On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

SoK: Watermarking for AI-Generated Content

As the outputs of generative AI (GenAI) techniques improve in quality, it becomes increasingly challenging to distinguish them from human-created content. Watermarking schemes are a promising approach to address the problem of distinguishing between AI and human-generated content. These schemes embed hidden signals within AI-generated content to enable reliable detection. While watermarking is not a silver bullet for addressing all risks associated with GenAI, it can play a crucial role in enhancing AI safety and trustworthiness by combating misinformation and deception. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of watermarking techniques for GenAI, beginning with the need for watermarking from historical and regulatory perspectives. We formalize the definitions and desired properties of watermarking schemes and examine the key objectives and threat models for existing approaches. Practical evaluation strategies are also explored, providing insights into the development of robust watermarking techniques capable of resisting various attacks. Additionally, we review recent representative works, highlight open challenges, and discuss potential directions for this emerging field. By offering a thorough understanding of watermarking in GenAI, this work aims to guide researchers in advancing watermarking methods and applications, and support policymakers in addressing the broader implications of GenAI.

Remote Timing Attacks on Efficient Language Model Inference

Scaling up language models has significantly increased their capabilities. But larger models are slower models, and so there is now an extensive body of work (e.g., speculative sampling or parallel decoding) that improves the (average case) efficiency of language model generation. But these techniques introduce data-dependent timing characteristics. We show it is possible to exploit these timing differences to mount a timing attack. By monitoring the (encrypted) network traffic between a victim user and a remote language model, we can learn information about the content of messages by noting when responses are faster or slower. With complete black-box access, on open source systems we show how it is possible to learn the topic of a user's conversation (e.g., medical advice vs. coding assistance) with 90%+ precision, and on production systems like OpenAI's ChatGPT and Anthropic's Claude we can distinguish between specific messages or infer the user's language. We further show that an active adversary can leverage a boosting attack to recover PII placed in messages (e.g., phone numbers or credit card numbers) for open source systems. We conclude with potential defenses and directions for future work.

The Last Iterate Advantage: Empirical Auditing and Principled Heuristic Analysis of Differentially Private SGD

We propose a simple heuristic privacy analysis of noisy clipped stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) in the setting where only the last iterate is released and the intermediate iterates remain hidden. Namely, our heuristic assumes a linear structure for the model. We show experimentally that our heuristic is predictive of the outcome of privacy auditing applied to various training procedures. Thus it can be used prior to training as a rough estimate of the final privacy leakage. We also probe the limitations of our heuristic by providing some artificial counterexamples where it underestimates the privacy leakage. The standard composition-based privacy analysis of DP-SGD effectively assumes that the adversary has access to all intermediate iterates, which is often unrealistic. However, this analysis remains the state of the art in practice. While our heuristic does not replace a rigorous privacy analysis, it illustrates the large gap between the best theoretical upper bounds and the privacy auditing lower bounds and sets a target for further work to improve the theoretical privacy analyses. We also empirically support our heuristic and show existing privacy auditing attacks are bounded by our heuristic analysis in both vision and language tasks.

Avoiding Generative Model Writer's Block With Embedding Nudging

Generative image models, since introduction, have become a global phenomenon. From new arts becoming possible to new vectors of abuse, many new capabilities have become available. One of the challenging issues with generative models is controlling the generation process specially to prevent specific generations classes or instances . There are several reasons why one may want to control the output of generative models, ranging from privacy and safety concerns to application limitations or user preferences To address memorization and privacy challenges, there has been considerable research dedicated to filtering prompts or filtering the outputs of these models. What all these solutions have in common is that at the end of the day they stop the model from producing anything, hence limiting the usability of the model. In this paper, we propose a method for addressing this usability issue by making it possible to steer away from unwanted concepts (when detected in model's output) and still generating outputs. In particular we focus on the latent diffusion image generative models and how one can prevent them to generate particular images while generating similar images with limited overhead. We focus on mitigating issues like image memorization, demonstrating our technique's effectiveness through qualitative and quantitative evaluations. Our method successfully prevents the generation of memorized training images while maintaining comparable image quality and relevance to the unmodified model.

Phantom: General Trigger Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context

In this report, we present the latest model of the Gemini family, Gemini 1.5 Pro, a highly compute-efficient multimodal mixture-of-experts model capable of recalling and reasoning over fine-grained information from millions of tokens of context, including multiple long documents and hours of video and audio. Gemini 1.5 Pro achieves near-perfect recall on long-context retrieval tasks across modalities, improves the state-of-the-art in long-document QA, long-video QA and long-context ASR, and matches or surpasses Gemini 1.0 Ultra's state-of-the-art performance across a broad set of benchmarks. Studying the limits of Gemini 1.5 Pro's long-context ability, we find continued improvement in next-token prediction and near-perfect retrieval (>99%) up to at least 10M tokens, a generational leap over existing models such as Claude 2.1 (200k) and GPT-4 Turbo (128k). Finally, we highlight surprising new capabilities of large language models at the frontier; when given a grammar manual for Kalamang, a language with fewer than 200 speakers worldwide, the model learns to translate English to Kalamang at a similar level to a person who learned from the same content.

Query-Based Adversarial Prompt Generation

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Private Fine-tuning of Large Language Models with Zeroth-order Optimization

Fine-tuning large pretrained models on private datasets may run the risk of violating privacy. Differential privacy is a framework for mitigating privacy risks by enforcing algorithmic stability. DP-SGD enables training models with private data in a privacy-preserving manner, but raises new obstacles in the form of performance loss and significant engineering challenges. We introduce DP-ZO, a new method for fine-tuning large language models that preserves the privacy of training data by privatizing zeroth-order optimization. A key insight into the design of our method is that the direction of the gradient in SPSA, the zeroth-order algorithm we use, is always random and the only information that depends on private data is the step size, i.e., a scalar. Therefore, we only need to privatize the scalar step size, which is memory-efficient. DP-ZO, which can be instantiated with either Laplace or Gaussian noise, provides a strong privacy-utility trade-off across different tasks, and model sizes, under conservative privacy budgets. One noteworthy result is that DP-ZO exhibits just $1.86\%$ performance degradation due to privacy at $(1,10^{-5})$-DP when fine-tuning OPT-66B on 1000 training samples from SQuAD.

Gemini: A Family of Highly Capable Multimodal Models

This report introduces a new family of multimodal models, Gemini, that exhibit remarkable capabilities across image, audio, video, and text understanding. The Gemini family consists of Ultra, Pro, and Nano sizes, suitable for applications ranging from complex reasoning tasks to on-device memory-constrained use-cases. Evaluation on a broad range of benchmarks shows that our most-capable Gemini Ultra model advances the state of the art in 30 of 32 of these benchmarks - notably being the first model to achieve human-expert performance on the well-studied exam benchmark MMLU, and improving the state of the art in every one of the 20 multimodal benchmarks we examined. We believe that the new capabilities of Gemini models in cross-modal reasoning and language understanding will enable a wide variety of use cases and we discuss our approach toward deploying them responsibly to users.