Stronger Models are NOT Stronger Teachers for Instruction Tuning

Instruction tuning has been widely adopted to ensure large language models (LLMs) follow user instructions effectively. The resulting instruction-following capabilities of LLMs heavily rely on the instruction datasets used for tuning. Recently, synthetic instruction datasets have emerged as an economically viable solution to provide LLMs diverse and high-quality instructions. However, existing approaches typically assume that larger or stronger models are stronger teachers for instruction tuning, and hence simply adopt these models as response generators to the synthetic instructions. In this paper, we challenge this commonly-adopted assumption. Our extensive experiments across five base models and twenty response generators reveal that larger and stronger models are not necessarily stronger teachers of smaller models. We refer to this phenomenon as the Larger Models' Paradox. We observe that existing metrics cannot precisely predict the effectiveness of response generators since they ignore the compatibility between teachers and base models being fine-tuned. We thus develop a novel metric, named as Compatibility-Adjusted Reward (CAR) to measure the effectiveness of response generators. Our experiments across five base models demonstrate that CAR outperforms almost all baselines.

CleanGen: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks for Generation Tasks in Large Language Models

The remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) in generation tasks has enabled practitioners to leverage publicly available models to power custom applications, such as chatbots and virtual assistants. However, the data used to train or fine-tune these LLMs is often undisclosed, allowing an attacker to compromise the data and inject backdoors into the models. In this paper, we develop a novel inference time defense, named CleanGen, to mitigate backdoor attacks for generation tasks in LLMs. CleanGenis a lightweight and effective decoding strategy that is compatible with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs. Our insight behind CleanGen is that compared to other LLMs, backdoored LLMs assign significantly higher probabilities to tokens representing the attacker-desired contents. These discrepancies in token probabilities enable CleanGen to identify suspicious tokens favored by the attacker and replace them with tokens generated by another LLM that is not compromised by the same attacker, thereby avoiding generation of attacker-desired content. We evaluate CleanGen against five SOTA backdoor attacks. Our results show that CleanGen achieves lower attack success rates (ASR) compared to five SOTA baseline defenses for all five backdoor attacks. Moreover, LLMs deploying CleanGen maintain helpfulness in their responses when serving benign user queries with minimal added computational overhead.

ChatBug: A Common Vulnerability of Aligned LLMs Induced by Chat Templates

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Magpie: Alignment Data Synthesis from Scratch by Prompting Aligned LLMs with Nothing

High-quality instruction data is critical for aligning large language models (LLMs). Although some models, such as Llama-3-Instruct, have open weights, their alignment data remain private, which hinders the democratization of AI. High human labor costs and a limited, predefined scope for prompting prevent existing open-source data creation methods from scaling effectively, potentially limiting the diversity and quality of public alignment datasets. Is it possible to synthesize high-quality instruction data at scale by extracting it directly from an aligned LLM? We present a self-synthesis method for generating large-scale alignment data named Magpie. Our key observation is that aligned LLMs like Llama-3-Instruct can generate a user query when we input only the left-side templates up to the position reserved for user messages, thanks to their auto-regressive nature. We use this method to prompt Llama-3-Instruct and generate 4 million instructions along with their corresponding responses. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the extracted data and select 300K high-quality instances. To compare Magpie data with other public instruction datasets, we fine-tune Llama-3-8B-Base with each dataset and evaluate the performance of the fine-tuned models. Our results indicate that in some tasks, models fine-tuned with Magpie perform comparably to the official Llama-3-8B-Instruct, despite the latter being enhanced with 10 million data points through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and subsequent feedback learning. We also show that using Magpie solely for SFT can surpass the performance of previous public datasets utilized for both SFT and preference optimization, such as direct preference optimization with UltraFeedback. This advantage is evident on alignment benchmarks such as AlpacaEval, ArenaHard, and WildBench.

ACE: A Model Poisoning Attack on Contribution Evaluation Methods in Federated Learning

In Federated Learning (FL), a set of clients collaboratively train a machine learning model (called global model) without sharing their local training data. The local training data of clients is typically non-i.i.d. and heterogeneous, resulting in varying contributions from individual clients to the final performance of the global model. In response, many contribution evaluation methods were proposed, where the server could evaluate the contribution made by each client and incentivize the high-contributing clients to sustain their long-term participation in FL. Existing studies mainly focus on developing new metrics or algorithms to better measure the contribution of each client. However, the security of contribution evaluation methods of FL operating in adversarial environments is largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose the first model poisoning attack on contribution evaluation methods in FL, termed ACE. Specifically, we show that any malicious client utilizing ACE could manipulate the parameters of its local model such that it is evaluated to have a high contribution by the server, even when its local training data is indeed of low quality. We perform both theoretical analysis and empirical evaluations of ACE. Theoretically, we show our design of ACE can effectively boost the malicious client's perceived contribution when the server employs the widely-used cosine distance metric to measure contribution. Empirically, our results show ACE effectively and efficiently deceive five state-of-the-art contribution evaluation methods. In addition, ACE preserves the accuracy of the final global models on testing inputs. We also explore six countermeasures to defend ACE. Our results show they are inadequate to thwart ACE, highlighting the urgent need for new defenses to safeguard the contribution evaluation methods in FL.

