Abstract:We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 46x slowdown and high transferability of the attack across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third party applications operating reasoning models.
Abstract:Judging the safety of an action, whether taken by a human or a system, must take into account the context in which the action takes place. For example, deleting an email from a user's mailbox may or may not be appropriate depending on the email's content, the user's goals, or even available space. Systems today that make these judgements -- providing security against harmful or inappropriate actions -- rely on manually-crafted policies or user confirmation for each relevant context. With the upcoming deployment of systems like generalist agents, we argue that we must rethink security designs to adapt to the scale of contexts and capabilities of these systems. As a first step, this paper explores contextual security in the domain of agents and proposes contextual security for agents (Conseca), a framework to generate just-in-time, contextual, and human-verifiable security policies.
Abstract:We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.
Abstract:Advances in generative AI point towards a new era of personalized applications that perform diverse tasks on behalf of users. While general AI assistants have yet to fully emerge, their potential to share personal data raises significant privacy challenges. This paper introduces CI-Bench, a comprehensive synthetic benchmark for evaluating the ability of AI assistants to protect personal information during model inference. Leveraging the Contextual Integrity framework, our benchmark enables systematic assessment of information flow across important context dimensions, including roles, information types, and transmission principles. We present a novel, scalable, multi-step synthetic data pipeline for generating natural communications, including dialogues and emails. Unlike previous work with smaller, narrowly focused evaluations, we present a novel, scalable, multi-step data pipeline that synthetically generates natural communications, including dialogues and emails, which we use to generate 44 thousand test samples across eight domains. Additionally, we formulate and evaluate a naive AI assistant to demonstrate the need for further study and careful training towards personal assistant tasks. We envision CI-Bench as a valuable tool for guiding future language model development, deployment, system design, and dataset construction, ultimately contributing to the development of AI assistants that align with users' privacy expectations.