Agency Is Frame-Dependent

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

A Black Swan Hypothesis in Markov Decision Process via Irrationality

Black swan events are statistically rare occurrences that carry extremely high risks. A typical view of defining black swan events is heavily assumed to originate from an unpredictable time-varying environments; however, the community lacks a comprehensive definition of black swan events. To this end, this paper challenges that the standard view is incomplete and claims that high-risk, statistically rare events can also occur in unchanging environments due to human misperception of their value and likelihood, which we call as spatial black swan event. We first carefully categorize black swan events, focusing on spatial black swan events, and mathematically formalize the definition of black swan events. We hope these definitions can pave the way for the development of algorithms to prevent such events by rationally correcting human perception

Three Dogmas of Reinforcement Learning

Modern reinforcement learning has been conditioned by at least three dogmas. The first is the environment spotlight, which refers to our tendency to focus on modeling environments rather than agents. The second is our treatment of learning as finding the solution to a task, rather than adaptation. The third is the reward hypothesis, which states that all goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of a reward signal. These three dogmas shape much of what we think of as the science of reinforcement learning. While each of the dogmas have played an important role in developing the field, it is time we bring them to the surface and reflect on whether they belong as basic ingredients of our scientific paradigm. In order to realize the potential of reinforcement learning as a canonical frame for researching intelligent agents, we suggest that it is time we shed dogmas one and two entirely, and embrace a nuanced approach to the third.

Pragmatic Feature Preferences: Learning Reward-Relevant Preferences from Human Input

Humans use social context to specify preferences over behaviors, i.e. their reward functions. Yet, algorithms for inferring reward models from preference data do not take this social learning view into account. Inspired by pragmatic human communication, we study how to extract fine-grained data regarding why an example is preferred that is useful for learning more accurate reward models. We propose to enrich binary preference queries to ask both (1) which features of a given example are preferable in addition to (2) comparisons between examples themselves. We derive an approach for learning from these feature-level preferences, both for cases where users specify which features are reward-relevant, and when users do not. We evaluate our approach on linear bandit settings in both vision- and language-based domains. Results support the efficiency of our approach in quickly converging to accurate rewards with fewer comparisons vs. example-only labels. Finally, we validate the real-world applicability with a behavioral experiment on a mushroom foraging task. Our findings suggest that incorporating pragmatic feature preferences is a promising approach for more efficient user-aligned reward learning.

A Definition of Continual Reinforcement Learning

In this paper we develop a foundation for continual reinforcement learning.

On the Convergence of Bounded Agents

When has an agent converged? Standard models of the reinforcement learning problem give rise to a straightforward definition of convergence: An agent converges when its behavior or performance in each environment state stops changing. However, as we shift the focus of our learning problem from the environment's state to the agent's state, the concept of an agent's convergence becomes significantly less clear. In this paper, we propose two complementary accounts of agent convergence in a framing of the reinforcement learning problem that centers around bounded agents. The first view says that a bounded agent has converged when the minimal number of states needed to describe the agent's future behavior cannot decrease. The second view says that a bounded agent has converged just when the agent's performance only changes if the agent's internal state changes. We establish basic properties of these two definitions, show that they accommodate typical views of convergence in standard settings, and prove several facts about their nature and relationship. We take these perspectives, definitions, and analysis to bring clarity to a central idea of the field.

Settling the Reward Hypothesis

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Meta-Gradients in Non-Stationary Environments

Meta-gradient methods (Xu et al., 2018; Zahavy et al., 2020) offer a promising solution to the problem of hyperparameter selection and adaptation in non-stationary reinforcement learning problems. However, the properties of meta-gradients in such environments have not been systematically studied. In this work, we bring new clarity to meta-gradients in non-stationary environments. Concretely, we ask: (i) how much information should be given to the learned optimizers, so as to enable faster adaptation and generalization over a lifetime, (ii) what meta-optimizer functions are learned in this process, and (iii) whether meta-gradient methods provide a bigger advantage in highly non-stationary environments. To study the effect of information provided to the meta-optimizer, as in recent works (Flennerhag et al., 2021; Almeida et al., 2021), we replace the tuned meta-parameters of fixed update rules with learned meta-parameter functions of selected context features. The context features carry information about agent performance and changes in the environment and hence can inform learned meta-parameter schedules. We find that adding more contextual information is generally beneficial, leading to faster adaptation of meta-parameter values and increased performance over a lifetime. We support these results with a qualitative analysis of resulting meta-parameter schedules and learned functions of context features. Lastly, we find that without context, meta-gradients do not provide a consistent advantage over the baseline in highly non-stationary environments. Our findings suggest that contextualizing meta-gradients can play a pivotal role in extracting high performance from meta-gradients in non-stationary settings.

A Theory of Abstraction in Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning defines the problem facing agents that learn to make good decisions through action and observation alone. To be effective problem solvers, such agents must efficiently explore vast worlds, assign credit from delayed feedback, and generalize to new experiences, all while making use of limited data, computational resources, and perceptual bandwidth. Abstraction is essential to all of these endeavors. Through abstraction, agents can form concise models of their environment that support the many practices required of a rational, adaptive decision maker. In this dissertation, I present a theory of abstraction in reinforcement learning. I first offer three desiderata for functions that carry out the process of abstraction: they should 1) preserve representation of near-optimal behavior, 2) be learned and constructed efficiently, and 3) lower planning or learning time. I then present a suite of new algorithms and analysis that clarify how agents can learn to abstract according to these desiderata. Collectively, these results provide a partial path toward the discovery and use of abstraction that minimizes the complexity of effective reinforcement learning.

On the Expressivity of Markov Reward

Reward is the driving force for reinforcement-learning agents. This paper is dedicated to understanding the expressivity of reward as a way to capture tasks that we would want an agent to perform. We frame this study around three new abstract notions of "task" that might be desirable: (1) a set of acceptable behaviors, (2) a partial ordering over behaviors, or (3) a partial ordering over trajectories. Our main results prove that while reward can express many of these tasks, there exist instances of each task type that no Markov reward function can capture. We then provide a set of polynomial-time algorithms that construct a Markov reward function that allows an agent to optimize tasks of each of these three types, and correctly determine when no such reward function exists. We conclude with an empirical study that corroborates and illustrates our theoretical findings.