PlanGPT: Enhancing Urban Planning with Tailored Language Model and Efficient Retrieval

In the field of urban planning, general-purpose large language models often struggle to meet the specific needs of planners. Tasks like generating urban planning texts, retrieving related information, and evaluating planning documents pose unique challenges. To enhance the efficiency of urban professionals and overcome these obstacles, we introduce PlanGPT, the first specialized Large Language Model tailored for urban and spatial planning. Developed through collaborative efforts with institutions like the Chinese Academy of Urban Planning, PlanGPT leverages a customized local database retrieval framework, domain-specific fine-tuning of base models, and advanced tooling capabilities. Empirical tests demonstrate that PlanGPT has achieved advanced performance, delivering responses of superior quality precisely tailored to the intricacies of urban planning.

Fault Tolerant Neural Control Barrier Functions for Robotic Systems under Sensor Faults and Attacks

Safety is a fundamental requirement of many robotic systems. Control barrier function (CBF)-based approaches have been proposed to guarantee the safety of robotic systems. However, the effectiveness of these approaches highly relies on the choice of CBFs. Inspired by the universal approximation power of neural networks, there is a growing trend toward representing CBFs using neural networks, leading to the notion of neural CBFs (NCBFs). Current NCBFs, however, are trained and deployed in benign environments, making them ineffective for scenarios where robotic systems experience sensor faults and attacks. In this paper, we study safety-critical control synthesis for robotic systems under sensor faults and attacks. Our main contribution is the development and synthesis of a new class of CBFs that we term fault tolerant neural control barrier function (FT-NCBF). We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for FT-NCBFs to guarantee safety, and develop a data-driven method to learn FT-NCBFs by minimizing a loss function constructed using the derived conditions. Using the learned FT-NCBF, we synthesize a control input and formally prove the safety guarantee provided by our approach. We demonstrate our proposed approach using two case studies: obstacle avoidance problem for an autonomous mobile robot and spacecraft rendezvous problem, with code available via https://github.com/HongchaoZhang-HZ/FTNCBF.

SafeDecoding: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks via Safety-Aware Decoding

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications such as code generation and chatbot assistance, extensive efforts have been made to align LLM behavior with human values, including safety. Jailbreak attacks, aiming to provoke unintended and unsafe behaviors from LLMs, remain a significant/leading LLM safety threat. In this paper, we aim to defend LLMs against jailbreak attacks by introducing SafeDecoding, a safety-aware decoding strategy for LLMs to generate helpful and harmless responses to user queries. Our insight in developing SafeDecoding is based on the observation that, even though probabilities of tokens representing harmful contents outweigh those representing harmless responses, safety disclaimers still appear among the top tokens after sorting tokens by probability in descending order. This allows us to mitigate jailbreak attacks by identifying safety disclaimers and amplifying their token probabilities, while simultaneously attenuating the probabilities of token sequences that are aligned with the objectives of jailbreak attacks. We perform extensive experiments on five LLMs using six state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks and four benchmark datasets. Our results show that SafeDecoding significantly reduces the attack success rate and harmfulness of jailbreak attacks without compromising the helpfulness of responses to benign user queries. SafeDecoding outperforms six defense methods.

ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

Game of Trojans: Adaptive Adversaries Against Output-based Trojaned-Model Detectors

We propose and analyze an adaptive adversary that can retrain a Trojaned DNN and is also aware of SOTA output-based Trojaned model detectors. We show that such an adversary can ensure (1) high accuracy on both trigger-embedded and clean samples and (2) bypass detection. Our approach is based on an observation that the high dimensionality of the DNN parameters provides sufficient degrees of freedom to simultaneously achieve these objectives. We also enable SOTA detectors to be adaptive by allowing retraining to recalibrate their parameters, thus modeling a co-evolution of parameters of a Trojaned model and detectors. We then show that this co-evolution can be modeled as an iterative game, and prove that the resulting (optimal) solution of this interactive game leads to the adversary successfully achieving the above objectives. In addition, we provide a greedy algorithm for the adversary to select a minimum number of input samples for embedding triggers. We show that for cross-entropy or log-likelihood loss functions used by the DNNs, the greedy algorithm provides provable guarantees on the needed number of trigger-embedded input samples. Extensive experiments on four diverse datasets -- MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SpeechCommand -- reveal that the adversary effectively evades four SOTA output-based Trojaned model detectors: MNTD, NeuralCleanse, STRIP, and TABOR.