Computing Ex Ante Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Zero-Sum Team Games

The ex ante equilibrium for two-team zero-sum games, where agents within each team collaborate to compete against the opposing team, is known to be the best a team can do for coordination. Many existing works on ex ante equilibrium solutions are aiming to extend the scope of ex ante equilibrium solving to large-scale team games based on Policy Space Response Oracle (PSRO). However, the joint team policy space constructed by the most prominent method, Team PSRO, cannot cover the entire team policy space in heterogeneous team games where teammates play distinct roles. Such insufficient policy expressiveness causes Team PSRO to be trapped into a sub-optimal ex ante equilibrium with significantly higher exploitability and never converges to the global ex ante equilibrium. To find the global ex ante equilibrium without introducing additional computational complexity, we first parameterize heterogeneous policies for teammates, and we prove that optimizing the heterogeneous teammates' policies sequentially can guarantee a monotonic improvement in team rewards. We further propose Heterogeneous-PSRO (H-PSRO), a novel framework for heterogeneous team games, which integrates the sequential correlation mechanism into the PSRO framework and serves as the first PSRO framework for heterogeneous team games. We prove that H-PSRO achieves lower exploitability than Team PSRO in heterogeneous team games. Empirically, H-PSRO achieves convergence in matrix heterogeneous games that are unsolvable by non-heterogeneous baselines. Further experiments reveal that H-PSRO outperforms non-heterogeneous baselines in both heterogeneous team games and homogeneous settings.

Tailed Low-Rank Matrix Factorization for Similarity Matrix Completion

Similarity matrix serves as a fundamental tool at the core of numerous downstream machine-learning tasks. However, missing data is inevitable and often results in an inaccurate similarity matrix. To address this issue, Similarity Matrix Completion (SMC) methods have been proposed, but they suffer from high computation complexity due to the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) operation. To reduce the computation complexity, Matrix Factorization (MF) techniques are more explicit and frequently applied to provide a low-rank solution, but the exact low-rank optimal solution can not be guaranteed since it suffers from a non-convex structure. In this paper, we introduce a novel SMC framework that offers a more reliable and efficient solution. Specifically, beyond simply utilizing the unique Positive Semi-definiteness (PSD) property to guide the completion process, our approach further complements a carefully designed rank-minimization regularizer, aiming to achieve an optimal and low-rank solution. Based on the key insights that the underlying PSD property and Low-Rank property improve the SMC performance, we present two novel, scalable, and effective algorithms, SMCNN and SMCNmF, which investigate the PSD property to guide the estimation process and incorporate nonconvex low-rank regularizer to ensure the low-rank solution. Theoretical analysis ensures better estimation performance and convergence speed. Empirical results on real-world datasets demonstrate the superiority and efficiency of our proposed methods compared to various baseline methods.

In-Context Exploiter for Extensive-Form Games

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a widely adopted solution concept in game theory due to its stability property. However, we observe that the NE strategy might not always yield the best results, especially against opponents who do not adhere to NE strategies. Based on this observation, we pose a new game-solving question: Can we learn a model that can exploit any, even NE, opponent to maximize their own utility? In this work, we make the first attempt to investigate this problem through in-context learning. Specifically, we introduce a novel method, In-Context Exploiter (ICE), to train a single model that can act as any player in the game and adaptively exploit opponents entirely by in-context learning. Our ICE algorithm involves generating diverse opponent strategies, collecting interactive history training data by a reinforcement learning algorithm, and training a transformer-based agent within a well-designed curriculum learning framework. Finally, comprehensive experimental results validate the effectiveness of our ICE algorithm, showcasing its in-context learning ability to exploit any unknown opponent, thereby positively answering our initial game-solving question.

Direct Alignment of Language Models via Quality-Aware Self-Refinement

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been commonly used to align the behaviors of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. Recently, a popular alternative is Direct Policy Optimization (DPO), which replaces an LLM-based reward model with the policy itself, thus obviating the need for extra memory and training time to learn the reward model. However, DPO does not consider the relative qualities of the positive and negative responses, and can lead to sub-optimal training outcomes. To alleviate this problem, we investigate the use of intrinsic knowledge within the on-the-fly fine-tuning LLM to obtain relative qualities and help to refine the loss function. Specifically, we leverage the knowledge of the LLM to design a refinement function to estimate the quality of both the positive and negative responses. We show that the constructed refinement function can help self-refine the loss function under mild assumptions. The refinement function is integrated into DPO and its variant Identity Policy Optimization (IPO). Experiments across various evaluators indicate that they can improve the performance of the fine-tuned models over DPO and IPO.

