Abstract:Due to their multimodal capabilities, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have found numerous impactful applications in real-world scenarios. However, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to image-based adversarial attacks, particularly targeted adversarial images that manipulate the model to generate harmful content specified by the adversary. Current attack methods rely on predefined target labels to create targeted adversarial attacks, which limits their scalability and applicability for large-scale robustness evaluations. In this paper, we propose AnyAttack, a self-supervised framework that generates targeted adversarial images for VLMs without label supervision, allowing any image to serve as a target for the attack. To address the limitation of existing methods that require label supervision, we introduce a contrastive loss that trains a generator on a large-scale unlabeled image dataset, LAION-400M dataset, for generating targeted adversarial noise. This large-scale pre-training endows our method with powerful transferability across a wide range of VLMs. Extensive experiments on five mainstream open-source VLMs (CLIP, BLIP, BLIP2, InstructBLIP, and MiniGPT-4) across three multimodal tasks (image-text retrieval, multimodal classification, and image captioning) demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack. Additionally, we successfully transfer AnyAttack to multiple commercial VLMs, including Google's Gemini, Claude's Sonnet, and Microsoft's Copilot. These results reveal an unprecedented risk to VLMs, highlighting the need for effective countermeasures.
Abstract:Despite significant ongoing efforts in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 and LLaMA 3 remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that can induce harmful behaviors, including those triggered by adversarial suffixes. Building on prior research, we hypothesize that these adversarial suffixes are not mere bugs but may represent features that can dominate the LLM's behavior. To evaluate this hypothesis, we conduct several experiments. First, we demonstrate that benign features can be effectively made to function as adversarial suffixes, i.e., we develop a feature extraction method to extract sample-agnostic features from benign dataset in the form of suffixes and show that these suffixes may effectively compromise safety alignment. Second, we show that adversarial suffixes generated from jailbreak attacks may contain meaningful features, i.e., appending the same suffix to different prompts results in responses exhibiting specific characteristics. Third, we show that such benign-yet-safety-compromising features can be easily introduced through fine-tuning using only benign datasets, i.e., even in the absence of harmful content. This highlights the critical risk posed by dominating benign features in the training data and calls for further research to reinforce LLM safety alignment. Our code and data is available at \url{https://github.com/anonymous}.
Abstract:Influence functions aim to quantify the impact of individual training data points on a model's predictions. While extensive research has been conducted on influence functions in traditional machine learning models, their application to large language models (LLMs) has been limited. In this work, we conduct a systematic study to address a key question: do influence functions work on LLMs? Specifically, we evaluate influence functions across multiple tasks and find that they consistently perform poorly in most settings. Our further investigation reveals that their poor performance can be attributed to: (1) inevitable approximation errors when estimating the iHVP component due to the scale of LLMs, (2) uncertain convergence during fine-tuning, and, more fundamentally, (3) the definition itself, as changes in model parameters do not necessarily correlate with changes in LLM behavior. Our study thus suggests the need for alternative approaches for identifying influential samples. To support future work, our code is made available at https://github.com/plumprc/Failures-of-Influence-Functions-in-LLMs.
Abstract:Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides across various tasks, but they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where specific triggers in the prompt cause the LLM to generate adversary-desired responses. While most backdoor research has focused on vision or text classification tasks, backdoor attacks in text generation have been largely overlooked. In this work, we introduce \textit{BackdoorLLM}, the first comprehensive benchmark for studying backdoor attacks on LLMs. \textit{BackdoorLLM} features: 1) a repository of backdoor benchmarks with a standardized training pipeline, 2) diverse attack strategies, including data poisoning, weight poisoning, hidden state attacks, and chain-of-thought attacks, 3) extensive evaluations with over 200 experiments on 8 attacks across 7 scenarios and 6 model architectures, and 4) key insights into the effectiveness and limitations of backdoors in LLMs. We hope \textit{BackdoorLLM} will raise awareness of backdoor threats and contribute to advancing AI safety. The code is available at \url{https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM}.
Abstract:Backdoor attacks have emerged as a primary threat to (pre-)training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). While backdoor attacks have been extensively studied in a body of works, most of them were focused on single-trigger attacks that poison a dataset using a single type of trigger. Arguably, real-world backdoor attacks can be much more complex, e.g., the existence of multiple adversaries for the same dataset if it is of high value. In this work, we investigate the practical threat of backdoor attacks under the setting of \textbf{multi-trigger attacks} where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks, including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we provide a set of important understandings of the coexisting, overwriting, and cross-activating effects between different triggers on the same dataset. Moreover, we show that single-trigger attacks tend to cause overly optimistic views of the security of current defense techniques, as all examined defense methods struggle to defend against multi-trigger attacks. Finally, we create a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to help future evaluation of backdoor attacks and defenses. Although our work is purely empirical, we hope it can help steer backdoor research toward more realistic settings.
