Abstract:To enhance large language models (LLMs) for chemistry problem solving, several LLM-based agents augmented with tools have been proposed, such as ChemCrow and Coscientist. However, their evaluations are narrow in scope, leaving a large gap in understanding the benefits of tools across diverse chemistry tasks. To bridge this gap, we develop ChemAgent, an enhanced chemistry agent over ChemCrow, and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its performance on both specialized chemistry tasks and general chemistry questions. Surprisingly, ChemAgent does not consistently outperform its base LLMs without tools. Our error analysis with a chemistry expert suggests that: For specialized chemistry tasks, such as synthesis prediction, we should augment agents with specialized tools; however, for general chemistry questions like those in exams, agents' ability to reason correctly with chemistry knowledge matters more, and tool augmentation does not always help.
Abstract:Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~\citep{liao2024amplegcg}, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.
Abstract:Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .
Abstract:In this paper, we propose AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box jailbreak method that can automatically discover as many jailbreak strategies as possible from scratch, without any human intervention or predefined scopes (e.g., specified candidate strategies), and use them for red-teaming. As a result, AutoDAN-Turbo can significantly outperform baseline methods, achieving a 74.3% higher average attack success rate on public benchmarks. Notably, AutoDAN-Turbo achieves an 88.5 attack success rate on GPT-4-1106-turbo. In addition, AutoDAN-Turbo is a unified framework that can incorporate existing human-designed jailbreak strategies in a plug-and-play manner. By integrating human-designed strategies, AutoDAN-Turbo can even achieve a higher attack success rate of 93.4 on GPT-4-1106-turbo.
Abstract:Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are transforming the capabilities of graphical user interface (GUI) agents, facilitating their transition from controlled simulations to complex, real-world applications across various platforms. However, the effectiveness of these agents hinges on the robustness of their grounding capability. Current GUI agents predominantly utilize text-based representations such as HTML or accessibility trees, which, despite their utility, often introduce noise, incompleteness, and increased computational overhead. In this paper, we advocate a human-like embodiment for GUI agents that perceive the environment entirely visually and directly take pixel-level operations on the GUI. The key is visual grounding models that can accurately map diverse referring expressions of GUI elements to their coordinates on the GUI across different platforms. We show that a simple recipe, which includes web-based synthetic data and slight adaptation of the LLaVA architecture, is surprisingly effective for training such visual grounding models. We collect the largest dataset for GUI visual grounding so far, containing 10M GUI elements and their referring expressions over 1.3M screenshots, and use it to train UGround, a strong universal visual grounding model for GUI agents. Empirical results on six benchmarks spanning three categories (grounding, offline agent, and online agent) show that 1) UGround substantially outperforms existing visual grounding models for GUI agents, by up to 20% absolute, and 2) agents with UGround outperform state-of-the-art agents, despite the fact that existing agents use additional text-based input while ours only uses visual perception. These results provide strong support for the feasibility and promises of GUI agents that navigate the digital world as humans do.
Abstract:The advancements of language language models (LLMs) have piqued growing interest in developing LLM-based language agents to automate scientific discovery end-to-end, which has sparked both excitement and skepticism about the true capabilities of such agents. In this work, we argue that for an agent to fully automate scientific discovery, it must be able to complete all essential tasks in the workflow. Thus, we call for rigorous assessment of agents on individual tasks in a scientific workflow before making bold claims on end-to-end automation. To this end, we present ScienceAgentBench, a new benchmark for evaluating language agents for data-driven scientific discovery. To ensure the scientific authenticity and real-world relevance of our benchmark, we extract 102 tasks from 44 peer-reviewed publications in four disciplines and engage nine subject matter experts to validate them. We unify the target output for every task to a self-contained Python program file and employ an array of evaluation metrics to examine the generated programs, execution results, and costs. Each task goes through multiple rounds of manual validation by annotators and subject matter experts to ensure its annotation quality and scientific plausibility. We also propose two effective strategies to mitigate data contamination concerns. Using our benchmark, we evaluate five open-weight and proprietary LLMs, each with three frameworks: direct prompting, OpenHands, and self-debug. Given three attempts for each task, the best-performing agent can only solve 32.4% of the tasks independently and 34.3% with expert-provided knowledge. These results underscore the limited capacities of current language agents in generating code for data-driven discovery, let alone end-to-end automation for scientific research.