Grasper: A Generalist Pursuer for Pursuit-Evasion Problems

Pursuit-evasion games (PEGs) model interactions between a team of pursuers and an evader in graph-based environments such as urban street networks. Recent advancements have demonstrated the effectiveness of the pre-training and fine-tuning paradigm in PSRO to improve scalability in solving large-scale PEGs. However, these methods primarily focus on specific PEGs with fixed initial conditions that may vary substantially in real-world scenarios, which significantly hinders the applicability of the traditional methods. To address this issue, we introduce Grasper, a GeneRAlist purSuer for Pursuit-Evasion pRoblems, capable of efficiently generating pursuer policies tailored to specific PEGs. Our contributions are threefold: First, we present a novel architecture that offers high-quality solutions for diverse PEGs, comprising critical components such as (i) a graph neural network (GNN) to encode PEGs into hidden vectors, and (ii) a hypernetwork to generate pursuer policies based on these hidden vectors. As a second contribution, we develop an efficient three-stage training method involving (i) a pre-pretraining stage for learning robust PEG representations through self-supervised graph learning techniques like GraphMAE, (ii) a pre-training stage utilizing heuristic-guided multi-task pre-training (HMP) where heuristic-derived reference policies (e.g., through Dijkstra's algorithm) regularize pursuer policies, and (iii) a fine-tuning stage that employs PSRO to generate pursuer policies on designated PEGs. Finally, we perform extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world maps, showcasing Grasper's significant superiority over baselines in terms of solution quality and generalizability. We demonstrate that Grasper provides a versatile approach for solving pursuit-evasion problems across a broad range of scenarios, enabling practical deployment in real-world situations.

Offline Equilibrium Finding

Offline reinforcement learning (Offline RL) is an emerging field that has recently begun gaining attention across various application domains due to its ability to learn behavior from earlier collected datasets. Using logged data is imperative when further interaction with the environment is expensive (computationally or otherwise), unsafe, or entirely unfeasible. Offline RL proved very successful, paving a path to solving previously intractable real-world problems, and we aim to generalize this paradigm to a multi-agent or multiplayer-game setting. Very little research has been done in this area, as the progress is hindered by the lack of standardized datasets and meaningful benchmarks. In this work, we coin the term offline equilibrium finding (OEF) to describe this area and construct multiple datasets consisting of strategies collected across a wide range of games using several established methods. We also propose a benchmark method -- an amalgamation of a behavior-cloning and a model-based algorithm. Our two model-based algorithms -- OEF-PSRO and OEF-CFR -- are adaptations of the widely-used equilibrium finding algorithms Deep CFR and PSRO in the context of offline learning. In the empirical part, we evaluate the performance of the benchmark algorithms on the constructed datasets. We hope that our efforts may help to accelerate research in large-scale equilibrium finding. Datasets and code are available at https://github.com/SecurityGames/oef.

Solving Large-Scale Extensive-Form Network Security Games via Neural Fictitious Self-Play

Securing networked infrastructures is important in the real world. The problem of deploying security resources to protect against an attacker in networked domains can be modeled as Network Security Games (NSGs). Unfortunately, existing approaches, including the deep learning-based approaches, are inefficient to solve large-scale extensive-form NSGs. In this paper, we propose a novel learning paradigm, NSG-NFSP, to solve large-scale extensive-form NSGs based on Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP). Our main contributions include: i) reforming the best response (BR) policy network in NFSP to be a mapping from action-state pair to action-value, to make the calculation of BR possible in NSGs; ii) converting the average policy network of an NFSP agent into a metric-based classifier, helping the agent to assign distributions only on legal actions rather than all actions; iii) enabling NFSP with high-level actions, which can benefit training efficiency and stability in NSGs; and iv) leveraging information contained in graphs of NSGs by learning efficient graph node embeddings. Our algorithm significantly outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms in both scalability and solution quality.

CFR-MIX: Solving Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games with Combinatorial Action Space

In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which results in the inefficiency of the existing algorithms, e.g., Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR). To address this problem, we propose a new framework of CFR: CFR-MIX. Firstly, we propose a new strategy representation that represents a joint action strategy using individual strategies of all agents and a consistency relationship to maintain the cooperation between agents. To compute the equilibrium with individual strategies under the CFR framework, we transform the consistency relationship between strategies to the consistency relationship between the cumulative regret values. Furthermore, we propose a novel decomposition method over cumulative regret values to guarantee the consistency relationship between the cumulative regret values. Finally, we introduce our new algorithm CFR-MIX which employs a mixing layer to estimate cumulative regret values of joint actions as a non-linear combination of cumulative regret values of individual actions. Experimental results show that CFR-MIX outperforms existing algorithms on various games significantly.