question whether even rank=1 LoRA is necessary for learning to reason and propose TinyLoRA, a method for scaling low-rank adapters to sizes as small as one parameter. Within our new parameterization, we are able to train the 8B parameter size of Qwen2.5 to 91\% accuracy on GSM8K with only 13 trained parameters in bf16 (26 total bytes). We find this trend holds in general: we are able to recover 90\% of performance improvements while training $1000x$ fewer parameters across a suite of more difficult learning-to-reason benchmarks such as AIME, AMC, and MATH500. Notably, we are only able to achieve such strong performance with RL: models trained using SFT require $100-1000x$ larger updates to reach the same performance.

Privasis: Synthesizing the Largest "Public" Private Dataset from Scratch

Research involving privacy-sensitive data has always been constrained by data scarcity, standing in sharp contrast to other areas that have benefited from data scaling. This challenge is becoming increasingly urgent as modern AI agents--such as OpenClaw and Gemini Agent--are granted persistent access to highly sensitive personal information. To tackle this longstanding bottleneck and the rising risks, we present Privasis (i.e., privacy oasis), the first million-scale fully synthetic dataset entirely built from scratch--an expansive reservoir of texts with rich and diverse private information--designed to broaden and accelerate research in areas where processing sensitive social data is inevitable. Compared to existing datasets, Privasis, comprising 1.4 million records, offers orders-of-magnitude larger scale with quality, and far greater diversity across various document types, including medical history, legal documents, financial records, calendars, and text messages with a total of 55.1 million annotated attributes such as ethnicity, date of birth, workplace, etc. We leverage Privasis to construct a parallel corpus for text sanitization with our pipeline that decomposes texts and applies targeted sanitization. Our compact sanitization models (<=4B) trained on this dataset outperform state-of-the-art large language models, such as GPT-5 and Qwen-3 235B. We plan to release data, models, and code to accelerate future research on privacy-sensitive domains and agents.

Memorization Dynamics in Knowledge Distillation for Language Models

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is increasingly adopted to transfer capabilities from large language models to smaller ones, offering significant improvements in efficiency and utility while often surpassing standard fine-tuning. Beyond performance, KD is also explored as a privacy-preserving mechanism to mitigate the risk of training data leakage. While training data memorization has been extensively studied in standard pre-training and fine-tuning settings, its dynamics in a knowledge distillation setup remain poorly understood. In this work, we study memorization across the KD pipeline using three large language model (LLM) families (Pythia, OLMo-2, Qwen-3) and three datasets (FineWeb, Wikitext, Nemotron-CC-v2). We find: (1) distilled models memorize significantly less training data than standard fine-tuning (reducing memorization by more than 50%); (2) some examples are inherently easier to memorize and account for a large fraction of memorization during distillation (over ~95%); (3) student memorization is predictable prior to distillation using features based on zlib entropy, KL divergence, and perplexity; and (4) while soft and hard distillation have similar overall memorization rates, hard distillation poses a greater risk: it inherits $2.7\times$ more teacher-specific examples than soft distillation. Overall, we demonstrate that distillation can provide both improved generalization and reduced memorization risks compared to standard fine-tuning.

Quantifying the Effect of Test Set Contamination on Generative Evaluations

As frontier AI systems are pretrained on web-scale data, test set contamination has become a critical concern for accurately assessing their capabilities. While research has thoroughly investigated the impact of test set contamination on discriminative evaluations like multiple-choice question-answering, comparatively little research has studied the impact of test set contamination on generative evaluations. In this work, we quantitatively assess the effect of test set contamination on generative evaluations through the language model lifecycle. We pretrain language models on mixtures of web data and the MATH benchmark, sweeping model sizes and number of test set replicas contaminating the pretraining corpus; performance improves with contamination and model size. Using scaling laws, we make a surprising discovery: including even a single test set replica enables models to achieve lower loss than the irreducible error of training on the uncontaminated corpus. We then study further training: overtraining with fresh data reduces the effects of contamination, whereas supervised finetuning on the training set can either increase or decrease performance on test data, depending on the amount of pretraining contamination. Finally, at inference, we identify factors that modulate memorization: high sampling temperatures mitigate contamination effects, and longer solutions are exponentially more difficult to memorize than shorter ones, presenting a contrast with discriminative evaluations, where solutions are only a few tokens in length. By characterizing how generation and memorization interact, we highlight a new layer of complexity for trustworthy evaluation of AI systems.

Reinforcement Learning Improves Traversal of Hierarchical Knowledge in LLMs

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning and generalization at the expense of degrading memorized knowledge. We challenge this narrative by observing that RL-enhanced models consistently outperform their base and supervised fine-tuned (SFT) counterparts on pure knowledge recall tasks, particularly those requiring traversal of hierarchical, structured knowledge (e.g., medical codes). We hypothesize these gains stem not from newly acquired data, but from improved procedural skills in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. To support this hypothesis, we show that structured prompting, which explicitly guides SFTed models through hierarchical traversal, recovers most of the performance gap (reducing 24pp to 7pp on MedConceptsQA for DeepSeek-V3/R1). We further find that while prompting improves final-answer accuracy, RL-enhanced models retain superior ability to recall correct procedural paths on deep-retrieval tasks. Finally our layer-wise internal activation analysis reveals that while factual representations (e.g., activations for the statement "code 57.95 refers to urinary infection") maintain high cosine similarity between SFT and RL models, query representations (e.g., "what is code 57.95") diverge noticeably, indicating that RL primarily transforms how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself.