Abstract:Generalist web agents have evolved rapidly and demonstrated remarkable potential. However, there are unprecedented safety risks associated with these them, which are nearly unexplored so far. In this work, we aim to narrow this gap by conducting the first study on the privacy risks of generalist web agents in adversarial environments. First, we present a threat model that discusses the adversarial targets, constraints, and attack scenarios. Particularly, we consider two types of adversarial targets: stealing users' specific personally identifiable information (PII) or stealing the entire user request. To achieve these objectives, we propose a novel attack method, termed Environmental Injection Attack (EIA). This attack injects malicious content designed to adapt well to different environments where the agents operate, causing them to perform unintended actions. This work instantiates EIA specifically for the privacy scenario. It inserts malicious web elements alongside persuasive instructions that mislead web agents into leaking private information, and can further leverage CSS and JavaScript features to remain stealthy. We collect 177 actions steps that involve diverse PII categories on realistic websites from the Mind2Web dataset, and conduct extensive experiments using one of the most capable generalist web agent frameworks to date, SeeAct. The results demonstrate that EIA achieves up to 70% ASR in stealing users' specific PII. Stealing full user requests is more challenging, but a relaxed version of EIA can still achieve 16% ASR. Despite these concerning results, it is important to note that the attack can still be detectable through careful human inspection, highlighting a trade-off between high autonomy and security. This leads to our detailed discussion on the efficacy of EIA under different levels of human supervision as well as implications on defenses for generalist web agents.
Abstract:This paper introduces MMMU-Pro, a robust version of the Massive Multi-discipline Multimodal Understanding and Reasoning (MMMU) benchmark. MMMU-Pro rigorously assesses multimodal models' true understanding and reasoning capabilities through a three-step process based on MMMU: (1) filtering out questions answerable by text-only models, (2) augmenting candidate options, and (3) introducing a vision-only input setting where questions are embedded within images. This setting challenges AI to truly "see" and "read" simultaneously, testing a fundamental human cognitive skill of seamlessly integrating visual and textual information. Results show that model performance is substantially lower on MMMU-Pro than on MMMU, ranging from 16.8% to 26.9% across models. We explore the impact of OCR prompts and Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning, finding that OCR prompts have minimal effect while CoT generally improves performance. MMMU-Pro provides a more rigorous evaluation tool, closely mimicking real-world scenarios and offering valuable directions for future research in multimodal AI.
Abstract:We study whether transformers can learn to implicitly reason over parametric knowledge, a skill that even the most capable language models struggle with. Focusing on two representative reasoning types, composition and comparison, we consistently find that transformers can learn implicit reasoning, but only through grokking, i.e., extended training far beyond overfitting. The levels of generalization also vary across reasoning types: when faced with out-of-distribution examples, transformers fail to systematically generalize for composition but succeed for comparison. We delve into the model's internals throughout training, conducting analytical experiments that reveal: 1) the mechanism behind grokking, such as the formation of the generalizing circuit and its relation to the relative efficiency of generalizing and memorizing circuits, and 2) the connection between systematicity and the configuration of the generalizing circuit. Our findings guide data and training setup to better induce implicit reasoning and suggest potential improvements to the transformer architecture, such as encouraging cross-layer knowledge sharing. Furthermore, we demonstrate that for a challenging reasoning task with a large search space, GPT-4-Turbo and Gemini-1.5-Pro based on non-parametric memory fail badly regardless of prompting styles or retrieval augmentation, while a fully grokked transformer can achieve near-perfect accuracy, showcasing the power of parametric memory for complex reasoning.
Abstract:As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~\citep{zou2023universal} proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.