Abstract:Backdoor attacks present a substantial security concern for deep learning models, especially those utilized in applications critical to safety and security. These attacks manipulate model behavior by embedding a hidden trigger during the training phase, allowing unauthorized control over the model's output during inference time. Although numerous defenses exist for image classification models, there is a conspicuous absence of defenses tailored for time series data, as well as an end-to-end solution capable of training clean models on poisoned data. To address this gap, this paper builds upon Anti-Backdoor Learning (ABL) and introduces an innovative method, End-to-End Anti-Backdoor Learning (E2ABL), for robust training against backdoor attacks. Unlike the original ABL, which employs a two-stage training procedure, E2ABL accomplishes end-to-end training through an additional classification head linked to the shallow layers of a Deep Neural Network (DNN). This secondary head actively identifies potential backdoor triggers, allowing the model to dynamically cleanse these samples and their corresponding labels during training. Our experiments reveal that E2ABL significantly improves on existing defenses and is effective against a broad range of backdoor attacks in both image and time series domains.
Abstract:Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, raising security concerns about their deployment in mission-critical applications. While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results, it is still not clear how to effectively remove backdoor-associated neurons in backdoored DNNs. In this paper, we propose a novel defense called \emph{Reconstructive Neuron Pruning} (RNP) to expose and prune backdoor neurons via an unlearning and then recovering process. Specifically, RNP first unlearns the neurons by maximizing the model's error on a small subset of clean samples and then recovers the neurons by minimizing the model's error on the same data. In RNP, unlearning is operated at the neuron level while recovering is operated at the filter level, forming an asymmetric reconstructive learning procedure. We show that such an asymmetric process on only a few clean samples can effectively expose and prune the backdoor neurons implanted by a wide range of attacks, achieving a new state-of-the-art defense performance. Moreover, the unlearned model at the intermediate step of our RNP can be directly used to improve other backdoor defense tasks including backdoor removal, trigger recovery, backdoor label detection, and backdoor sample detection. Code is available at \url{https://github.com/bboylyg/RNP}.
Abstract:Backdoor attack has emerged as a major security threat to deep neural networks (DNNs). While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results on detecting or erasing backdoors, it is still not clear whether robust training methods can be devised to prevent the backdoor triggers being injected into the trained model in the first place. In this paper, we introduce the concept of \emph{anti-backdoor learning}, aiming to train \emph{clean} models given backdoor-poisoned data. We frame the overall learning process as a dual-task of learning the \emph{clean} and the \emph{backdoor} portions of data. From this view, we identify two inherent characteristics of backdoor attacks as their weaknesses: 1) the models learn backdoored data much faster than learning with clean data, and the stronger the attack the faster the model converges on backdoored data; 2) the backdoor task is tied to a specific class (the backdoor target class). Based on these two weaknesses, we propose a general learning scheme, Anti-Backdoor Learning (ABL), to automatically prevent backdoor attacks during training. ABL introduces a two-stage \emph{gradient ascent} mechanism for standard training to 1) help isolate backdoor examples at an early training stage, and 2) break the correlation between backdoor examples and the target class at a later training stage. Through extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets against 10 state-of-the-art attacks, we empirically show that ABL-trained models on backdoor-poisoned data achieve the same performance as they were trained on purely clean data. Code is available at \url{https://github.com/bboylyg/ABL}.
Abstract:Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known vulnerable to backdoor attacks, a training time attack that injects a trigger pattern into a small proportion of training data so as to control the model's prediction at the test time. Backdoor attacks are notably dangerous since they do not affect the model's performance on clean examples, yet can fool the model to make incorrect prediction whenever the trigger pattern appears during testing. In this paper, we propose a novel defense framework Neural Attention Distillation (NAD) to erase backdoor triggers from backdoored DNNs. NAD utilizes a teacher network to guide the finetuning of the backdoored student network on a small clean subset of data such that the intermediate-layer attention of the student network aligns with that of the teacher network. The teacher network can be obtained by an independent finetuning process on the same clean subset. We empirically show, against 6 state-of-the-art backdoor attacks, NAD can effectively erase the backdoor triggers using only 5\% clean training data without causing obvious performance degradation on clean examples. Code is available in https://github.com/bboylyg/NAD.
Abstract:Spectral density matrix estimation of multivariate time series is a classical problem in time series and signal processing. In modern neuroscience, spectral density based metrics are commonly used for analyzing functional connectivity among brain regions. In this paper, we develop a non-asymptotic theory for regularized estimation of high-dimensional spectral density matrices of Gaussian and linear processes using thresholded versions of averaged periodograms. Our theoretical analysis ensures that consistent estimation of spectral density matrix of a $p$-dimensional time series using $n$ samples is possible under high-dimensional regime $\log p / n \rightarrow 0$ as long as the true spectral density is approximately sparse. A key technical component of our analysis is a new concentration inequality of average periodogram around its expectation, which is of independent interest. Our estimation consistency results complement existing results for shrinkage based estimators of multivariate spectral density, which require no assumption on sparsity but only ensure consistent estimation in a regime $p^2/n \rightarrow 0$. In addition, our proposed thresholding based estimators perform consistent and automatic edge selection when learning coherence networks among the components of a multivariate time series. We demonstrate the advantage of our estimators using simulation studies and a real data application on functional connectivity analysis with fMRI data.