SGHA-Attack: Semantic-Guided Hierarchical Alignment for Transferable Targeted Attacks on Vision-Language Models

Large vision-language models (VLMs) are vulnerable to transfer-based adversarial perturbations, enabling attackers to optimize on surrogate models and manipulate black-box VLM outputs. Prior targeted transfer attacks often overfit surrogate-specific embedding space by relying on a single reference and emphasizing final-layer alignment, which underutilizes intermediate semantics and degrades transfer across heterogeneous VLMs. To address this, we propose SGHA-Attack, a Semantic-Guided Hierarchical Alignment framework that adopts multiple target references and enforces intermediate-layer consistency. Concretely, we generate a visually grounded reference pool by sampling a frozen text-to-image model conditioned on the target prompt, and then carefully select the Top-K most semantically relevant anchors under the surrogate to form a weighted mixture for stable optimization guidance. Building on these anchors, SGHA-Attack injects target semantics throughout the feature hierarchy by aligning intermediate visual representations at both global and spatial granularities across multiple depths, and by synchronizing intermediate visual and textual features in a shared latent subspace to provide early cross-modal supervision before the final projection. Extensive experiments on open-source and commercial black-box VLMs show that SGHA-Attack achieves stronger targeted transferability than prior methods and remains robust under preprocessing and purification defenses.

Advances and Innovations in the Multi-Agent Robotic System (MARS) Challenge

Recent advancements in multimodal large language models and vision-languageaction models have significantly driven progress in Embodied AI. As the field transitions toward more complex task scenarios, multi-agent system frameworks are becoming essential for achieving scalable, efficient, and collaborative solutions. This shift is fueled by three primary factors: increasing agent capabilities, enhancing system efficiency through task delegation, and enabling advanced human-agent interactions. To address the challenges posed by multi-agent collaboration, we propose the Multi-Agent Robotic System (MARS) Challenge, held at the NeurIPS 2025 Workshop on SpaVLE. The competition focuses on two critical areas: planning and control, where participants explore multi-agent embodied planning using vision-language models (VLMs) to coordinate tasks and policy execution to perform robotic manipulation in dynamic environments. By evaluating solutions submitted by participants, the challenge provides valuable insights into the design and coordination of embodied multi-agent systems, contributing to the future development of advanced collaborative AI systems.

Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning

Large language model (LLM)-integrated applications have become increasingly prevalent, yet face critical security vulnerabilities from prompt injection (PI) attacks. Defending against PI attacks faces two major issues: malicious instructions can be injected through diverse vectors, and injected instructions often lack clear semantic boundaries from the surrounding context, making them difficult to identify. To address these issues, we propose InstruCoT, a model enhancement method for PI defense that synthesizes diverse training data and employs instruction-level chain-of-thought fine-tuning, enabling LLMs to effectively identify and reject malicious instructions regardless of their source or position in the context. We evaluate InstruCoT across three critical dimensions: Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output. Experimental results across four LLMs demonstrate that InstruCoT significantly outperforms baselines in all dimensions while maintaining utility performance without degradation

GAMBIT: A Gamified Jailbreak Framework for Multimodal Large Language Models

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have become widely deployed, yet their safety alignment remains fragile under adversarial inputs. Previous work has shown that increasing inference steps can disrupt safety mechanisms and lead MLLMs to generate attacker-desired harmful content. However, most existing attacks focus on increasing the complexity of the modified visual task itself and do not explicitly leverage the model's own reasoning incentives. This leads to them underperforming on reasoning models (Models with Chain-of-Thoughts) compared to non-reasoning ones (Models without Chain-of-Thoughts). If a model can think like a human, can we influence its cognitive-stage decisions so that it proactively completes a jailbreak? To validate this idea, we propose GAMBI} (Gamified Adversarial Multimodal Breakout via Instructional Traps), a novel multimodal jailbreak framework that decomposes and reassembles harmful visual semantics, then constructs a gamified scene that drives the model to explore, reconstruct intent, and answer as part of winning the game. The resulting structured reasoning chain increases task complexity in both vision and text, positioning the model as a participant whose goal pursuit reduces safety attention and induces it to answer the reconstructed malicious query. Extensive experiments on popular reasoning and non-reasoning MLLMs demonstrate that GAMBIT achieves high Attack Success Rates (ASR), reaching 92.13% on Gemini 2.5 Flash, 91.20% on QvQ-MAX, and 85.87% on GPT-4o, significantly outperforming baselines.

Casting a SPELL: Sentence Pairing Exploration for LLM Limitation-breaking

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized software development through AI-assisted coding tools, enabling developers with limited programming expertise to create sophisticated applications. However, this accessibility extends to malicious actors who may exploit these powerful tools to generate harmful software. Existing jailbreaking research primarily focuses on general attack scenarios against LLMs, with limited exploration of malicious code generation as a jailbreak target. To address this gap, we propose SPELL, a comprehensive testing framework specifically designed to evaluate the weakness of security alignment in malicious code generation. Our framework employs a time-division selection strategy that systematically constructs jailbreaking prompts by intelligently combining sentences from a prior knowledge dataset, balancing exploration of novel attack patterns with exploitation of successful techniques. Extensive evaluation across three advanced code models (GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5, and Qwen2.5-Coder) demonstrates SPELL's effectiveness, achieving attack success rates of 83.75%, 19.38%, and 68.12% respectively across eight malicious code categories. The generated prompts successfully produce malicious code in real-world AI development tools such as Cursor, with outputs confirmed as malicious by state-of-the-art detection systems at rates exceeding 73%. These findings reveal significant security gaps in current LLM implementations and provide valuable insights for improving AI safety alignment in code generation applications.

