The 1st Workshop on Human-Centered Recommender Systems

Recommender systems are quintessential applications of human-computer interaction. Widely utilized in daily life, they offer significant convenience but also present numerous challenges, such as the information cocoon effect, privacy concerns, fairness issues, and more. Consequently, this workshop aims to provide a platform for researchers to explore the development of Human-Centered Recommender Systems~(HCRS). HCRS refers to the creation of recommender systems that prioritize human needs, values, and capabilities at the core of their design and operation. In this workshop, topics will include, but are not limited to, robustness, privacy, transparency, fairness, diversity, accountability, ethical considerations, and user-friendly design. We hope to engage in discussions on how to implement and enhance these properties in recommender systems. Additionally, participants will explore diverse evaluation methods, including innovative metrics that capture user satisfaction and trust. This workshop seeks to foster a collaborative environment for researchers to share insights and advance the field toward more ethical, user-centric, and socially responsible recommender systems.

Improving the Shortest Plank: Vulnerability-Aware Adversarial Training for Robust Recommender System

Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.

Accelerating the Surrogate Retraining for Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems

Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of recommender systems to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject carefully crafted fake user interactions into the training data of recommenders to promote target items. Current attack methods involve iteratively retraining a surrogate recommender on the poisoned data with the latest fake users to optimize the attack. However, this repetitive retraining is highly time-consuming, hindering the efficient assessment and optimization of fake users. To mitigate this computational bottleneck and develop a more effective attack in an affordable time, we analyze the retraining process and find that a change in the representation of one user/item will cause a cascading effect through the user-item interaction graph. Under theoretical guidance, we introduce \emph{Gradient Passing} (GP), a novel technique that explicitly passes gradients between interacted user-item pairs during backpropagation, thereby approximating the cascading effect and accelerating retraining. With just a single update, GP can achieve effects comparable to multiple original training iterations. Under the same number of retraining epochs, GP enables a closer approximation of the surrogate recommender to the victim. This more accurate approximation provides better guidance for optimizing fake users, ultimately leading to enhanced data poisoning attacks. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed GP.

LoRec: Large Language Model for Robust Sequential Recommendation against Poisoning Attacks

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

Robust Recommender System: A Survey and Future Directions

With the rapid growth of information, recommender systems have become integral for providing personalized suggestions and overcoming information overload. However, their practical deployment often encounters "dirty" data, where noise or malicious information can lead to abnormal recommendations. Research on improving recommender systems' robustness against such dirty data has thus gained significant attention. This survey provides a comprehensive review of recent work on recommender systems' robustness. We first present a taxonomy to organize current techniques for withstanding malicious attacks and natural noise. We then explore state-of-the-art methods in each category, including fraudster detection, adversarial training, certifiable robust training against malicious attacks, and regularization, purification, self-supervised learning against natural noise. Additionally, we summarize evaluation metrics and common datasets used to assess robustness. We discuss robustness across varying recommendation scenarios and its interplay with other properties like accuracy, interpretability, privacy, and fairness. Finally, we delve into open issues and future research directions in this emerging field. Our goal is to equip readers with a holistic understanding of robust recommender systems and spotlight pathways for future research and development.

IDEA: Invariant Causal Defense for Graph Adversarial Robustness

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable success in various tasks, however, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks raises concerns for the real-world applications. Existing defense methods can resist some attacks, but suffer unbearable performance degradation under other unknown attacks. This is due to their reliance on either limited observed adversarial examples to optimize (adversarial training) or specific heuristics to alter graph or model structures (graph purification or robust aggregation). In this paper, we propose an Invariant causal DEfense method against adversarial Attacks (IDEA), providing a new perspective to address this issue. The method aims to learn causal features that possess strong predictability for labels and invariant predictability across attacks, to achieve graph adversarial robustness. Through modeling and analyzing the causal relationships in graph adversarial attacks, we design two invariance objectives to learn the causal features. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our IDEA significantly outperforms all the baselines under both poisoning and evasion attacks on five benchmark datasets, highlighting the strong and invariant predictability of IDEA. The implementation of IDEA is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/IDEA_repo-666B.

