Diversity-Rewarded CFG Distillation

Generative models are transforming creative domains such as music generation, with inference-time strategies like Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG) playing a crucial role. However, CFG doubles inference cost while limiting originality and diversity across generated contents. In this paper, we introduce diversity-rewarded CFG distillation, a novel finetuning procedure that distills the strengths of CFG while addressing its limitations. Our approach optimises two training objectives: (1) a distillation objective, encouraging the model alone (without CFG) to imitate the CFG-augmented predictions, and (2) an RL objective with a diversity reward, promoting the generation of diverse outputs for a given prompt. By finetuning, we learn model weights with the ability to generate high-quality and diverse outputs, without any inference overhead. This also unlocks the potential of weight-based model merging strategies: by interpolating between the weights of two models (the first focusing on quality, the second on diversity), we can control the quality-diversity trade-off at deployment time, and even further boost performance. We conduct extensive experiments on the MusicLM (Agostinelli et al., 2023) text-to-music generative model, where our approach surpasses CFG in terms of quality-diversity Pareto optimality. According to human evaluators, our finetuned-then-merged model generates samples with higher quality-diversity than the base model augmented with CFG. Explore our generations at https://google-research.github.io/seanet/musiclm/diverse_music/.

Gemma 2: Improving Open Language Models at a Practical Size

In this work, we introduce Gemma 2, a new addition to the Gemma family of lightweight, state-of-the-art open models, ranging in scale from 2 billion to 27 billion parameters. In this new version, we apply several known technical modifications to the Transformer architecture, such as interleaving local-global attentions (Beltagy et al., 2020a) and group-query attention (Ainslie et al., 2023). We also train the 2B and 9B models with knowledge distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) instead of next token prediction. The resulting models deliver the best performance for their size, and even offer competitive alternatives to models that are 2-3 times bigger. We release all our models to the community.

BOND: Aligning LLMs with Best-of-N Distillation

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a key driver of quality and safety in state-of-the-art large language models. Yet, a surprisingly simple and strong inference-time strategy is Best-of-N sampling that selects the best generation among N candidates. In this paper, we propose Best-of-N Distillation (BOND), a novel RLHF algorithm that seeks to emulate Best-of-N but without its significant computational overhead at inference time. Specifically, BOND is a distribution matching algorithm that forces the distribution of generations from the policy to get closer to the Best-of-N distribution. We use the Jeffreys divergence (a linear combination of forward and backward KL) to balance between mode-covering and mode-seeking behavior, and derive an iterative formulation that utilizes a moving anchor for efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and several design choices through experiments on abstractive summarization and Gemma models. Aligning Gemma policies with BOND outperforms other RLHF algorithms by improving results on several benchmarks.

Learning Correlated Equilibria in Mean-Field Games

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game theoretic analysis becomes effectively infeasible beyond a low number of players. Recent approaches have gone around this limitation by instead considering Mean-Field games, an approximation of anonymous $N$-player games, where the number of players is infinite and the population's state distribution, instead of every individual player's state, is the object of interest. The practical computability of Mean-Field Nash equilibria, the most studied Mean-Field equilibrium to date, however, typically depends on beneficial non-generic structural properties such as monotonicity or contraction properties, which are required for known algorithms to converge. In this work, we provide an alternative route for studying Mean-Field games, by developing the concepts of Mean-Field correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria. We show that they can be efficiently learnt in \emph{all games}, without requiring any additional assumption on the structure of the game, using three classical algorithms. Furthermore, we establish correspondences between our notions and those already present in the literature, derive optimality bounds for the Mean-Field - $N$-player transition, and empirically demonstrate the convergence of these algorithms on simple games.

Learning Mean Field Games: A Survey

Non-cooperative and cooperative games with a very large number of players have many applications but remain generally intractable when the number of players increases. Introduced by Lasry and Lions, and Huang, Caines and Malham\'e, Mean Field Games (MFGs) rely on a mean-field approximation to allow the number of players to grow to infinity. Traditional methods for solving these games generally rely on solving partial or stochastic differential equations with a full knowledge of the model. Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has appeared promising to solve complex problems. By combining MFGs and RL, we hope to solve games at a very large scale both in terms of population size and environment complexity. In this survey, we review the quickly growing recent literature on RL methods to learn Nash equilibria in MFGs. We first identify the most common settings (static, stationary, and evolutive). We then present a general framework for classical iterative methods (based on best-response computation or policy evaluation) to solve MFGs in an exact way. Building on these algorithms and the connection with Markov Decision Processes, we explain how RL can be used to learn MFG solutions in a model-free way. Last, we present numerical illustrations on a benchmark problem, and conclude with some perspectives.

Scalable Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for Mean Field Games

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is non-trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g. neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

Generalization in Mean Field Games by Learning Master Policies

Mean Field Games (MFGs) can potentially scale multi-agent systems to extremely large populations of agents. Yet, most of the literature assumes a single initial distribution for the agents, which limits the practical applications of MFGs. Machine Learning has the potential to solve a wider diversity of MFG problems thanks to generalizations capacities. We study how to leverage these generalization properties to learn policies enabling a typical agent to behave optimally against any population distribution. In reference to the Master equation in MFGs, we coin the term ``Master policies'' to describe them and we prove that a single Master policy provides a Nash equilibrium, whatever the initial distribution. We propose a method to learn such Master policies. Our approach relies on three ingredients: adding the current population distribution as part of the observation, approximating Master policies with neural networks, and training via Reinforcement Learning and Fictitious Play. We illustrate on numerical examples not only the efficiency of the learned Master policy but also its generalization capabilities beyond the distributions used for training.

Concave Utility Reinforcement Learning: the Mean-field Game viewpoint

Concave Utility Reinforcement Learning (CURL) extends RL from linear to concave utilities in the occupancy measure induced by the agent's policy. This encompasses not only RL but also imitation learning and exploration, among others. Yet, this more general paradigm invalidates the classical Bellman equations, and calls for new algorithms. Mean-field Games (MFGs) are a continuous approximation of many-agent RL. They consider the limit case of a continuous distribution of identical agents, anonymous with symmetric interests, and reduce the problem to the study of a single representative agent in interaction with the full population. Our core contribution consists in showing that CURL is a subclass of MFGs. We think this important to bridge together both communities. It also allows to shed light on aspects of both fields: we show the equivalence between concavity in CURL and monotonicity in the associated MFG, between optimality conditions in CURL and Nash equilibrium in MFG, or that Fictitious Play (FP) for this class of MFGs is simply Frank-Wolfe, bringing the first convergence rate for discrete-time FP for MFGs. We also experimentally demonstrate that, using algorithms recently introduced for solving MFGs, we can address the CURL problem more efficiently.

Mean Field Games Flock! The Reinforcement Learning Way

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock, which is a natural behavior observed in large populations of animals. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock's average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.

Scaling up Mean Field Games with Online Mirror Descent

We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent (OMD). We show that continuous-time OMD provably converges to a Nash equilibrium under a natural and well-motivated set of monotonicity assumptions. This theoretical result nicely extends to multi-population games and to settings involving common noise. A thorough experimental investigation on various single and multi-population MFGs shows that OMD outperforms traditional algorithms such as Fictitious Play (FP). We empirically show that OMD scales up and converges significantly faster than FP by solving, for the first time to our knowledge, examples of MFGs with hundreds of billions states. This study establishes the state-of-the-art for learning in large-scale multi-agent and multi-population games.