Provable unlearning in topic modeling and downstream tasks

Machine unlearning algorithms are increasingly important as legal concerns arise around the provenance of training data, but verifying the success of unlearning is often difficult. Provable guarantees for unlearning are often limited to supervised learning settings. In this paper, we provide the first theoretical guarantees for unlearning in the pre-training and fine-tuning paradigm by studying topic models, simple bag-of-words language models that can be adapted to solve downstream tasks like retrieval and classification. First, we design a provably effective unlearning algorithm for topic models that incurs a computational overhead independent of the size of the original dataset. Our analysis additionally quantifies the deletion capacity of the model -- i.e., the number of examples that can be unlearned without incurring a significant cost in model performance. Finally, we formally extend our analyses to account for adaptation to a given downstream task. In particular, we design an efficient algorithm to perform unlearning after fine-tuning the topic model via a linear head. Notably, we show that it is easier to unlearn pre-training data from models that have been fine-tuned to a particular task, and one can unlearn this data without modifying the base model.

Delta-Influence: Unlearning Poisons via Influence Functions

Addressing data integrity challenges, such as unlearning the effects of data poisoning after model training, is necessary for the reliable deployment of machine learning models. State-of-the-art influence functions, such as EK-FAC, often fail to accurately attribute abnormal model behavior to the specific poisoned training data responsible for the data poisoning attack. In addition, traditional unlearning algorithms often struggle to effectively remove the influence of poisoned samples, particularly when only a few affected examples can be identified. To address these challenge, we introduce $\Delta$-Influence, a novel approach that leverages influence functions to trace abnormal model behavior back to the responsible poisoned training data using as little as just one poisoned test example. $\Delta$-Influence applies data transformations that sever the link between poisoned training data and compromised test points without significantly affecting clean data. This allows $\Delta$-Influence to detect large negative shifts in influence scores following data transformations, a phenomenon we term as influence collapse, thereby accurately identifying poisoned training data. Unlearning this subset, e.g. through retraining, effectively eliminates the data poisoning. We validate our method across three vision-based poisoning attacks and three datasets, benchmarking against four detection algorithms and five unlearning strategies. We show that $\Delta$-Influence consistently achieves the best unlearning across all settings, showing the promise of influence functions for corrective unlearning. Our code is publicly available at: \url{https://github.com/andyisokay/delta-influence}

Protecting against simultaneous data poisoning attacks

Current backdoor defense methods are evaluated against a single attack at a time. This is unrealistic, as powerful machine learning systems are trained on large datasets scraped from the internet, which may be attacked multiple times by one or more attackers. We demonstrate that simultaneously executed data poisoning attacks can effectively install multiple backdoors in a single model without substantially degrading clean accuracy. Furthermore, we show that existing backdoor defense methods do not effectively prevent attacks in this setting. Finally, we leverage insights into the nature of backdoor attacks to develop a new defense, BaDLoss, that is effective in the multi-attack setting. With minimal clean accuracy degradation, BaDLoss attains an average attack success rate in the multi-attack setting of 7.98% in CIFAR-10 and 10.29% in GTSRB, compared to the average of other defenses at 64.48% and 84.28% respectively.

Robust Mixture Learning when Outliers Overwhelm Small Groups

We study the problem of estimating the means of well-separated mixtures when an adversary may add arbitrary outliers. While strong guarantees are available when the outlier fraction is significantly smaller than the minimum mixing weight, much less is known when outliers may crowd out low-weight clusters - a setting we refer to as list-decodable mixture learning (LD-ML). In this case, adversarial outliers can simulate additional spurious mixture components. Hence, if all means of the mixture must be recovered up to a small error in the output list, the list size needs to be larger than the number of (true) components. We propose an algorithm that obtains order-optimal error guarantees for each mixture mean with a minimal list-size overhead, significantly improving upon list-decodable mean estimation, the only existing method that is applicable for LD-ML. Although improvements are observed even when the mixture is non-separated, our algorithm achieves particularly strong guarantees when the mixture is separated: it can leverage the mixture structure to partially cluster the samples before carefully iterating a base learner for list-decodable mean estimation at different scales.

What Makes and Breaks Safety Fine-tuning? A Mechanistic Study

Safety fine-tuning helps align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences for their safe deployment. To better understand the underlying factors that make models safe via safety fine-tuning, we design a synthetic data generation framework that captures salient aspects of an unsafe input by modeling the interaction between the task the model is asked to perform (e.g., "design") versus the specific concepts the task is asked to be performed upon (e.g., a "cycle" vs. a "bomb"). Using this, we investigate three well-known safety fine-tuning methods -- supervised safety fine-tuning, direct preference optimization, and unlearning -- and provide significant evidence demonstrating that these methods minimally transform MLP weights to specifically align unsafe inputs into its weights' null space. This yields a clustering of inputs based on whether the model deems them safe or not. Correspondingly, when an adversarial input (e.g., a jailbreak) is provided, its activations are closer to safer samples, leading to the model processing such an input as if it were safe. We validate our findings, wherever possible, on real-world models -- specifically, Llama-2 7B and Llama-3 8B.

