Data Free Backdoor Attacks

Backdoor attacks aim to inject a backdoor into a classifier such that it predicts any input with an attacker-chosen backdoor trigger as an attacker-chosen target class. Existing backdoor attacks require either retraining the classifier with some clean data or modifying the model's architecture. As a result, they are 1) not applicable when clean data is unavailable, 2) less efficient when the model is large, and 3) less stealthy due to architecture changes. In this work, we propose DFBA, a novel retraining-free and data-free backdoor attack without changing the model architecture. Technically, our proposed method modifies a few parameters of a classifier to inject a backdoor. Through theoretical analysis, we verify that our injected backdoor is provably undetectable and unremovable by various state-of-the-art defenses under mild assumptions. Our evaluation on multiple datasets further demonstrates that our injected backdoor: 1) incurs negligible classification loss, 2) achieves 100% attack success rates, and 3) bypasses six existing state-of-the-art defenses. Moreover, our comparison with a state-of-the-art non-data-free backdoor attack shows our attack is more stealthy and effective against various defenses while achieving less classification accuracy loss.

Are We There Yet? Revealing the Risks of Utilizing Large Language Models in Scholarly Peer Review

Scholarly peer review is a cornerstone of scientific advancement, but the system is under strain due to increasing manuscript submissions and the labor-intensive nature of the process. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have led to their integration into peer review, with promising results such as substantial overlaps between LLM- and human-generated reviews. However, the unchecked adoption of LLMs poses significant risks to the integrity of the peer review system. In this study, we comprehensively analyze the vulnerabilities of LLM-generated reviews by focusing on manipulation and inherent flaws. Our experiments show that injecting covert deliberate content into manuscripts allows authors to explicitly manipulate LLM reviews, leading to inflated ratings and reduced alignment with human reviews. In a simulation, we find that manipulating 5% of the reviews could potentially cause 12% of the papers to lose their position in the top 30% rankings. Implicit manipulation, where authors strategically highlight minor limitations in their papers, further demonstrates LLMs' susceptibility compared to human reviewers, with a 4.5 times higher consistency with disclosed limitations. Additionally, LLMs exhibit inherent flaws, such as potentially assigning higher ratings to incomplete papers compared to full papers and favoring well-known authors in single-blind review process. These findings highlight the risks of over-reliance on LLMs in peer review, underscoring that we are not yet ready for widespread adoption and emphasizing the need for robust safeguards.

Towards Next-Generation Medical Agent: How o1 is Reshaping Decision-Making in Medical Scenarios

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become essential in modern healthcare, with large language models (LLMs) offering promising advances in clinical decision-making. Traditional model-based approaches, including those leveraging in-context demonstrations and those with specialized medical fine-tuning, have demonstrated strong performance in medical language processing but struggle with real-time adaptability, multi-step reasoning, and handling complex medical tasks. Agent-based AI systems address these limitations by incorporating reasoning traces, tool selection based on context, knowledge retrieval, and both short- and long-term memory. These additional features enable the medical AI agent to handle complex medical scenarios where decision-making should be built on real-time interaction with the environment. Therefore, unlike conventional model-based approaches that treat medical queries as isolated questions, medical AI agents approach them as complex tasks and behave more like human doctors. In this paper, we study the choice of the backbone LLM for medical AI agents, which is the foundation for the agent's overall reasoning and action generation. In particular, we consider the emergent o1 model and examine its impact on agents' reasoning, tool-use adaptability, and real-time information retrieval across diverse clinical scenarios, including high-stakes settings such as intensive care units (ICUs). Our findings demonstrate o1's ability to enhance diagnostic accuracy and consistency, paving the way for smarter, more responsive AI tools that support better patient outcomes and decision-making efficacy in clinical practice.

Evaluation of OpenAI o1: Opportunities and Challenges of AGI

This comprehensive study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview large language model across a diverse array of complex reasoning tasks, spanning multiple domains, including computer science, mathematics, natural sciences, medicine, linguistics, and social sciences. Through rigorous testing, o1-preview demonstrated remarkable capabilities, often achieving human-level or superior performance in areas ranging from coding challenges to scientific reasoning and from language processing to creative problem-solving. Key findings include: -83.3% success rate in solving complex competitive programming problems, surpassing many human experts. -Superior ability in generating coherent and accurate radiology reports, outperforming other evaluated models. -100% accuracy in high school-level mathematical reasoning tasks, providing detailed step-by-step solutions. -Advanced natural language inference capabilities across general and specialized domains like medicine. -Impressive performance in chip design tasks, outperforming specialized models in areas such as EDA script generation and bug analysis. -Remarkable proficiency in anthropology and geology, demonstrating deep understanding and reasoning in these specialized fields. -Strong capabilities in quantitative investing. O1 has comprehensive financial knowledge and statistical modeling skills. -Effective performance in social media analysis, including sentiment analysis and emotion recognition. The model excelled particularly in tasks requiring intricate reasoning and knowledge integration across various fields. While some limitations were observed, including occasional errors on simpler problems and challenges with certain highly specialized concepts, the overall results indicate significant progress towards artificial general intelligence.

AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

GuardAgent: Safeguard LLM Agents by a Guard Agent via Knowledge-Enabled Reasoning

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has catalyzed the deployment of LLM-powered agents across numerous applications, raising new concerns regarding their safety and trustworthiness. Existing methods for enhancing the safety of LLMs are not directly transferable to LLM-powered agents due to their diverse objectives and output modalities. In this paper, we propose GuardAgent, the first LLM agent as a guardrail to other LLM agents. Specifically, GuardAgent oversees a target LLM agent by checking whether its inputs/outputs satisfy a set of given guard requests defined by the users. GuardAgent comprises two steps: 1) creating a task plan by analyzing the provided guard requests, and 2) generating guardrail code based on the task plan and executing the code by calling APIs or using external engines. In both steps, an LLM is utilized as the core reasoning component, supplemented by in-context demonstrations retrieved from a memory module. Such knowledge-enabled reasoning allows GuardAgent to understand various textual guard requests and accurately "translate" them into executable code that provides reliable guardrails. Furthermore, GuardAgent is equipped with an extendable toolbox containing functions and APIs and requires no additional LLM training, which underscores its generalization capabilities and low operational overhead. Additionally, we propose two novel benchmarks: an EICU-AC benchmark for assessing privacy-related access control for healthcare agents and a Mind2Web-SC benchmark for safety evaluation for web agents. We show the effectiveness of GuardAgent on these two benchmarks with 98.7% and 90.0% accuracy in moderating invalid inputs and outputs for the two types of agents, respectively. We also show that GuardAgent is able to define novel functions in adaption to emergent LLM agents and guard requests, which underscores its strong generalization capabilities.

ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

BadChain: Backdoor Chain-of-Thought Prompting for Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

CBD: A Certified Backdoor Detector Based on Local Dominant Probability

Backdoor attack is a common threat to deep neural networks. During testing, samples embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified as an adversarial target by a backdoored model, while samples without the backdoor trigger will be correctly classified. In this paper, we present the first certified backdoor detector (CBD), which is based on a novel, adjustable conformal prediction scheme based on our proposed statistic local dominant probability. For any classifier under inspection, CBD provides 1) a detection inference, 2) the condition under which the attacks are guaranteed to be detectable for the same classification domain, and 3) a probabilistic upper bound for the false positive rate. Our theoretical results show that attacks with triggers that are more resilient to test-time noise and have smaller perturbation magnitudes are more likely to be detected with guarantees. Moreover, we conduct extensive experiments on four benchmark datasets considering various backdoor types, such as BadNet, CB, and Blend. CBD achieves comparable or even higher detection accuracy than state-of-the-art detectors, and it in addition provides detection certification. Notably, for backdoor attacks with random perturbation triggers bounded by $\ell_2\leq0.75$ which achieves more than 90\% attack success rate, CBD achieves 100\% (98\%), 100\% (84\%), 98\% (98\%), and 72\% (40\%) empirical (certified) detection true positive rates on the four benchmark datasets GTSRB, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and TinyImageNet, respectively, with low false positive rates.

Backdoor Mitigation by Correcting the Distribution of Neural Activations

Backdoor (Trojan) attacks are an important type of adversarial exploit against deep neural networks (DNNs), wherein a test instance is (mis)classified to the attacker's target class whenever the attacker's backdoor trigger is present. In this paper, we reveal and analyze an important property of backdoor attacks: a successful attack causes an alteration in the distribution of internal layer activations for backdoor-trigger instances, compared to that for clean instances. Even more importantly, we find that instances with the backdoor trigger will be correctly classified to their original source classes if this distribution alteration is corrected. Based on our observations, we propose an efficient and effective method that achieves post-training backdoor mitigation by correcting the distribution alteration using reverse-engineered triggers. Notably, our method does not change any trainable parameters of the DNN, but achieves generally better mitigation performance than existing methods that do require intensive DNN parameter tuning. It also efficiently detects test instances with the trigger, which may help to catch adversarial entities in the act of exploiting the backdoor.