Defeating Prompt Injections by Design

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks when handling untrusted data. In this paper we propose CaMeL, a robust defense that creates a protective system layer around the LLM, securing it even when underlying models may be susceptible to attacks. To operate, CaMeL explicitly extracts the control and data flows from the (trusted) query; therefore, the untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow. To further improve security, CaMeL relies on a notion of a capability to prevent the exfiltration of private data over unauthorized data flows. We demonstrate effectiveness of CaMeL by solving $67\%$ of tasks with provable security in AgentDojo [NeurIPS 2024], a recent agentic security benchmark.

Interpreting the Repeated Token Phenomenon in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities, often fail to accurately repeat a single word when prompted to, and instead output unrelated text. This unexplained failure mode represents a vulnerability, allowing even end-users to diverge models away from their intended behavior. We aim to explain the causes for this phenomenon and link it to the concept of ``attention sinks'', an emergent LLM behavior crucial for fluency, in which the initial token receives disproportionately high attention scores. Our investigation identifies the neural circuit responsible for attention sinks and shows how long repetitions disrupt this circuit. We extend this finding to other non-repeating sequences that exhibit similar circuit disruptions. To address this, we propose a targeted patch that effectively resolves the issue without negatively impacting the model's overall performance. This study provides a mechanistic explanation for an LLM vulnerability, demonstrating how interpretability can diagnose and address issues, and offering insights that pave the way for more secure and reliable models.

Trusted Machine Learning Models Unlock Private Inference for Problems Currently Infeasible with Cryptography

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Machine Unlearning Doesn't Do What You Think: Lessons for Generative AI Policy, Research, and Practice

We articulate fundamental mismatches between technical methods for machine unlearning in Generative AI, and documented aspirations for broader impact that these methods could have for law and policy. These aspirations are both numerous and varied, motivated by issues that pertain to privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of targeted information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or in-copyright expression of Spiderman that was included in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for thinking rigorously about these challenges, which enables us to be clear about why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact. We aim for conceptual clarity and to encourage more thoughtful communication among machine learning (ML), law, and policy experts who seek to develop and apply technical methods for compliance with policy objectives.

Hardware and Software Platform Inference

It is now a common business practice to buy access to large language model (LLM) inference rather than self-host, because of significant upfront hardware infrastructure and energy costs. However, as a buyer, there is no mechanism to verify the authenticity of the advertised service including the serving hardware platform, e.g. that it is actually being served using an NVIDIA H100. Furthermore, there are reports suggesting that model providers may deliver models that differ slightly from the advertised ones, often to make them run on less expensive hardware. That way, a client pays premium for a capable model access on more expensive hardware, yet ends up being served by a (potentially less capable) cheaper model on cheaper hardware. In this paper we introduce \textit{\textbf{hardware and software platform inference (HSPI)}} -- a method for identifying the underlying \GPU{} architecture and software stack of a (black-box) machine learning model solely based on its input-output behavior. Our method leverages the inherent differences of various \GPU{} architectures and compilers to distinguish between different \GPU{} types and software stacks. By analyzing the numerical patterns in the model's outputs, we propose a classification framework capable of accurately identifying the \GPU{} used for model inference as well as the underlying software configuration. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of inferring \GPU{} type from black-box models. We evaluate HSPI against models served on different real hardware and find that in a white-box setting we can distinguish between different \GPU{}s with between $83.9\%$ and $100\%$ accuracy. Even in a black-box setting we are able to achieve results that are up to three times higher than random guess accuracy.

Stealing User Prompts from Mixture of Experts

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using $O({VM}^2)$ queries (with vocabulary size $V$ and prompt length $M$) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

Measuring memorization through probabilistic discoverable extraction

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to memorizing training data, raising concerns due to the potential extraction of sensitive information. Current methods to measure memorization rates of LLMs, primarily discoverable extraction (Carlini et al., 2022), rely on single-sequence greedy sampling, potentially underestimating the true extent of memorization. This paper introduces a probabilistic relaxation of discoverable extraction that quantifies the probability of extracting a target sequence within a set of generated samples, considering various sampling schemes and multiple attempts. This approach addresses the limitations of reporting memorization rates through discoverable extraction by accounting for the probabilistic nature of LLMs and user interaction patterns. Our experiments demonstrate that this probabilistic measure can reveal cases of higher memorization rates compared to rates found through discoverable extraction. We further investigate the impact of different sampling schemes on extractability, providing a more comprehensive and realistic assessment of LLM memorization and its associated risks. Our contributions include a new probabilistic memorization definition, empirical evidence of its effectiveness, and a thorough evaluation across different models, sizes, sampling schemes, and training data repetitions.

Operationalizing Contextual Integrity in Privacy-Conscious Assistants

Advanced AI assistants combine frontier LLMs and tool access to autonomously perform complex tasks on behalf of users. While the helpfulness of such assistants can increase dramatically with access to user information including emails and documents, this raises privacy concerns about assistants sharing inappropriate information with third parties without user supervision. To steer information-sharing assistants to behave in accordance with privacy expectations, we propose to operationalize $\textit{contextual integrity}$ (CI), a framework that equates privacy with the appropriate flow of information in a given context. In particular, we design and evaluate a number of strategies to steer assistants' information-sharing actions to be CI compliant. Our evaluation is based on a novel form filling benchmark composed of synthetic data and human annotations, and it reveals that prompting frontier LLMs to perform CI-based reasoning yields strong results.

A False Sense of Safety: Unsafe Information Leakage in 'Safe' AI Responses

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks$\unicode{x2013}$methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

UnUnlearning: Unlearning is not sufficient for content regulation in advanced generative AI

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.