University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract:In this paper, we propose AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box jailbreak method that can automatically discover as many jailbreak strategies as possible from scratch, without any human intervention or predefined scopes (e.g., specified candidate strategies), and use them for red-teaming. As a result, AutoDAN-Turbo can significantly outperform baseline methods, achieving a 74.3% higher average attack success rate on public benchmarks. Notably, AutoDAN-Turbo achieves an 88.5 attack success rate on GPT-4-1106-turbo. In addition, AutoDAN-Turbo is a unified framework that can incorporate existing human-designed jailbreak strategies in a plug-and-play manner. By integrating human-designed strategies, AutoDAN-Turbo can even achieve a higher attack success rate of 93.4 on GPT-4-1106-turbo.
Abstract:Optimization methods are widely employed in deep learning to identify and mitigate undesired model responses. While gradient-based techniques have proven effective for image models, their application to language models is hindered by the discrete nature of the input space. This study introduces a novel optimization approach, termed the \emph{functional homotopy} method, which leverages the functional duality between model training and input generation. By constructing a series of easy-to-hard optimization problems, we iteratively solve these problems using principles derived from established homotopy methods. We apply this approach to jailbreak attack synthesis for large language models (LLMs), achieving a $20\%-30\%$ improvement in success rate over existing methods in circumventing established safe open-source models such as Llama-2 and Llama-3.
Abstract:Privacy policies are crucial in the online ecosystem, defining how services handle user data and adhere to regulations such as GDPR and CCPA. However, their complexity and frequent updates often make them difficult for stakeholders to understand and analyze. Current automated analysis methods, which utilize natural language processing, have limitations. They typically focus on individual tasks and fail to capture the full context of the policies. We propose PolicyLR, a new paradigm that offers a comprehensive machine-readable representation of privacy policies, serving as an all-in-one solution for multiple downstream tasks. PolicyLR converts privacy policies into a machine-readable format using valuations of atomic formulae, allowing for formal definitions of tasks like compliance and consistency. We have developed a compiler that transforms unstructured policy text into this format using off-the-shelf Large Language Models (LLMs). This compiler breaks down the transformation task into a two-stage translation and entailment procedure. This procedure considers the full context of the privacy policy to infer a complex formula, where each formula consists of simpler atomic formulae. The advantage of this model is that PolicyLR is interpretable by design and grounded in segments of the privacy policy. We evaluated the compiler using ToS;DR, a community-annotated privacy policy entailment dataset. Utilizing open-source LLMs, our compiler achieves precision and recall values of 0.91 and 0.88, respectively. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of PolicyLR in three privacy tasks: Policy Compliance, Inconsistency Detection, and Privacy Comparison Shopping.
Abstract:In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), given their remarkable text understanding and generation abilities, there is an unprecedented opportunity to develop new, LLM-based methods for trustworthy medical knowledge synthesis, extraction and summarization. This paper focuses on the problem of Pharmacovigilance (PhV), where the significance and challenges lie in identifying Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) from diverse text sources, such as medical literature, clinical notes, and drug labels. Unfortunately, this task is hindered by factors including variations in the terminologies of drugs and outcomes, and ADE descriptions often being buried in large amounts of narrative text. We present MALADE, the first effective collaborative multi-agent system powered by LLM with Retrieval Augmented Generation for ADE extraction from drug label data. This technique involves augmenting a query to an LLM with relevant information extracted from text resources, and instructing the LLM to compose a response consistent with the augmented data. MALADE is a general LLM-agnostic architecture, and its unique capabilities are: (1) leveraging a variety of external sources, such as medical literature, drug labels, and FDA tools (e.g., OpenFDA drug information API), (2) extracting drug-outcome association in a structured format along with the strength of the association, and (3) providing explanations for established associations. Instantiated with GPT-4 Turbo or GPT-4o, and FDA drug label data, MALADE demonstrates its efficacy with an Area Under ROC Curve of 0.90 against the OMOP Ground Truth table of ADEs. Our implementation leverages the Langroid multi-agent LLM framework and can be found at https://github.com/jihyechoi77/malade.
