How Do Large Language Monkeys Get Their Power (Laws)?

Recent research across mathematical problem solving, proof assistant programming and multimodal jailbreaking documents a striking finding: when (multimodal) language model tackle a suite of tasks with multiple attempts per task -- succeeding if any attempt is correct -- then the negative log of the average success rate scales a power law in the number of attempts. In this work, we identify an apparent puzzle: a simple mathematical calculation predicts that on each problem, the failure rate should fall exponentially with the number of attempts. We confirm this prediction empirically, raising a question: from where does aggregate polynomial scaling emerge? We then answer this question by demonstrating per-problem exponential scaling can be made consistent with aggregate polynomial scaling if the distribution of single-attempt success probabilities is heavy tailed such that a small fraction of tasks with extremely low success probabilities collectively warp the aggregate success trend into a power law - even as each problem scales exponentially on its own. We further demonstrate that this distributional perspective explains previously observed deviations from power law scaling, and provides a simple method for forecasting the power law exponent with an order of magnitude lower relative error, or equivalently, ${\sim}2-4$ orders of magnitude less inference compute. Overall, our work contributes to a better understanding of how neural language model performance improves with scaling inference compute and the development of scaling-predictable evaluations of (multimodal) language models.

Forecasting Rare Language Model Behaviors

Standard language model evaluations can fail to capture risks that emerge only at deployment scale. For example, a model may produce safe responses during a small-scale beta test, yet reveal dangerous information when processing billions of requests at deployment. To remedy this, we introduce a method to forecast potential risks across orders of magnitude more queries than we test during evaluation. We make forecasts by studying each query's elicitation probability -- the probability the query produces a target behavior -- and demonstrate that the largest observed elicitation probabilities predictably scale with the number of queries. We find that our forecasts can predict the emergence of diverse undesirable behaviors -- such as assisting users with dangerous chemical synthesis or taking power-seeking actions -- across up to three orders of magnitude of query volume. Our work enables model developers to proactively anticipate and patch rare failures before they manifest during large-scale deployments.

Best-of-N Jailbreaking

We introduce Best-of-N (BoN) Jailbreaking, a simple black-box algorithm that jailbreaks frontier AI systems across modalities. BoN Jailbreaking works by repeatedly sampling variations of a prompt with a combination of augmentations - such as random shuffling or capitalization for textual prompts - until a harmful response is elicited. We find that BoN Jailbreaking achieves high attack success rates (ASRs) on closed-source language models, such as 89% on GPT-4o and 78% on Claude 3.5 Sonnet when sampling 10,000 augmented prompts. Further, it is similarly effective at circumventing state-of-the-art open-source defenses like circuit breakers. BoN also seamlessly extends to other modalities: it jailbreaks vision language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4o and audio language models (ALMs) like Gemini 1.5 Pro, using modality-specific augmentations. BoN reliably improves when we sample more augmented prompts. Across all modalities, ASR, as a function of the number of samples (N), empirically follows power-law-like behavior for many orders of magnitude. BoN Jailbreaking can also be composed with other black-box algorithms for even more effective attacks - combining BoN with an optimized prefix attack achieves up to a 35% increase in ASR. Overall, our work indicates that, despite their capability, language models are sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes to inputs, which attackers can exploit across modalities.

Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Models

Developers try to evaluate whether an AI system can be misused by adversaries before releasing it; for example, they might test whether a model enables cyberoffense, user manipulation, or bioterrorism. In this work, we show that individually testing models for misuse is inadequate; adversaries can misuse combinations of models even when each individual model is safe. The adversary accomplishes this by first decomposing tasks into subtasks, then solving each subtask with the best-suited model. For example, an adversary might solve challenging-but-benign subtasks with an aligned frontier model, and easy-but-malicious subtasks with a weaker misaligned model. We study two decomposition methods: manual decomposition where a human identifies a natural decomposition of a task, and automated decomposition where a weak model generates benign tasks for a frontier model to solve, then uses the solutions in-context to solve the original task. Using these decompositions, we empirically show that adversaries can create vulnerable code, explicit images, python scripts for hacking, and manipulative tweets at much higher rates with combinations of models than either individual model. Our work suggests that even perfectly-aligned frontier systems can enable misuse without ever producing malicious outputs, and that red-teaming efforts should extend beyond single models in isolation.

Feedback Loops With Language Models Drive In-Context Reward Hacking

Language models influence the external world: they query APIs that read and write to web pages, generate content that shapes human behavior, and run system commands as autonomous agents. These interactions form feedback loops: LLM outputs affect the world, which in turn affect subsequent LLM outputs. In this work, we show that feedback loops can cause in-context reward hacking (ICRH), where the LLM at test-time optimizes a (potentially implicit) objective but creates negative side effects in the process. For example, consider an LLM agent deployed to increase Twitter engagement; the LLM may retrieve its previous tweets into the context window and make them more controversial, increasing engagement but also toxicity. We identify and study two processes that lead to ICRH: output-refinement and policy-refinement. For these processes, evaluations on static datasets are insufficient -- they miss the feedback effects and thus cannot capture the most harmful behavior. In response, we provide three recommendations for evaluation to capture more instances of ICRH. As AI development accelerates, the effects of feedback loops will proliferate, increasing the need to understand their role in shaping LLM behavior.

