Abstract:Rapid advances in the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have raised widespread concerns regarding their potential for malicious use. Open-weight LLMs present unique challenges, as existing safeguards lack robustness to tampering attacks that modify model weights. For example, recent works have demonstrated that refusal and unlearning safeguards can be trivially removed with a few steps of fine-tuning. These vulnerabilities necessitate new approaches for enabling the safe release of open-weight LLMs. We develop a method, called TAR, for building tamper-resistant safeguards into open-weight LLMs such that adversaries cannot remove the safeguards even after thousands of steps of fine-tuning. In extensive evaluations and red teaming analyses, we find that our method greatly improves tamper-resistance while preserving benign capabilities. Our results demonstrate that tamper-resistance is a tractable problem, opening up a promising new avenue to improve the safety and security of open-weight LLMs.
Abstract:As artificial intelligence systems grow more powerful, there has been increasing interest in "AI safety" research to address emerging and future risks. However, the field of AI safety remains poorly defined and inconsistently measured, leading to confusion about how researchers can contribute. This lack of clarity is compounded by the unclear relationship between AI safety benchmarks and upstream general capabilities (e.g., general knowledge and reasoning). To address these issues, we conduct a comprehensive meta-analysis of AI safety benchmarks, empirically analyzing their correlation with general capabilities across dozens of models and providing a survey of existing directions in AI safety. Our findings reveal that many safety benchmarks highly correlate with upstream model capabilities, potentially enabling "safetywashing" -- where capability improvements are misrepresented as safety advancements. Based on these findings, we propose an empirical foundation for developing more meaningful safety metrics and define AI safety in a machine learning research context as a set of clearly delineated research goals that are empirically separable from generic capabilities advancements. In doing so, we aim to provide a more rigorous framework for AI safety research, advancing the science of safety evaluations and clarifying the path towards measurable progress.
Abstract:AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that interrupts the models as they respond with harmful outputs with "circuit breakers." Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, circuit-breaking directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, circuit breakers allow the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.
Abstract:AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.
Abstract:The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 4,157 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop CUT, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. CUT reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai
Abstract:We propose a straightforward approach called Distillation Contrastive Decoding (DCD) to enhance the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) during inference. In contrast to previous approaches that relied on smaller amateur models or analysis of hidden state differences, DCD employs Contrastive Chain-of-thought Prompting and advanced distillation techniques, including Dropout and Quantization. This approach effectively addresses the limitations of Contrastive Decoding (CD), which typically requires both an expert and an amateur model, thus increasing computational resource demands. By integrating contrastive prompts with distillation, DCD obviates the need for an amateur model and reduces memory usage. Our evaluations demonstrate that DCD significantly enhances LLM performance across a range of reasoning benchmarks, surpassing both CD and existing methods in the GSM8K and StrategyQA datasets.
Abstract:Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.
Abstract:In this paper, we identify and characterize the emerging area of representation engineering (RepE), an approach to enhancing the transparency of AI systems that draws on insights from cognitive neuroscience. RepE places population-level representations, rather than neurons or circuits, at the center of analysis, equipping us with novel methods for monitoring and manipulating high-level cognitive phenomena in deep neural networks (DNNs). We provide baselines and an initial analysis of RepE techniques, showing that they offer simple yet effective solutions for improving our understanding and control of large language models. We showcase how these methods can provide traction on a wide range of safety-relevant problems, including honesty, harmlessness, power-seeking, and more, demonstrating the promise of top-down transparency research. We hope that this work catalyzes further exploration of RepE and fosters advancements in the transparency and safety of AI systems.
Abstract:While code-mixing is a common linguistic practice in many parts of the world, collecting high-quality and low-cost code-mixed data remains a challenge for natural language processing (NLP) research. The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in recent times compels one to ask: can these systems be used for data generation? In this article, we explore prompting multilingual LLMs in a zero-shot manner to create code-mixed data for five languages in South East Asia (SEA) -- Indonesian, Malay, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, as well as the creole language Singlish. We find that ChatGPT shows the most potential, capable of producing code-mixed text 68% of the time when the term "code-mixing" is explicitly defined. Moreover, both ChatGPT's and InstructGPT's (davinci-003) performances in generating Singlish texts are noteworthy, averaging a 96% success rate across a variety of prompts. Their code-mixing proficiency, however, is dampened by word choice errors that lead to semantic inaccuracies. Other multilingual models such as BLOOMZ and Flan-T5-XXL are unable to produce code-mixed texts altogether. By highlighting the limited promises of LLMs in a specific form of low-resource data generation, we call for a measured approach when applying similar techniques to other data-scarce NLP contexts.
Abstract:As language models grow ever larger, the need for large-scale high-quality text datasets has never been more pressing, especially in multilingual settings. The BigScience workshop, a 1-year international and multidisciplinary initiative, was formed with the goal of researching and training large language models as a values-driven undertaking, putting issues of ethics, harm, and governance in the foreground. This paper documents the data creation and curation efforts undertaken by BigScience to assemble the Responsible Open-science Open-collaboration Text Sources (ROOTS) corpus, a 1.6TB dataset spanning 59 languages that was used to train the 176-billion-parameter BigScience Large Open-science Open-access Multilingual (BLOOM) language model. We further release a large initial subset of the corpus and analyses thereof, and hope to empower large-scale monolingual and multilingual modeling projects with both the data and the processing tools, as well as stimulate research around this large multilingual corpus.