Abstract:Mechanistic interpretability aims to reverse engineer the computation performed by a neural network in terms of its internal components. Although there is a growing body of research on mechanistic interpretation of neural networks, the notion of a mechanistic interpretation itself is often ad-hoc. Inspired by the notion of abstract interpretation from the program analysis literature that aims to develop approximate semantics for programs, we give a set of axioms that formally characterize a mechanistic interpretation as a description that approximately captures the semantics of the neural network under analysis in a compositional manner. We use these axioms to guide the mechanistic interpretability analysis of a Transformer-based model trained to solve the well-known 2-SAT problem. We are able to reverse engineer the algorithm learned by the model -- the model first parses the input formulas and then evaluates their satisfiability via enumeration of different possible valuations of the Boolean input variables. We also present evidence to support that the mechanistic interpretation of the analyzed model indeed satisfies the stated axioms.
Abstract:Large Language Model (LLM) systems are inherently compositional, with individual LLM serving as the core foundation with additional layers of objects such as plugins, sandbox, and so on. Along with the great potential, there are also increasing concerns over the security of such probabilistic intelligent systems. However, existing studies on LLM security often focus on individual LLM, but without examining the ecosystem through the lens of LLM systems with other objects (e.g., Frontend, Webtool, Sandbox, and so on). In this paper, we systematically analyze the security of LLM systems, instead of focusing on the individual LLMs. To do so, we build on top of the information flow and formulate the security of LLM systems as constraints on the alignment of the information flow within LLM and between LLM and other objects. Based on this construction and the unique probabilistic nature of LLM, the attack surface of the LLM system can be decomposed into three key components: (1) multi-layer security analysis, (2) analysis of the existence of constraints, and (3) analysis of the robustness of these constraints. To ground this new attack surface, we propose a multi-layer and multi-step approach and apply it to the state-of-art LLM system, OpenAI GPT4. Our investigation exposes several security issues, not just within the LLM model itself but also in its integration with other components. We found that although the OpenAI GPT4 has designed numerous safety constraints to improve its safety features, these safety constraints are still vulnerable to attackers. To further demonstrate the real-world threats of our discovered vulnerabilities, we construct an end-to-end attack where an adversary can illicitly acquire the user's chat history, all without the need to manipulate the user's input or gain direct access to OpenAI GPT4. Our demo is in the link: https://fzwark.github.io/LLM-System-Attack-Demo/
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.
Abstract:Large Language Models' success on text generation has also made them better at code generation and coding tasks. While a lot of work has demonstrated their remarkable performance on tasks such as code completion and editing, it is still unclear as to why. We help bridge this gap by exploring to what degree auto-regressive models understand the logical constructs of the underlying programs. We propose Counterfactual Analysis for Programming Concept Predicates (CACP) as a counterfactual testing framework to evaluate whether Large Code Models understand programming concepts. With only black-box access to the model, we use CACP to evaluate ten popular Large Code Models for four different programming concepts. Our findings suggest that current models lack understanding of concepts such as data flow and control flow.
Abstract:Recently, diffusion models (DMs) have become the state-of-the-art method for image synthesis. Editing models based on DMs, known for their high fidelity and precision, have inadvertently introduced new challenges related to image copyright infringement and malicious editing. Our work is the first to formalize and address this issue. After assessing and attempting to enhance traditional image watermarking techniques, we recognize their limitations in this emerging context. In response, we develop a novel technique, RIW (Robust Invisible Watermarking), to embed invisible watermarks leveraging adversarial example techniques. Our technique ensures a high extraction accuracy of $96\%$ for the invisible watermark after editing, compared to the $0\%$ offered by conventional methods. We provide access to our code at https://github.com/BennyTMT/RIW.
Abstract:We construct the first provable watermarking scheme for language models with public detectability or verifiability: we use a private key for watermarking and a public key for watermark detection. Our protocol is the first watermarking scheme that does not embed a statistical signal in generated text. Rather, we directly embed a publicly-verifiable cryptographic signature using a form of rejection sampling. We show that our construction meets strong formal security guarantees and preserves many desirable properties found in schemes in the private-key watermarking setting. In particular, our watermarking scheme retains distortion-freeness and model agnosticity. We implement our scheme and make empirical measurements over open models in the 7B parameter range. Our experiments suggest that our watermarking scheme meets our formal claims while preserving text quality.