EscapeBench: Pushing Language Models to Think Outside the Box

Language model agents excel in long-session planning and reasoning, but existing benchmarks primarily focus on goal-oriented tasks with explicit objectives, neglecting creative adaptation in unfamiliar environments. To address this, we introduce EscapeBench, a benchmark suite of room escape game environments designed to challenge agents with creative reasoning, unconventional tool use, and iterative problem-solving to uncover implicit goals. Our results show that current LM models, despite employing working memory and Chain-of-Thought reasoning, achieve only 15% average progress without hints, highlighting their limitations in creativity. To bridge this gap, we propose EscapeAgent, a framework designed to enhance creative reasoning through Foresight (innovative tool use) and Reflection (identifying unsolved tasks). Experiments show that EscapeAgent can execute action chains over 1,000 steps while maintaining logical coherence. It navigates and completes games with up to 40% fewer steps and hints, performs robustly across varying difficulty levels, and achieves higher action success rates with more efficient and innovative puzzle-solving strategies. All the data and codes are released.

Shadowcast: Stealthy Data Poisoning Attacks Against Vision-Language Models

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel in generating textual responses from visual inputs, yet their versatility raises significant security concerns. This study takes the first step in exposing VLMs' susceptibility to data poisoning attacks that can manipulate responses to innocuous, everyday prompts. We introduce Shadowcast, a stealthy data poisoning attack method where poison samples are visually indistinguishable from benign images with matching texts. Shadowcast demonstrates effectiveness in two attack types. The first is Label Attack, tricking VLMs into misidentifying class labels, such as confusing Donald Trump for Joe Biden. The second is Persuasion Attack, which leverages VLMs' text generation capabilities to craft narratives, such as portraying junk food as health food, through persuasive and seemingly rational descriptions. We show that Shadowcast are highly effective in achieving attacker's intentions using as few as 50 poison samples. Moreover, these poison samples remain effective across various prompts and are transferable across different VLM architectures in the black-box setting. This work reveals how poisoned VLMs can generate convincing yet deceptive misinformation and underscores the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of VLMs. Our code is available at: https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning.

Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning -- Certify the Confidence Interval

Currently, reinforcement learning (RL), especially deep RL, has received more and more attention in the research area. However, the security of RL has been an obvious problem due to the attack manners becoming mature. In order to defend against such adversarial attacks, several practical approaches are developed, such as adversarial training, data filtering, etc. However, these methods are mostly based on empirical algorithms and experiments, without rigorous theoretical analysis of the robustness of the algorithms. In this paper, we develop an algorithm to certify the robustness of a given policy offline with random smoothing, which could be proven and conducted as efficiently as ones without random smoothing. Experiments on different environments confirm the correctness of our algorithm.