Keypoint Abstraction using Large Models for Object-Relative Imitation Learning

Generalization to novel object configurations and instances across diverse tasks and environments is a critical challenge in robotics. Keypoint-based representations have been proven effective as a succinct representation for capturing essential object features, and for establishing a reference frame in action prediction, enabling data-efficient learning of robot skills. However, their manual design nature and reliance on additional human labels limit their scalability. In this paper, we propose KALM, a framework that leverages large pre-trained vision-language models (LMs) to automatically generate task-relevant and cross-instance consistent keypoints. KALM distills robust and consistent keypoints across views and objects by generating proposals using LMs and verifies them against a small set of robot demonstration data. Based on the generated keypoints, we can train keypoint-conditioned policy models that predict actions in keypoint-centric frames, enabling robots to generalize effectively across varying object poses, camera views, and object instances with similar functional shapes. Our method demonstrates strong performance in the real world, adapting to different tasks and environments from only a handful of demonstrations while requiring no additional labels. Website: https://kalm-il.github.io/

VisualPredicator: Learning Abstract World Models with Neuro-Symbolic Predicates for Robot Planning

Broadly intelligent agents should form task-specific abstractions that selectively expose the essential elements of a task, while abstracting away the complexity of the raw sensorimotor space. In this work, we present Neuro-Symbolic Predicates, a first-order abstraction language that combines the strengths of symbolic and neural knowledge representations. We outline an online algorithm for inventing such predicates and learning abstract world models. We compare our approach to hierarchical reinforcement learning, vision-language model planning, and symbolic predicate invention approaches, on both in- and out-of-distribution tasks across five simulated robotic domains. Results show that our approach offers better sample complexity, stronger out-of-distribution generalization, and improved interpretability.

Learning Linear Attention in Polynomial Time

Previous research has explored the computational expressivity of Transformer models in simulating Boolean circuits or Turing machines. However, the learnability of these simulators from observational data has remained an open question. Our study addresses this gap by providing the first polynomial-time learnability results (specifically strong, agnostic PAC learning) for single-layer Transformers with linear attention. We show that linear attention may be viewed as a linear predictor in a suitably defined RKHS. As a consequence, the problem of learning any linear transformer may be converted into the problem of learning an ordinary linear predictor in an expanded feature space, and any such predictor may be converted back into a multiheaded linear transformer. Moving to generalization, we show how to efficiently identify training datasets for which every empirical risk minimizer is equivalent (up to trivial symmetries) to the linear Transformer that generated the data, thereby guaranteeing the learned model will correctly generalize across all inputs. Finally, we provide examples of computations expressible via linear attention and therefore polynomial-time learnable, including associative memories, finite automata, and a class of Universal Turing Machine (UTMs) with polynomially bounded computation histories. We empirically validate our theoretical findings on three tasks: learning random linear attention networks, key--value associations, and learning to execute finite automata. Our findings bridge a critical gap between theoretical expressivity and learnability of Transformers, and show that flexible and general models of computation are efficiently learnable.

SIFToM: Robust Spoken Instruction Following through Theory of Mind

Spoken language instructions are ubiquitous in agent collaboration. However, in human-robot collaboration, recognition accuracy for human speech is often influenced by various speech and environmental factors, such as background noise, the speaker's accents, and mispronunciation. When faced with noisy or unfamiliar auditory inputs, humans use context and prior knowledge to disambiguate the stimulus and take pragmatic actions, a process referred to as top-down processing in cognitive science. We present a cognitively inspired model, Speech Instruction Following through Theory of Mind (SIFToM), to enable robots to pragmatically follow human instructions under diverse speech conditions by inferring the human's goal and joint plan as prior for speech perception and understanding. We test SIFToM in simulated home experiments (VirtualHome 2). Results show that the SIFToM model outperforms state-of-the-art speech and language models, approaching human-level accuracy on challenging speech instruction following tasks. We then demonstrate its ability at the task planning level on a mobile manipulator for breakfast preparation tasks.

What Makes a Maze Look Like a Maze?

A unique aspect of human visual understanding is the ability to flexibly interpret abstract concepts: acquiring lifted rules explaining what they symbolize, grounding them across familiar and unfamiliar contexts, and making predictions or reasoning about them. While off-the-shelf vision-language models excel at making literal interpretations of images (e.g., recognizing object categories such as tree branches), they still struggle to make sense of such visual abstractions (e.g., how an arrangement of tree branches may form the walls of a maze). To address this challenge, we introduce Deep Schema Grounding (DSG), a framework that leverages explicit structured representations of visual abstractions for grounding and reasoning. At the core of DSG are schemas--dependency graph descriptions of abstract concepts that decompose them into more primitive-level symbols. DSG uses large language models to extract schemas, then hierarchically grounds concrete to abstract components of the schema onto images with vision-language models. The grounded schema is used to augment visual abstraction understanding. We systematically evaluate DSG and different methods in reasoning on our new Visual Abstractions Dataset, which consists of diverse, real-world images of abstract concepts and corresponding question-answer pairs labeled by humans. We show that DSG significantly improves the abstract visual reasoning performance of vision-language models, and is a step toward human-aligned understanding of visual abstractions.