Popularity Debiasing from Exposure to Interaction in Collaborative Filtering

Recommender systems often suffer from popularity bias, where popular items are overly recommended while sacrificing unpopular items. Existing researches generally focus on ensuring the number of recommendations exposure of each item is equal or proportional, using inverse propensity weighting, causal intervention, or adversarial training. However, increasing the exposure of unpopular items may not bring more clicks or interactions, resulting in skewed benefits and failing in achieving real reasonable popularity debiasing. In this paper, we propose a new criterion for popularity debiasing, i.e., in an unbiased recommender system, both popular and unpopular items should receive Interactions Proportional to the number of users who Like it, namely IPL criterion. Under the guidance of the criterion, we then propose a debiasing framework with IPL regularization term which is theoretically shown to achieve a win-win situation of both popularity debiasing and recommendation performance. Experiments conducted on four public datasets demonstrate that when equipping two representative collaborative filtering models with our framework, the popularity bias is effectively alleviated while maintaining the recommendation performance.

Graph Adversarial Immunization for Certifiable Robustness

Despite achieving great success, graph neural networks (GNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Existing defenses focus on developing adversarial training or robust GNNs. However, little research attention is paid to the potential and practice of immunization on graphs. In this paper, we propose and formulate graph adversarial immunization, i.e., vaccinating part of graph structure to improve certifiable robustness of graph against any admissible adversarial attack. We first propose edge-level immunization to vaccinate node pairs. Despite the primary success, such edge-level immunization cannot defend against emerging node injection attacks, since it only immunizes existing node pairs. To this end, we further propose node-level immunization. To circumvent computationally expensive combinatorial optimization when solving adversarial immunization, we design AdvImmune-Edge and AdvImmune-Node algorithms to effectively obtain the immune node pairs or nodes. Experiments demonstrate the superiority of AdvImmune methods. In particular, AdvImmune-Node remarkably improves the ratio of robust nodes by 79%, 294%, and 100%, after immunizing only 5% nodes. Furthermore, AdvImmune methods show excellent defensive performance against various attacks, outperforming state-of-the-art defenses. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to improve certifiable robustness from graph data perspective without losing performance on clean graphs, providing new insights into graph adversarial learning.

Adversarial Camouflage for Node Injection Attack on Graphs

Node injection attacks against Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have received emerging attention as a practical attack scenario, where the attacker injects malicious nodes instead of modifying node features or edges to degrade the performance of GNNs. Despite the initial success of node injection attacks, we find that the injected nodes by existing methods are easy to be distinguished from the original normal nodes by defense methods and limiting their attack performance in practice. To solve the above issues, we devote to camouflage node injection attack, i.e., camouflaging injected malicious nodes (structure/attributes) as the normal ones that appear legitimate/imperceptible to defense methods. The non-Euclidean nature of graph data and the lack of human prior brings great challenges to the formalization, implementation, and evaluation of camouflage on graphs. In this paper, we first propose and formulate the camouflage of injected nodes from both the fidelity and diversity of the ego networks centered around injected nodes. Then, we design an adversarial CAmouflage framework for Node injection Attack, namely CANA, to improve the camouflage while ensuring the attack performance. Several novel indicators for graph camouflage are further designed for a comprehensive evaluation. Experimental results demonstrate that when equipping existing node injection attack methods with our proposed CANA framework, the attack performance against defense methods as well as node camouflage is significantly improved.

Single Node Injection Attack against Graph Neural Networks

Node injection attack on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) is an emerging and practical attack scenario that the attacker injects malicious nodes rather than modifying original nodes or edges to affect the performance of GNNs. However, existing node injection attacks ignore extremely limited scenarios, namely the injected nodes might be excessive such that they may be perceptible to the target GNN. In this paper, we focus on an extremely limited scenario of single node injection evasion attack, i.e., the attacker is only allowed to inject one single node during the test phase to hurt GNN's performance. The discreteness of network structure and the coupling effect between network structure and node features bring great challenges to this extremely limited scenario. We first propose an optimization-based method to explore the performance upper bound of single node injection evasion attack. Experimental results show that 100%, 98.60%, and 94.98% nodes on three public datasets are successfully attacked even when only injecting one node with one edge, confirming the feasibility of single node injection evasion attack. However, such an optimization-based method needs to be re-optimized for each attack, which is computationally unbearable. To solve the dilemma, we further propose a Generalizable Node Injection Attack model, namely G-NIA, to improve the attack efficiency while ensuring the attack performance. Experiments are conducted across three well-known GNNs. Our proposed G-NIA significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and is 500 times faster than the optimization-based method when inferring.