Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in natural language generation tasks, yet their uncontrolled outputs pose significant ethical and safety risks. Recently, representation engineering methods have shown promising results in steering model behavior by modifying the rich semantic information encoded in activation vectors. However, due to the difficulty of precisely disentangling semantic directions within high-dimensional representation space, existing approaches suffer from three major limitations: lack of fine-grained control, quality degradation of generated content, and poor interpretability. To address these challenges, we propose a sparse encoding-based representation engineering method, named SRE, which decomposes polysemantic activations into a structured, monosemantic feature space. By leveraging sparse autoencoding, our approach isolates and adjusts only task-specific sparse feature dimensions, enabling precise and interpretable steering of model behavior while preserving content quality. We validate our method on three critical domains, i.e., safety, fairness, and truthfulness using the open-source LLM Gemma-2-2B-it. Experimental results show that SRE achieves superior controllability while maintaining the overall quality of generated content (i.e., controllability and quality), demonstrating its effectiveness as a fine-grained and interpretable activation steering framework.
Abstract:Small language models (SLMs) have emerged as promising alternatives to large language models (LLMs) due to their low computational demands, enhanced privacy guarantees and comparable performance in specific domains through light-weight fine-tuning. Deploying SLMs on edge devices, such as smartphones and smart vehicles, has become a growing trend. However, the security implications of SLMs have received less attention than LLMs, particularly regarding jailbreak attacks, which is recognized as one of the top threats of LLMs by the OWASP. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of SLMs' vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. Through systematically evaluation on 63 SLMs from 15 mainstream SLM families against 8 state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, we demonstrate that 47.6% of evaluated SLMs show high susceptibility to jailbreak attacks (ASR > 40%) and 38.1% of them can not even resist direct harmful query (ASR > 50%). We further analyze the reasons behind the vulnerabilities and identify four key factors: model size, model architecture, training datasets and training techniques. Moreover, we assess the effectiveness of three prompt-level defense methods and find that none of them achieve perfect performance, with detection accuracy varying across different SLMs and attack methods. Notably, we point out that the inherent security awareness play a critical role in SLM security, and models with strong security awareness could timely terminate unsafe response with little reminder. Building upon the findings, we highlight the urgent need for security-by-design approaches in SLM development and provide valuable insights for building more trustworthy SLM ecosystem.
Abstract:Physical adversarial patches printed on clothing can easily allow individuals to evade person detectors. However, most existing adversarial patch generation methods prioritize attack effectiveness over stealthiness, resulting in patches that are aesthetically unpleasing. Although existing methods using generative adversarial networks or diffusion models can produce more natural-looking patches, they often struggle to balance stealthiness with attack effectiveness and lack flexibility for user customization. To address these challenges, we propose a novel diffusion-based customizable patch generation framework termed DiffPatch, specifically tailored for creating naturalistic and customizable adversarial patches. Our approach enables users to utilize a reference image as the source, rather than starting from random noise, and incorporates masks to craft naturalistic patches of various shapes, not limited to squares. To prevent the original semantics from being lost during the diffusion process, we employ Null-text inversion to map random noise samples to a single input image and generate patches through Incomplete Diffusion Optimization (IDO). Notably, while maintaining a natural appearance, our method achieves a comparable attack performance to state-of-the-art non-naturalistic patches when using similarly sized attacks. Using DiffPatch, we have created a physical adversarial T-shirt dataset, AdvPatch-1K, specifically targeting YOLOv5s. This dataset includes over a thousand images across diverse scenarios, validating the effectiveness of our attack in real-world environments. Moreover, it provides a valuable resource for future research.