Orca 2: Teaching Small Language Models How to Reason

Orca 1 learns from rich signals, such as explanation traces, allowing it to outperform conventional instruction-tuned models on benchmarks like BigBench Hard and AGIEval. In Orca 2, we continue exploring how improved training signals can enhance smaller LMs' reasoning abilities. Research on training small LMs has often relied on imitation learning to replicate the output of more capable models. We contend that excessive emphasis on imitation may restrict the potential of smaller models. We seek to teach small LMs to employ different solution strategies for different tasks, potentially different from the one used by the larger model. For example, while larger models might provide a direct answer to a complex task, smaller models may not have the same capacity. In Orca 2, we teach the model various reasoning techniques (step-by-step, recall then generate, recall-reason-generate, direct answer, etc.). More crucially, we aim to help the model learn to determine the most effective solution strategy for each task. We evaluate Orca 2 using a comprehensive set of 15 diverse benchmarks (corresponding to approximately 100 tasks and over 36,000 unique prompts). Orca 2 significantly surpasses models of similar size and attains performance levels similar or better to those of models 5-10x larger, as assessed on complex tasks that test advanced reasoning abilities in zero-shot settings. make Orca 2 weights publicly available at aka.ms/orca-lm to support research on the development, evaluation, and alignment of smaller LMs

Teaching Language Models to Hallucinate Less with Synthetic Tasks

Large language models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate on abstractive summarization tasks such as document-based question-answering, meeting summarization, and clinical report generation, even though all necessary information is included in context. However, optimizing LLMs to hallucinate less on these tasks is challenging, as hallucination is hard to efficiently evaluate at each optimization step. In this work, we show that reducing hallucination on a synthetic task can also reduce hallucination on real-world downstream tasks. Our method, SynTra, first designs a synthetic task where hallucinations are easy to elicit and measure. It next optimizes the LLM's system message via prefix-tuning on the synthetic task, and finally transfers the system message to realistic, hard-to-optimize tasks. Across three realistic abstractive summarization tasks, SynTra reduces hallucination for two 13B-parameter LLMs using only a synthetic retrieval task for supervision. We also find that optimizing the system message rather than the model weights can be critical; fine-tuning the entire model on the synthetic task can counterintuitively increase hallucination. Overall, SynTra demonstrates that the extra flexibility of working with synthetic data can help mitigate undesired behaviors in practice.

Attention Satisfies: A Constraint-Satisfaction Lens on Factual Errors of Language Models

We investigate the internal behavior of Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) when they generate factually incorrect text. We propose modeling factual queries as Constraint Satisfaction Problems and use this framework to investigate how the model interacts internally with factual constraints. Specifically, we discover a strong positive relation between the model's attention to constraint tokens and the factual accuracy of its responses. In our curated suite of 11 datasets with over 40,000 prompts, we study the task of predicting factual errors with the Llama-2 family across all scales (7B, 13B, 70B). We propose SAT Probe, a method probing self-attention patterns, that can predict constraint satisfaction and factual errors, and allows early error identification. The approach and findings demonstrate how using the mechanistic understanding of factuality in LLMs can enhance reliability.

Mass-Producing Failures of Multimodal Systems with Language Models

Deployed multimodal systems can fail in ways that evaluators did not anticipate. In order to find these failures before deployment, we introduce MultiMon, a system that automatically identifies systematic failures -- generalizable, natural-language descriptions of patterns of model failures. To uncover systematic failures, MultiMon scrapes a corpus for examples of erroneous agreement: inputs that produce the same output, but should not. It then prompts a language model (e.g., GPT-4) to find systematic patterns of failure and describe them in natural language. We use MultiMon to find 14 systematic failures (e.g., "ignores quantifiers") of the CLIP text-encoder, each comprising hundreds of distinct inputs (e.g., "a shelf with a few/many books"). Because CLIP is the backbone for most state-of-the-art multimodal systems, these inputs produce failures in Midjourney 5.1, DALL-E, VideoFusion, and others. MultiMon can also steer towards failures relevant to specific use cases, such as self-driving cars. We see MultiMon as a step towards evaluation that autonomously explores the long tail of potential system failures. Code for MULTIMON is available at https://github.com/tsb0601/MultiMon.

Automatically Auditing Large Language Models via Discrete Optimization

Auditing large language models for unexpected behaviors is critical to preempt catastrophic deployments, yet remains challenging. In this work, we cast auditing as an optimization problem, where we automatically search for input-output pairs that match a desired target behavior. For example, we might aim to find a non-toxic input that starts with "Barack Obama" that a model maps to a toxic output. This optimization problem is difficult to solve as the set of feasible points is sparse, the space is discrete, and the language models we audit are non-linear and high-dimensional. To combat these challenges, we introduce a discrete optimization algorithm, ARCA, that jointly and efficiently optimizes over inputs and outputs. Our approach automatically uncovers derogatory completions about celebrities (e.g. "Barack Obama is a legalized unborn" -> "child murderer"), produces French inputs that complete to English outputs, and finds inputs that generate a specific name. Our work offers a promising new tool to uncover models' failure-modes before deployment.