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography

By integrating language understanding with perceptual modalities such as images, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) constitute a critical substrate for modern AI systems, particularly intelligent agents operating in open and interactive environments. However, their increasing accessibility also raises heightened risks of misuse, such as generating harmful or unsafe content. To mitigate these risks, alignment techniques are commonly applied to align model behavior with human values. Despite these efforts, recent studies have shown that jailbreak attacks can circumvent alignment and elicit unsafe outputs. Currently, most existing jailbreak methods are tailored for open-source models and exhibit limited effectiveness against commercial MLLM-integrated systems, which often employ additional filters. These filters can detect and prevent malicious input and output content, significantly reducing jailbreak threats. In this paper, we reveal that the success of these safety filters heavily relies on a critical assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in either the input or the output. This assumption, while often valid for traditional LLM-integrated systems, breaks down in MLLM-integrated systems, where attackers can leverage multiple modalities to conceal adversarial intent, leading to a false sense of security in existing MLLM-integrated systems. To challenge this assumption, we propose Odysseus, a novel jailbreak paradigm that introduces dual steganography to covertly embed malicious queries and responses into benign-looking images. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our Odysseus successfully jailbreaks several pioneering and realistic MLLM-integrated systems, achieving up to 99% attack success rate. It exposes a fundamental blind spot in existing defenses, and calls for rethinking cross-modal security in MLLM-integrated systems.

Shedding Light on VLN Robustness: A Black-box Framework for Indoor Lighting-based Adversarial Attack

Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents have made remarkable progress, but their robustness remains insufficiently studied. Existing adversarial evaluations often rely on perturbations that manifest as unusual textures rarely encountered in everyday indoor environments. Errors under such contrived conditions have limited practical relevance, as real-world agents are unlikely to encounter such artificial patterns. In this work, we focus on indoor lighting, an intrinsic yet largely overlooked scene attribute that strongly influences navigation. We propose Indoor Lighting-based Adversarial Attack (ILA), a black-box framework that manipulates global illumination to disrupt VLN agents. Motivated by typical household lighting usage, we design two attack modes: Static Indoor Lighting-based Attack (SILA), where the lighting intensity remains constant throughout an episode, and Dynamic Indoor Lighting-based Attack (DILA), where lights are switched on or off at critical moments to induce abrupt illumination changes. We evaluate ILA on two state-of-the-art VLN models across three navigation tasks. Results show that ILA significantly increases failure rates while reducing trajectory efficiency, revealing previously unrecognized vulnerabilities of VLN agents to realistic indoor lighting variations.

Beyond Pixels: Semantic-aware Typographic Attack for Geo-Privacy Protection

Large Visual Language Models (LVLMs) now pose a serious yet overlooked privacy threat, as they can infer a social media user's geolocation directly from shared images, leading to unintended privacy leakage. While adversarial image perturbations provide a potential direction for geo-privacy protection, they require relatively strong distortions to be effective against LVLMs, which noticeably degrade visual quality and diminish an image's value for sharing. To overcome this limitation, we identify typographical attacks as a promising direction for protecting geo-privacy by adding text extension outside the visual content. We further investigate which textual semantics are effective in disrupting geolocation inference and design a two-stage, semantics-aware typographical attack that generates deceptive text to protect user privacy. Extensive experiments across three datasets demonstrate that our approach significantly reduces geolocation prediction accuracy of five state-of-the-art commercial LVLMs, establishing a practical and visually-preserving protection strategy against emerging geo-privacy threats.

LLM Jailbreak Detection for (Almost) Free!

Large language models (LLMs) enhance security through alignment when widely used, but remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks capable of producing inappropriate content. Jailbreak detection methods show promise in mitigating jailbreak attacks through the assistance of other models or multiple model inferences. However, existing methods entail significant computational costs. In this paper, we first present a finding that the difference in output distributions between jailbreak and benign prompts can be employed for detecting jailbreak prompts. Based on this finding, we propose a Free Jailbreak Detection (FJD) which prepends an affirmative instruction to the input and scales the logits by temperature to further distinguish between jailbreak and benign prompts through the confidence of the first token. Furthermore, we enhance the detection performance of FJD through the integration of virtual instruction learning. Extensive experiments on aligned LLMs show that our FJD can effectively detect jailbreak prompts with almost no additional computational costs during LLM inference.

PhysPatch: A Physically Realizable and Transferable Adversarial Patch Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models-based Autonomous Driving Systems

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are becoming integral to autonomous driving (AD) systems due to their strong vision-language reasoning capabilities. However, MLLMs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, particularly adversarial patch attacks, which can pose serious threats in real-world scenarios. Existing patch-based attack methods are primarily designed for object detection models and perform poorly when transferred to MLLM-based systems due to the latter's complex architectures and reasoning abilities. To address these limitations, we propose PhysPatch, a physically realizable and transferable adversarial patch framework tailored for MLLM-based AD systems. PhysPatch jointly optimizes patch location, shape, and content to enhance attack effectiveness and real-world applicability. It introduces a semantic-based mask initialization strategy for realistic placement, an SVD-based local alignment loss with patch-guided crop-resize to improve transferability, and a potential field-based mask refinement method. Extensive experiments across open-source, commercial, and reasoning-capable MLLMs demonstrate that PhysPatch significantly outperforms prior methods in steering MLLM-based AD systems toward target-aligned perception and planning outputs. Moreover, PhysPatch consistently places adversarial patches in physically feasible regions of AD scenes, ensuring strong real-world applicability and deployability.