Position: Privacy Is Not Just Memorization!

The discourse on privacy risks in Large Language Models (LLMs) has disproportionately focused on verbatim memorization of training data, while a constellation of more immediate and scalable privacy threats remain underexplored. This position paper argues that the privacy landscape of LLM systems extends far beyond training data extraction, encompassing risks from data collection practices, inference-time context leakage, autonomous agent capabilities, and the democratization of surveillance through deep inference attacks. We present a comprehensive taxonomy of privacy risks across the LLM lifecycle -- from data collection through deployment -- and demonstrate through case studies how current privacy frameworks fail to address these multifaceted threats. Through a longitudinal analysis of 1,322 AI/ML privacy papers published at leading conferences over the past decade (2016--2025), we reveal that while memorization receives outsized attention in technical research, the most pressing privacy harms lie elsewhere, where current technical approaches offer little traction and viable paths forward remain unclear. We call for a fundamental shift in how the research community approaches LLM privacy, moving beyond the narrow focus of current technical solutions and embracing interdisciplinary approaches that address the sociotechnical nature of these emerging threats.

Bob's Confetti: Phonetic Memorization Attacks in Music and Video Generation

Lyrics-to-Song (LS2) generation models promise end-to-end music synthesis from text, yet their vulnerability to training data memorization remains underexplored. We introduce Adversarial PhoneTic Prompting (APT), a novel attack where lyrics are semantically altered while preserving their acoustic structure through homophonic substitutions (e.g., Eminem's famous "mom's spaghetti" $\rightarrow$ "Bob's confetti"). Despite these distortions, we uncover a powerful form of sub-lexical memorization: models like SUNO and YuE regenerate outputs strikingly similar to known training content, achieving high similarity across audio-domain metrics, including CLAP, AudioJudge, and CoverID. This vulnerability persists across multiple languages and genres. More surprisingly, we discover that phoneme-altered lyrics alone can trigger visual memorization in text-to-video models. When prompted with phonetically modified lyrics from Lose Yourself, Veo 3 reconstructs visual elements from the original music video -- including character appearance and scene composition -- despite no visual cues in the prompt. We term this phenomenon phonetic-to-visual regurgitation. Together, these findings expose a critical vulnerability in transcript-conditioned multimodal generation: phonetic prompting alone can unlock memorized audiovisual content, raising urgent questions about copyright, safety, and content provenance in modern generative systems. Example generations are available on our demo page (jrohsc.github.io/music_attack/).

Strong Membership Inference Attacks on Massive Datasets and (Moderately) Large Language Models

State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training reference models (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small-scale models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle - achieving close-to-arbitrary success - and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges have prompted an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA - one of the strongest MIAs - to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training reference models on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in three key ways: (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs; (2) their effectiveness, however, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings; and, (3) the relationship between MIA success and related privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.

Can Large Language Models Really Recognize Your Name?

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to protect sensitive user data. However, current LLM-based privacy solutions assume that these models can reliably detect personally identifiable information (PII), particularly named entities. In this paper, we challenge that assumption by revealing systematic failures in LLM-based privacy tasks. Specifically, we show that modern LLMs regularly overlook human names even in short text snippets due to ambiguous contexts, which cause the names to be misinterpreted or mishandled. We propose AMBENCH, a benchmark dataset of seemingly ambiguous human names, leveraging the name regularity bias phenomenon, embedded within concise text snippets along with benign prompt injections. Our experiments on modern LLMs tasked to detect PII as well as specialized tools show that recall of ambiguous names drops by 20--40% compared to more recognizable names. Furthermore, ambiguous human names are four times more likely to be ignored in supposedly privacy-preserving summaries generated by LLMs when benign prompt injections are present. These findings highlight the underexplored risks of relying solely on LLMs to safeguard user privacy and underscore the need for a more systematic investigation into their privacy failure modes.

A False Sense of Privacy: Evaluating Textual Data Sanitization Beyond Surface-level Privacy Leakage

Sanitizing sensitive text data typically involves removing personally identifiable information (PII) or generating synthetic data under the assumption that these methods adequately protect privacy; however, their effectiveness is often only assessed by measuring the leakage of explicit identifiers but ignoring nuanced textual markers that can lead to re-identification. We challenge the above illusion of privacy by proposing a new framework that evaluates re-identification attacks to quantify individual privacy risks upon data release. Our approach shows that seemingly innocuous auxiliary information -- such as routine social activities -- can be used to infer sensitive attributes like age or substance use history from sanitized data. For instance, we demonstrate that Azure's commercial PII removal tool fails to protect 74\% of information in the MedQA dataset. Although differential privacy mitigates these risks to some extent, it significantly reduces the utility of the sanitized text for downstream tasks. Our findings indicate that current sanitization techniques offer a \textit{false sense of privacy}, highlighting the need for more robust methods that protect against semantic-level information leakage.