Quantifying Knowledge Distillation Using Partial Information Decomposition

Knowledge distillation provides an effective method for deploying complex machine learning models in resource-constrained environments. It typically involves training a smaller student model to emulate either the probabilistic outputs or the internal feature representations of a larger teacher model. By doing so, the student model often achieves substantially better performance on a downstream task compared to when it is trained independently. Nevertheless, the teacher's internal representations can also encode noise or additional information that may not be relevant to the downstream task. This observation motivates our primary question: What are the information-theoretic limits of knowledge transfer? To this end, we leverage a body of work in information theory called Partial Information Decomposition (PID) to quantify the distillable and distilled knowledge of a teacher's representation corresponding to a given student and a downstream task. Moreover, we demonstrate that this metric can be practically used in distillation to address challenges caused by the complexity gap between the teacher and the student representations.

Mind Your Step (by Step): Chain-of-Thought can Reduce Performance on Tasks where Thinking Makes Humans Worse

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Adaptive Language-Guided Abstraction from Contrastive Explanations

Many approaches to robot learning begin by inferring a reward function from a set of human demonstrations. To learn a good reward, it is necessary to determine which features of the environment are relevant before determining how these features should be used to compute reward. End-to-end methods for joint feature and reward learning (e.g., using deep networks or program synthesis techniques) often yield brittle reward functions that are sensitive to spurious state features. By contrast, humans can often generalizably learn from a small number of demonstrations by incorporating strong priors about what features of a demonstration are likely meaningful for a task of interest. How do we build robots that leverage this kind of background knowledge when learning from new demonstrations? This paper describes a method named ALGAE (Adaptive Language-Guided Abstraction from [Contrastive] Explanations) which alternates between using language models to iteratively identify human-meaningful features needed to explain demonstrated behavior, then standard inverse reinforcement learning techniques to assign weights to these features. Experiments across a variety of both simulated and real-world robot environments show that ALGAE learns generalizable reward functions defined on interpretable features using only small numbers of demonstrations. Importantly, ALGAE can recognize when features are missing, then extract and define those features without any human input -- making it possible to quickly and efficiently acquire rich representations of user behavior.

Multilevel Interpretability Of Artificial Neural Networks: Leveraging Framework And Methods From Neuroscience

As deep learning systems are scaled up to many billions of parameters, relating their internal structure to external behaviors becomes very challenging. Although daunting, this problem is not new: Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists have accumulated decades of experience analyzing a particularly complex system - the brain. In this work, we argue that interpreting both biological and artificial neural systems requires analyzing those systems at multiple levels of analysis, with different analytic tools for each level. We first lay out a joint grand challenge among scientists who study the brain and who study artificial neural networks: understanding how distributed neural mechanisms give rise to complex cognition and behavior. We then present a series of analytical tools that can be used to analyze biological and artificial neural systems, organizing those tools according to Marr's three levels of analysis: computation/behavior, algorithm/representation, and implementation. Overall, the multilevel interpretability framework provides a principled way to tackle neural system complexity; links structure, computation, and behavior; clarifies assumptions and research priorities at each level; and paves the way toward a unified effort for understanding intelligent systems, may they be biological or artificial.

Building Machines that Learn and Think with People

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

Quantifying Spuriousness of Biased Datasets Using Partial Information Decomposition

Spurious patterns refer to a mathematical association between two or more variables in a dataset that are not causally related. However, this notion of spuriousness, which is usually introduced due to sampling biases in the dataset, has classically lacked a formal definition. To address this gap, this work presents the first information-theoretic formalization of spuriousness in a dataset (given a split of spurious and core features) using a mathematical framework called Partial Information Decomposition (PID). Specifically, we disentangle the joint information content that the spurious and core features share about another target variable (e.g., the prediction label) into distinct components, namely unique, redundant, and synergistic information. We propose the use of unique information, with roots in Blackwell Sufficiency, as a novel metric to formally quantify dataset spuriousness and derive its desirable properties. We empirically demonstrate how higher unique information in the spurious features in a dataset could lead a model into choosing the spurious features over the core features for inference, often having low worst-group-accuracy. We also propose a novel autoencoder-based estimator for computing unique information that is able to handle high-dimensional image data. Finally, we also show how this unique information in the spurious feature is reduced across several dataset-based spurious-pattern-mitigation techniques such as data reweighting and varying levels of background mixing, demonstrating a novel tradeoff between unique information (spuriousness) and worst-group-accuracy.

Large Language Models Assume People are More Rational than We Really are

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Representational Alignment Supports Effective Machine Teaching

A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable; but should be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we integrate insights from machine teaching and pragmatic communication with the burgeoning literature on representational alignment to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment and teacher capability for promoting student learning. To explore the characteristics of this utility curve, we design a supervised learning environment that disentangles representational alignment from teacher accuracy. We conduct extensive computational experiments with machines teaching machines, complemented by a series of experiments in which machines teach humans. Drawing on our findings that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), we design a classroom matching procedure that assigns students to teachers based on the utility curve. If we are to design effective machine teachers, it is not enough to build teachers that are accurate -- we want teachers that can align, representationally, to their students too.

Characterizing Similarities and Divergences in Conversational Tones in Humans and LLMs by Sampling with People

Conversational tones -- the manners and attitudes in which speakers communicate -- are essential to effective communication. Amidst the increasing popularization of Large Language Models (LLMs) over recent years, it becomes necessary to characterize the divergences in their conversational tones relative to humans. However, existing investigations of conversational modalities rely on pre-existing taxonomies or text corpora, which suffer from experimenter bias and may not be representative of real-world distributions for the studies' psycholinguistic domains. Inspired by methods from cognitive science, we propose an iterative method for simultaneously eliciting conversational tones and sentences, where participants alternate between two tasks: (1) one participant identifies the tone of a given sentence and (2) a different participant generates a sentence based on that tone. We run 100 iterations of this process with human participants and GPT-4, then obtain a dataset of sentences and frequent conversational tones. In an additional experiment, humans and GPT-4 annotated all sentences with all tones. With data from 1,339 human participants, 33,370 human judgments, and 29,900 GPT-4 queries, we show how our approach can be used to create an interpretable geometric representation of relations between conversational tones in humans and GPT-4. This work demonstrates how combining ideas from machine learning and cognitive science can address challenges in human-computer interactions.

Large language models surpass human experts in predicting neuroscience results

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.