Abstract:This paper investigates the feasibility of a proactive DeepFake defense framework, {\em FacePosion}, to prevent individuals from becoming victims of DeepFake videos by sabotaging face detection. The motivation stems from the reliance of most DeepFake methods on face detectors to automatically extract victim faces from videos for training or synthesis (testing). Once the face detectors malfunction, the extracted faces will be distorted or incorrect, subsequently disrupting the training or synthesis of the DeepFake model. To achieve this, we adapt various adversarial attacks with a dedicated design for this purpose and thoroughly analyze their feasibility. Based on FacePoison, we introduce {\em VideoFacePoison}, a strategy that propagates FacePoison across video frames rather than applying them individually to each frame. This strategy can largely reduce the computational overhead while retaining the favorable attack performance. Our method is validated on five face detectors, and extensive experiments against eleven different DeepFake models demonstrate the effectiveness of disrupting face detectors to hinder DeepFake generation.
Abstract:Recently, point clouds have been widely used in computer vision, whereas their collection is time-consuming and expensive. As such, point cloud datasets are the valuable intellectual property of their owners and deserve protection. To detect and prevent unauthorized use of these datasets, especially for commercial or open-sourced ones that cannot be sold again or used commercially without permission, we intend to identify whether a suspicious third-party model is trained on our protected dataset under the black-box setting. We achieve this goal by designing a scalable clean-label backdoor-based dataset watermark for point clouds that ensures both effectiveness and stealthiness. Unlike existing clean-label watermark schemes, which are susceptible to the number of categories, our method could watermark samples from all classes instead of only from the target one. Accordingly, it can still preserve high effectiveness even on large-scale datasets with many classes. Specifically, we perturb selected point clouds with non-target categories in both shape-wise and point-wise manners before inserting trigger patterns without changing their labels. The features of perturbed samples are similar to those of benign samples from the target class. As such, models trained on the watermarked dataset will have a distinctive yet stealthy backdoor behavior, i.e., misclassifying samples from the target class whenever triggers appear, since the trained DNNs will treat the inserted trigger pattern as a signal to deny predicting the target label. We also design a hypothesis-test-guided dataset ownership verification based on the proposed watermark. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets are conducted, verifying the effectiveness of our method and its resistance to potential removal methods.
Abstract:We propose the Artificial Intelligence Velocimetry-Thermometry (AIVT) method to infer hidden temperature fields from experimental turbulent velocity data. This physics-informed machine learning method enables us to infer continuous temperature fields using only sparse velocity data, hence eliminating the need for direct temperature measurements. Specifically, AIVT is based on physics-informed Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks (not neural networks) and is trained by optimizing a combined loss function that minimizes the residuals of the velocity data, boundary conditions, and the governing equations. We apply AIVT to a unique set of experimental volumetric and simultaneous temperature and velocity data of Rayleigh-B\'enard convection (RBC) that we acquired by combining Particle Image Thermometry and Lagrangian Particle Tracking. This allows us to compare AIVT predictions and measurements directly. We demonstrate that we can reconstruct and infer continuous and instantaneous velocity and temperature fields from sparse experimental data at a fidelity comparable to direct numerical simulations (DNS) of turbulence. This, in turn, enables us to compute important quantities for quantifying turbulence, such as fluctuations, viscous and thermal dissipation, and QR distribution. This paradigm shift in processing experimental data using AIVT to infer turbulent fields at DNS-level fidelity is a promising avenue in breaking the current deadlock of quantitative understanding of turbulence at high Reynolds numbers, where DNS is computationally infeasible.
Abstract:Recently, advanced Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 have been integrated into many real-world applications like Code Copilot. These applications have significantly expanded the attack surface of LLMs, exposing them to a variety of threats. Among them, jailbreak attacks that induce toxic responses through jailbreak prompts have raised critical safety concerns. To identify these threats, a growing number of red teaming approaches simulate potential adversarial scenarios by crafting jailbreak prompts to test the target LLM. However, existing red teaming methods do not consider the unique vulnerabilities of LLM in different scenarios, making it difficult to adjust the jailbreak prompts to find context-specific vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, these methods are limited to refining jailbreak templates using a few mutation operations, lacking the automation and scalability to adapt to different scenarios. To enable context-aware and efficient red teaming, we abstract and model existing attacks into a coherent concept called "jailbreak strategy" and propose a multi-agent LLM system named RedAgent that leverages these strategies to generate context-aware jailbreak prompts. By self-reflecting on contextual feedback in an additional memory buffer, RedAgent continuously learns how to leverage these strategies to achieve effective jailbreaks in specific contexts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our system can jailbreak most black-box LLMs in just five queries, improving the efficiency of existing red teaming methods by two times. Additionally, RedAgent can jailbreak customized LLM applications more efficiently. By generating context-aware jailbreak prompts towards applications on GPTs, we discover 60 severe vulnerabilities of these real-world applications with only two queries per vulnerability. We have reported all found issues and communicated with OpenAI and Meta for bug fixes.
