Evidence from counterfactual tasks supports emergent analogical reasoning in large language models

We recently reported evidence that large language models are capable of solving a wide range of text-based analogy problems in a zero-shot manner, indicating the presence of an emergent capacity for analogical reasoning. Two recent commentaries have challenged these results, citing evidence from so-called `counterfactual' tasks in which the standard sequence of the alphabet is arbitrarily permuted so as to decrease similarity with materials that may have been present in the language model's training data. Here, we reply to these critiques, clarifying some misunderstandings about the test materials used in our original work, and presenting evidence that language models are also capable of generalizing to these new counterfactual task variants.

Emergent Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models

The recent advent of large language models - large neural networks trained on a simple predictive objective over a massive corpus of natural language - has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training on those problems. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a novel text-based matrix reasoning task closely modeled on Raven's Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Zero-shot visual reasoning through probabilistic analogical mapping

Human reasoning is grounded in an ability to identify highly abstract commonalities governing superficially dissimilar visual inputs. Recent efforts to develop algorithms with this capacity have largely focused on approaches that require extensive direct training on visual reasoning tasks, and yield limited generalization to problems with novel content. In contrast, a long tradition of research in cognitive science has focused on elucidating the computational principles underlying human analogical reasoning; however, this work has generally relied on manually constructed representations. Here we present visiPAM (visual Probabilistic Analogical Mapping), a model of visual reasoning that synthesizes these two approaches. VisiPAM employs learned representations derived directly from naturalistic visual inputs, coupled with a similarity-based mapping operation derived from cognitive theories of human reasoning. We show that without any direct training, visiPAM outperforms a state-of-the-art deep learning model on an analogical mapping task. In addition, visiPAM closely matches the pattern of human performance on a novel task involving mapping of 3D objects across disparate categories.

CX-ToM: Counterfactual Explanations with Theory-of-Mind for Enhancing Human Trust in Image Recognition Models

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

Visual analogy: Deep learning versus compositional models

Is analogical reasoning a task that must be learned to solve from scratch by applying deep learning models to massive numbers of reasoning problems? Or are analogies solved by computing similarities between structured representations of analogs? We address this question by comparing human performance on visual analogies created using images of familiar three-dimensional objects (cars and their subregions) with the performance of alternative computational models. Human reasoners achieved above-chance accuracy for all problem types, but made more errors in several conditions (e.g., when relevant subregions were occluded). We compared human performance to that of two recent deep learning models (Siamese Network and Relation Network) directly trained to solve these analogy problems, as well as to that of a compositional model that assesses relational similarity between part-based representations. The compositional model based on part representations, but not the deep learning models, generated qualitative performance similar to that of human reasoners.

Probabilistic Analogical Mapping with Semantic Relation Networks

The human ability to flexibly reason with cross-domain analogies depends on mechanisms for identifying relations between concepts and for mapping concepts and their relations across analogs. We present a new computational model of analogical mapping, based on semantic relation networks constructed from distributed representations of individual concepts and of relations between concepts. Through comparisons with human performance in a new analogy experiment with 1,329 participants, as well as in four classic studies, we demonstrate that the model accounts for a broad range of phenomena involving analogical mapping by both adults and children. The key insight is that rich semantic representations of individual concepts and relations, coupled with a generic prior favoring isomorphic mappings, yield human-like analogical mapping.

Show Me What You Can Do: Capability Calibration on Reachable Workspace for Human-Robot Collaboration

Aligning humans' assessment of what a robot can do with its true capability is crucial for establishing a common ground between human and robot partners when they collaborate on a joint task. In this work, we propose an approach to calibrate humans' estimate of a robot's reachable workspace through a small number of demonstrations before collaboration. We develop a novel motion planning method, REMP (Reachability-Expressive Motion Planning), which jointly optimizes the physical cost and the expressiveness of robot motion to reveal the robot's motion capability to a human observer. Our experiments with human participants demonstrate that a short calibration using REMP can effectively bridge the gap between what a non-expert user thinks a robot can reach and the ground-truth. We show that this calibration procedure not only results in better user perception, but also promotes more efficient human-robot collaborations in a subsequent joint task.

Learning Perceptual Inference by Contrasting

"Thinking in pictures," [1] i.e., spatial-temporal reasoning, effortless and instantaneous for humans, is believed to be a significant ability to perform logical induction and a crucial factor in the intellectual history of technology development. Modern Artificial Intelligence (AI), fueled by massive datasets, deeper models, and mighty computation, has come to a stage where (super-)human-level performances are observed in certain specific tasks. However, current AI's ability in "thinking in pictures" is still far lacking behind. In this work, we study how to improve machines' reasoning ability on one challenging task of this kind: Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM). Specifically, we borrow the very idea of "contrast effects" from the field of psychology, cognition, and education to design and train a permutation-invariant model. Inspired by cognitive studies, we equip our model with a simple inference module that is jointly trained with the perception backbone. Combining all the elements, we propose the Contrastive Perceptual Inference network (CoPINet) and empirically demonstrate that CoPINet sets the new state-of-the-art for permutation-invariant models on two major datasets. We conclude that spatial-temporal reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the relations between objects and can be solved from pixel-level inputs.

Theory-based Causal Transfer: Integrating Instance-level Induction and Abstract-level Structure Learning

Learning transferable knowledge across similar but different settings is a fundamental component of generalized intelligence. In this paper, we approach the transfer learning challenge from a causal theory perspective. Our agent is endowed with two basic yet general theories for transfer learning: (i) a task shares a common abstract structure that is invariant across domains, and (ii) the behavior of specific features of the environment remain constant across domains. We adopt a Bayesian perspective of causal theory induction and use these theories to transfer knowledge between environments. Given these general theories, the goal is to train an agent by interactively exploring the problem space to (i) discover, form, and transfer useful abstract and structural knowledge, and (ii) induce useful knowledge from the instance-level attributes observed in the environment. A hierarchy of Bayesian structures is used to model abstract-level structural causal knowledge, and an instance-level associative learning scheme learns which specific objects can be used to induce state changes through interaction. This model-learning scheme is then integrated with a model-based planner to achieve a task in the OpenLock environment, a virtual ``escape room'' with a complex hierarchy that requires agents to reason about an abstract, generalized causal structure. We compare performances against a set of predominate model-free reinforcement learning(RL) algorithms. RL agents showed poor ability transferring learned knowledge across different trials. Whereas the proposed model revealed similar performance trends as human learners, and more importantly, demonstrated transfer behavior across trials and learning situations.

X-ToM: Explaining with Theory-of-Mind for Gaining Justified Human Trust

We present a new explainable AI (XAI) framework aimed at increasing justified human trust and reliance in the AI machine through explanations. We pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, the machine generates sequence of explanations in a dialog which takes into account three important aspects at each dialog turn: (a) human's intention (or curiosity); (b) human's understanding of the machine; and (c) machine's understanding of the human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. In other words, these explicit mental representations in ToM are incorporated to learn an optimal explanation policy that takes into account human's perception and beliefs. Furthermore, we also show that ToM facilitates in quantitatively measuring justified human trust in the machine by comparing all the three mental representations. We applied our framework to three visual recognition tasks, namely, image classification, action recognition, and human body pose estimation. We argue that our ToM based explanations are practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex machine learning models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to derive explanations using ToM. Extensive human study experiments verify our hypotheses, showing that the proposed explanations significantly outperform the state-of-the-art XAI methods in terms of all the standard quantitative and qualitative XAI evaluation metrics including human trust, reliance, and explanation satisfaction.