Efficient Model-agnostic Alignment via Bayesian Persuasion

With recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), alignment has emerged as an effective technique for keeping LLMs consensus with human intent. Current methods primarily involve direct training through Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), both of which require substantial computational resources and extensive ground truth data. This paper explores an efficient method for aligning black-box large models using smaller models, introducing a model-agnostic and lightweight Bayesian Persuasion Alignment framework. We formalize this problem as an optimization of the signaling strategy from the small model's perspective. In the persuasion process, the small model (Advisor) observes the information item (i.e., state) and persuades large models (Receiver) to elicit improved responses. The Receiver then generates a response based on the input, the signal from the Advisor, and its updated belief about the information item. Through training using our framework, we demonstrate that the Advisor can significantly enhance the performance of various Receivers across a range of tasks. We theoretically analyze our persuasion framework and provide an upper bound on the Advisor's regret, confirming its effectiveness in learning the optimal signaling strategy. Our Empirical results demonstrates that GPT-2 can significantly improve the performance of various models, achieving an average enhancement of 16.1% in mathematical reasoning ability and 13.7% in code generation. We hope our work can provide an initial step toward rethinking the alignment framework from the Bayesian Persuasion perspective.

Incentive Compatibility for AI Alignment in Sociotechnical Systems: Positions and Prospects

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

Measuring Value Understanding in Language Models through Discriminator-Critique Gap

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have heightened concerns about their potential misalignment with human values. However, evaluating their grasp of these values is complex due to their intricate and adaptable nature. We argue that truly understanding values in LLMs requires considering both "know what" and "know why". To this end, we present the Value Understanding Measurement (VUM) framework that quantitatively assesses both "know what" and "know why" by measuring the discriminator-critique gap related to human values. Using the Schwartz Value Survey, we specify our evaluation values and develop a thousand-level dialogue dataset with GPT-4. Our assessment looks at both the value alignment of LLM's outputs compared to baseline answers and how LLM responses align with reasons for value recognition versus GPT-4's annotations. We evaluate five representative LLMs and provide strong evidence that the scaling law significantly impacts "know what" but not much on "know why", which has consistently maintained a high level. This may further suggest that LLMs might craft plausible explanations based on the provided context without truly understanding their inherent value, indicating potential risks.

Zero-shot Preference Learning for Offline RL via Optimal Transport

Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) has demonstrated remarkable efficacy in aligning rewards with human intentions. However, a significant challenge lies in the need of substantial human labels, which is costly and time-consuming. Additionally, the expensive preference data obtained from prior tasks is not typically reusable for subsequent task learning, leading to extensive labeling for each new task. In this paper, we propose a novel zero-shot preference-based RL algorithm that leverages labeled preference data from source tasks to infer labels for target tasks, eliminating the requirement for human queries. Our approach utilizes Gromov-Wasserstein distance to align trajectory distributions between source and target tasks. The solved optimal transport matrix serves as a correspondence between trajectories of two tasks, making it possible to identify corresponding trajectory pairs between tasks and transfer the preference labels. However, learning directly from inferred labels that contains a fraction of noisy labels will result in an inaccurate reward function, subsequently affecting policy performance. To this end, we introduce Robust Preference Transformer, which models the rewards as Gaussian distributions and incorporates reward uncertainty in addition to reward mean. The empirical results on robotic manipulation tasks of Meta-World and Robomimic show that our method has strong capabilities of transferring preferences between tasks and learns reward functions from noisy labels robustly. Furthermore, we reveal that our method attains near-oracle performance with a small proportion of scripted labels.