Abstract:Federated Learning (FL) exhibits privacy vulnerabilities under gradient inversion attacks (GIAs), which can extract private information from individual gradients. To enhance privacy, FL incorporates Secure Aggregation (SA) to prevent the server from obtaining individual gradients, thus effectively resisting GIAs. In this paper, we propose a stealthy label inference attack to bypass SA and recover individual clients' private labels. Specifically, we conduct a theoretical analysis of label inference from the aggregated gradients that are exclusively obtained after implementing SA. The analysis results reveal that the inputs (embeddings) and outputs (logits) of the final fully connected layer (FCL) contribute to gradient disaggregation and label restoration. To preset the embeddings and logits of FCL, we craft a fishing model by solely modifying the parameters of a single batch normalization (BN) layer in the original model. Distributing client-specific fishing models, the server can derive the individual gradients regarding the bias of FCL by resolving a linear system with expected embeddings and the aggregated gradients as coefficients. Then the labels of each client can be precisely computed based on preset logits and gradients of FCL's bias. Extensive experiments show that our attack achieves large-scale label recovery with 100\% accuracy on various datasets and model architectures.
Abstract:Language models (LMs) are susceptible to "memorizing" training data, including a large amount of private or copyright-protected content. To safeguard the right to be forgotten (RTBF), machine unlearning has emerged as a promising method for LMs to efficiently "forget" sensitive training content and mitigate knowledge leakage risks. However, despite its good intentions, could the unlearning mechanism be counterproductive? In this paper, we propose the Textual Unlearning Leakage Attack (TULA), where an adversary can infer information about the unlearned data only by accessing the models before and after unlearning. Furthermore, we present variants of TULA in both black-box and white-box scenarios. Through various experimental results, we critically demonstrate that machine unlearning amplifies the risk of knowledge leakage from LMs. Specifically, TULA can increase an adversary's ability to infer membership information about the unlearned data by more than 20% in black-box scenario. Moreover, TULA can even reconstruct the unlearned data directly with more than 60% accuracy with white-box access. Our work is the first to reveal that machine unlearning in LMs can inversely create greater knowledge risks and inspire the development of more secure unlearning mechanisms.
Abstract:Spurious correlations in training data significantly hinder the generalization capability of machine learning models when faced with distribution shifts in real-world scenarios. To tackle the problem, numerous debias approaches have been proposed and benchmarked on datasets intentionally designed with severe biases. However, it remains to be asked: \textit{1. Do existing benchmarks really capture biases in the real world? 2. Can existing debias methods handle biases in the real world?} To answer the questions, we revisit biased distributions in existing benchmarks and real-world datasets, and propose a fine-grained framework for analyzing dataset bias by disentangling it into the magnitude and prevalence of bias. We observe and theoretically demonstrate that existing benchmarks poorly represent real-world biases. We further introduce two novel biased distributions to bridge this gap, forming a nuanced evaluation framework for real-world debiasing. Building upon these results, we evaluate existing debias methods with our evaluation framework. Results show that existing methods are incapable of handling real-world biases. Through in-depth analysis, we propose a simple yet effective approach that can be easily applied to existing debias methods, named Debias in Destruction (DiD). Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of DiD, improving the performance of existing methods on all types of biases within the proposed evaluation framework.