Abstract:Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.
Abstract:The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit
Abstract:Multimodal foundation models (MMFMs) play a crucial role in various applications, including autonomous driving, healthcare, and virtual assistants. However, several studies have revealed vulnerabilities in these models, such as generating unsafe content by text-to-image models. Existing benchmarks on multimodal models either predominantly assess the helpfulness of these models, or only focus on limited perspectives such as fairness and privacy. In this paper, we present the first unified platform, MMDT (Multimodal DecodingTrust), designed to provide a comprehensive safety and trustworthiness evaluation for MMFMs. Our platform assesses models from multiple perspectives, including safety, hallucination, fairness/bias, privacy, adversarial robustness, and out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization. We have designed various evaluation scenarios and red teaming algorithms under different tasks for each perspective to generate challenging data, forming a high-quality benchmark. We evaluate a range of multimodal models using MMDT, and our findings reveal a series of vulnerabilities and areas for improvement across these perspectives. This work introduces the first comprehensive and unique safety and trustworthiness evaluation platform for MMFMs, paving the way for developing safer and more reliable MMFMs and systems. Our platform and benchmark are available at https://mmdecodingtrust.github.io/.
Abstract:Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment
Abstract:Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, RLHF is susceptible to reward hacking, where the agent exploits flaws in the reward function rather than learning the intended behavior, thus degrading alignment. While reward shaping helps stabilize RLHF and partially mitigate reward hacking, a systematic investigation into shaping techniques and their underlying principles remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we present a comprehensive study of the prevalent reward shaping methods. Our analysis suggests three key design principles: (1) RL reward is ideally bounded, (2) RL benefits from rapid initial growth followed by gradual convergence, and (3) RL reward is best formulated as a function of centered reward. Guided by these insights, we propose Preference As Reward (PAR), a novel approach that leverages the latent preferences embedded within the reward model itself as the signal for reinforcement learning. We evaluated PAR on two base models, Gemma2-2B and Llama3-8B, using two datasets, Ultrafeedback-Binarized and HH-RLHF. Experimental results demonstrate PAR's superior performance over other reward shaping methods. On the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark, PAR achieves a win rate at least 5 percentage points higher than competing approaches. Furthermore, PAR exhibits remarkable data efficiency, requiring only a single reference reward for optimal performance, and maintains robustness against reward hacking even after two full epochs of training. Code is available at https://github.com/PorUna-byte/PAR.
Abstract:How can we verify whether copyrighted content was used to train a large vision-language model (VLM) without direct access to its training data? Motivated by the hypothesis that a VLM is able to recognize images from its training corpus, we propose DIS-CO, a novel approach to infer the inclusion of copyrighted content during the model's development. By repeatedly querying a VLM with specific frames from targeted copyrighted material, DIS-CO extracts the content's identity through free-form text completions. To assess its effectiveness, we introduce MovieTection, a benchmark comprising 14,000 frames paired with detailed captions, drawn from films released both before and after a model's training cutoff. Our results show that DIS-CO significantly improves detection performance, nearly doubling the average AUC of the best prior method on models with logits available. Our findings also highlight a broader concern: all tested models appear to have been exposed to some extent to copyrighted content. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/avduarte333/DIS-CO
Abstract:Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size $N$, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty
Abstract:The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.
Abstract:Recent studies have discovered that LLMs have serious privacy leakage concerns, where an LLM may be fooled into outputting private information under carefully crafted adversarial prompts. These risks include leaking system prompts, personally identifiable information, training data, and model parameters. Most existing red-teaming approaches for privacy leakage rely on humans to craft the adversarial prompts. A few automated methods are proposed for system prompt extraction, but they cannot be applied to more severe risks (e.g., training data extraction) and have limited effectiveness even for system prompt extraction. In this paper, we propose PrivAgent, a novel black-box red-teaming framework for LLM privacy leakage. We formulate different risks as a search problem with a unified attack goal. Our framework trains an open-source LLM through reinforcement learning as the attack agent to generate adversarial prompts for different target models under different risks. We propose a novel reward function to provide effective and fine-grained rewards for the attack agent. Finally, we introduce customizations to better fit our general framework to system prompt extraction and training data extraction. Through extensive evaluations, we first show that PrivAgent outperforms existing automated methods in system prompt leakage against six popular LLMs. Notably, our approach achieves a 100% success rate in extracting system prompts from real-world applications in OpenAI's GPT Store. We also show PrivAgent's effectiveness in extracting training data from an open-source LLM with a success rate of 5.9%. We further demonstrate PrivAgent's effectiveness in evading the existing guardrail defense and its helpfulness in enabling better safety alignment. Finally, we validate our customized designs through a detailed ablation study. We release our code here https://github.com/rucnyz/RedAgent.
Abstract:The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, GPTID, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0\%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.