What Makes and Breaks Safety Fine-tuning? Mechanistic Study

Safety fine-tuning helps align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences for their safe deployment. To better understand the underlying factors that make models safe via safety fine-tuning, we design a synthetic data generation framework that captures salient aspects of an unsafe input by modeling the interaction between the task the model is asked to perform (e.g., ``design'') versus the specific concepts the task is asked to be performed upon (e.g., a ``cycle'' vs. a ``bomb''). Using this, we investigate three well-known safety fine-tuning methods -- supervised safety fine-tuning, direct preference optimization, and unlearning -- and provide significant evidence demonstrating that these methods minimally transform MLP weights to specifically align unsafe inputs into its weights' null space. This yields a clustering of inputs based on whether the model deems them safe or not. Correspondingly, when an adversarial input (e.g., a jailbreak) is provided, its activations are closer to safer samples, leading to the model processing such an input as if it were safe. We validate our findings, wherever possible, on real-world models -- specifically, Llama-2 7B and Llama-3 8B.

Accuracy on the wrong line: On the pitfalls of noisy data for out-of-distribution generalisation

"Accuracy-on-the-line" is a widely observed phenomenon in machine learning, where a model's accuracy on in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) data is positively correlated across different hyperparameters and data configurations. But when does this useful relationship break down? In this work, we explore its robustness. The key observation is that noisy data and the presence of nuisance features can be sufficient to shatter the Accuracy-on-the-line phenomenon. In these cases, ID and OOD accuracy can become negatively correlated, leading to "Accuracy-on-the-wrong-line". This phenomenon can also occur in the presence of spurious (shortcut) features, which tend to overshadow the more complex signal (core, non-spurious) features, resulting in a large nuisance feature space. Moreover, scaling to larger datasets does not mitigate this undesirable behavior and may even exacerbate it. We formally prove a lower bound on Out-of-distribution (OOD) error in a linear classification model, characterizing the conditions on the noise and nuisance features for a large OOD error. We finally demonstrate this phenomenon across both synthetic and real datasets with noisy data and nuisance features.

The Role of Learning Algorithms in Collective Action

Collective action in Machine Learning is the study of the control that a coordinated group can have over machine learning algorithms. While previous research has concentrated on assessing the impact of collectives against Bayes optimal classifiers, this perspective is limited, given that in reality, classifiers seldom achieve Bayes optimality and are influenced by the choice of learning algorithms along with their inherent inductive biases. In this work, we initiate the study of how the choice of the learning algorithm plays a role in the success of a collective in practical settings. Specifically, we focus on distributionally robust algorithms (DRO), popular for improving a worst group error, and on the popular stochastic gradient descent (SGD), due to its inductive bias for "simpler" functions. Our empirical results, supported by a theoretical foundation, show that the effective size and success of the collective are highly dependent on properties of the learning algorithm. This highlights the necessity of taking the learning algorithm into account when studying the impact of collective action in Machine learning.

Provable Privacy with Non-Private Pre-Processing

When analysing Differentially Private (DP) machine learning pipelines, the potential privacy cost of data-dependent pre-processing is frequently overlooked in privacy accounting. In this work, we propose a general framework to evaluate the additional privacy cost incurred by non-private data-dependent pre-processing algorithms. Our framework establishes upper bounds on the overall privacy guarantees by utilising two new technical notions: a variant of DP termed Smooth DP and the bounded sensitivity of the pre-processing algorithms. In addition to the generic framework, we provide explicit overall privacy guarantees for multiple data-dependent pre-processing algorithms, such as data imputation, quantization, deduplication and PCA, when used in combination with several DP algorithms. Notably, this framework is also simple to implement, allowing direct integration into existing DP pipelines.

On the Growth of Mistakes in Differentially Private Online Learning: A Lower Bound Perspective

In this paper, we provide lower bounds for Differentially Private (DP) Online Learning algorithms. Our result shows that, for a broad class of $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-DP online algorithms, for $T$ such that $\log T\leq O(1 / \delta)$, the expected number of mistakes incurred by the algorithm grows as $\Omega(\log \frac{T}{\delta})$. This matches the upper bound obtained by Golowich and Livni (2021) and is in contrast to non-private online learning where the number of mistakes is independent of $T$. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first result towards settling lower bounds for DP-Online learning and partially addresses the open question in Sanyal and Ramponi (2022).