Evaluating Multiview Object Consistency in Humans and Image Models

We introduce a benchmark to directly evaluate the alignment between human observers and vision models on a 3D shape inference task. We leverage an experimental design from the cognitive sciences which requires zero-shot visual inferences about object shape: given a set of images, participants identify which contain the same/different objects, despite considerable viewpoint variation. We draw from a diverse range of images that include common objects (e.g., chairs) as well as abstract shapes (i.e., procedurally generated `nonsense' objects). After constructing over 2000 unique image sets, we administer these tasks to human participants, collecting 35K trials of behavioral data from over 500 participants. This includes explicit choice behaviors as well as intermediate measures, such as reaction time and gaze data. We then evaluate the performance of common vision models (e.g., DINOv2, MAE, CLIP). We find that humans outperform all models by a wide margin. Using a multi-scale evaluation approach, we identify underlying similarities and differences between models and humans: while human-model performance is correlated, humans allocate more time/processing on challenging trials. All images, data, and code can be accessed via our project page.

Understanding Epistemic Language with a Bayesian Theory of Mind

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others' beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents' goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic ``language-of-thought'', then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a probabilistic generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments about epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent's beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

Can Large Language Models Understand Symbolic Graphics Programs?

Assessing the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) is often challenging, in part, because it is hard to find tasks to which they have not been exposed during training. We take one step to address this challenge by turning to a new task: focusing on symbolic graphics programs, which are a popular representation for graphics content that procedurally generates visual data. LLMs have shown exciting promise towards program synthesis, but do they understand symbolic graphics programs? Unlike conventional programs, symbolic graphics programs can be translated to graphics content. Here, we characterize an LLM's understanding of symbolic programs in terms of their ability to answer questions related to the graphics content. This task is challenging as the questions are difficult to answer from the symbolic programs alone -- yet, they would be easy to answer from the corresponding graphics content as we verify through a human experiment. To understand symbolic programs, LLMs may need to possess the ability to imagine how the corresponding graphics content would look without directly accessing the rendered visual content. We use this task to evaluate LLMs by creating a large benchmark for the semantic understanding of symbolic graphics programs. This benchmark is built via program-graphics correspondence, hence requiring minimal human efforts. We evaluate current LLMs on our benchmark to elucidate a preliminary assessment of their ability to reason about visual scenes from programs. We find that this task distinguishes existing LLMs and models considered good at reasoning perform better. Lastly, we introduce Symbolic Instruction Tuning (SIT) to improve this ability. Specifically, we query GPT4-o with questions and images generated by symbolic programs. Such data are then used to finetune an LLM. We also find that SIT data can improve the general instruction following ability of LLMs.

Compositional Physical Reasoning of Objects and Events from Videos

Understanding and reasoning about objects' physical properties in the natural world is a fundamental challenge in artificial intelligence. While some properties like colors and shapes can be directly observed, others, such as mass and electric charge, are hidden from the objects' visual appearance. This paper addresses the unique challenge of inferring these hidden physical properties from objects' motion and interactions and predicting corresponding dynamics based on the inferred physical properties. We first introduce the Compositional Physical Reasoning (ComPhy) dataset. For a given set of objects, ComPhy includes limited videos of them moving and interacting under different initial conditions. The model is evaluated based on its capability to unravel the compositional hidden properties, such as mass and charge, and use this knowledge to answer a set of questions. Besides the synthetic videos from simulators, we also collect a real-world dataset to show further test physical reasoning abilities of different models. We evaluate state-of-the-art video reasoning models on ComPhy and reveal their limited ability to capture these hidden properties, which leads to inferior performance. We also propose a novel neuro-symbolic framework, Physical Concept Reasoner (PCR), that learns and reasons about both visible and hidden physical properties from question answering. After training, PCR demonstrates remarkable capabilities. It can detect and associate objects across frames, ground visible and hidden physical properties, make future and counterfactual predictions, and utilize these extracted representations to answer challenging questions.

Infinite Ends from Finite Samples: Open-Ended Goal Inference as Top-Down Bayesian Filtering of Bottom-Up Proposals

The space of human goals is tremendously vast; and yet, from just a few moments of watching a scene or reading a story, we seem to spontaneously infer a range of plausible motivations for the people and characters involved. What explains this remarkable capacity for intuiting other agents' goals, despite the infinitude of ends they might pursue? And how does this cohere with our understanding of other people as approximately rational agents? In this paper, we introduce a sequential Monte Carlo model of open-ended goal inference, which combines top-down Bayesian inverse planning with bottom-up sampling based on the statistics of co-occurring subgoals. By proposing goal hypotheses related to the subgoals achieved by an agent, our model rapidly generates plausible goals without exhaustive search, then filters out goals that would be irrational given the actions taken so far. We validate this model in a goal inference task called Block Words, where participants try to guess the word that someone is stacking out of lettered blocks. In comparison to both heuristic bottom-up guessing and exact Bayesian inference over hundreds of goals, our model better predicts the mean, variance, efficiency, and resource rationality of human goal inferences, achieving similar accuracy to the exact model at a fraction of the cognitive cost, while also explaining garden-path effects that arise from misleading bottom-up cues. Our experiments thus highlight the importance of uniting top-down and bottom-up models for explaining the speed, accuracy, and generality of human theory-of-mind.