On Multi-Agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning

In multi-agent systems, the agent behavior is highly influenced by its utility function, as these utilities shape both individual goals as well as interactions with the other agents. Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) is a well-established approach to inferring the utility function by observing an expert behavior within a given environment. In this paper, we extend the IRL framework to the multi-agent setting, assuming to observe agents who are following Nash Equilibrium (NE) policies. We theoretically investigate the set of utilities that explain the behavior of NE experts. Specifically, we provide an explicit characterization of the feasible reward set and analyze how errors in estimating the transition dynamics and expert behavior impact the recovered rewards. Building on these findings, we provide the first sample complexity analysis for the multi-agent IRL problem. Finally, we provide a numerical evaluation of our theoretical results.

Improved Sample Complexity for Global Convergence of Actor-Critic Algorithms

In this paper, we establish the global convergence of the actor-critic algorithm with a significantly improved sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-3})$, advancing beyond the existing local convergence results. Previous works provide local convergence guarantees with a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-2})$ for bounding the squared gradient of the return, which translates to a global sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-4})$ using the gradient domination lemma. In contrast to traditional methods that employ decreasing step sizes for both the actor and critic, we demonstrate that a constant step size for the critic is sufficient to ensure convergence in expectation. This key insight reveals that using a decreasing step size for the actor alone is sufficient to handle the noise for both the actor and critic. Our findings provide theoretical support for the practical success of many algorithms that rely on constant step sizes.

Preference Elicitation for Offline Reinforcement Learning

Applying reinforcement learning (RL) to real-world problems is often made challenging by the inability to interact with the environment and the difficulty of designing reward functions. Offline RL addresses the first challenge by considering access to an offline dataset of environment interactions labeled by the reward function. In contrast, Preference-based RL does not assume access to the reward function and learns it from preferences, but typically requires an online interaction with the environment. We bridge the gap between these frameworks by exploring efficient methods for acquiring preference feedback in a fully offline setup. We propose Sim-OPRL, an offline preference-based reinforcement learning algorithm, which leverages a learned environment model to elicit preference feedback on simulated rollouts. Drawing on insights from both the offline RL and the preference-based RL literature, our algorithm employs a pessimistic approach for out-of-distribution data, and an optimistic approach for acquiring informative preferences about the optimal policy. We provide theoretical guarantees regarding the sample complexity of our approach, dependent on how well the offline data covers the optimal policy. Finally, we demonstrate the empirical performance of Sim-OPRL in different environments.

Stochastic Bilevel Optimization with Lower-Level Contextual Markov Decision Processes

In various applications, the optimal policy in a strategic decision-making problem depends both on the environmental configuration and exogenous events. For these settings, we introduce Bilevel Optimization with Contextual Markov Decision Processes (BO-CMDP), a stochastic bilevel decision-making model, where the lower level consists of solving a contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP). BO-CMDP can be viewed as a Stackelberg Game where the leader and a random context beyond the leader's control together decide the setup of (many) MDPs that (potentially multiple) followers best respond to. This framework extends beyond traditional bilevel optimization and finds relevance in diverse fields such as model design for MDPs, tax design, reward shaping and dynamic mechanism design. We propose a stochastic Hyper Policy Gradient Descent (HPGD) algorithm to solve BO-CMDP, and demonstrate its convergence. Notably, HPGD only utilizes observations of the followers' trajectories. Therefore, it allows followers to use any training procedure and the leader to be agnostic of the specific algorithm used, which aligns with various real-world scenarios. We further consider the setting when the leader can influence the training of followers and propose an accelerated algorithm. We empirically demonstrate the performance of our algorithm.

Truly No-Regret Learning in Constrained MDPs

Constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) are a common way to model safety constraints in reinforcement learning. State-of-the-art methods for efficiently solving CMDPs are based on primal-dual algorithms. For these algorithms, all currently known regret bounds allow for error cancellations -- one can compensate for a constraint violation in one round with a strict constraint satisfaction in another. This makes the online learning process unsafe since it only guarantees safety for the final (mixture) policy but not during learning. As Efroni et al. (2020) pointed out, it is an open question whether primal-dual algorithms can provably achieve sublinear regret if we do not allow error cancellations. In this paper, we give the first affirmative answer. We first generalize a result on last-iterate convergence of regularized primal-dual schemes to CMDPs with multiple constraints. Building upon this insight, we propose a model-based primal-dual algorithm to learn in an unknown CMDP. We prove that our algorithm achieves sublinear regret without error cancellations.

Exploiting Causal Graph Priors with Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning

Posterior sampling allows the exploitation of prior knowledge of the environment's transition dynamics to improve the sample efficiency of reinforcement learning. The prior is typically specified as a class of parametric distributions, a task that can be cumbersome in practice, often resulting in the choice of uninformative priors. In this work, we propose a novel posterior sampling approach in which the prior is given as a (partial) causal graph over the environment's variables. The latter is often more natural to design, such as listing known causal dependencies between biometric features in a medical treatment study. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian procedure, called C-PSRL, simultaneously learning the full causal graph at the higher level and the parameters of the resulting factored dynamics at the lower level. For this procedure, we provide an analysis of its Bayesian regret, which explicitly connects the regret rate with the degree of prior knowledge. Our numerical evaluation conducted in illustrative domains confirms that C-PSRL strongly improves the efficiency of posterior sampling with an uninformative prior while performing close to posterior sampling with the full causal graph.

On Imitation in Mean-field Games

We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC.

Provably Learning Nash Policies in Constrained Markov Potential Games

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) addresses sequential decision-making problems with multiple agents, where each agent optimizes its own objective. In many real-world instances, the agents may not only want to optimize their objectives, but also ensure safe behavior. For example, in traffic routing, each car (agent) aims to reach its destination quickly (objective) while avoiding collisions (safety). Constrained Markov Games (CMGs) are a natural formalism for safe MARL problems, though generally intractable. In this work, we introduce and study Constrained Markov Potential Games (CMPGs), an important class of CMGs. We first show that a Nash policy for CMPGs can be found via constrained optimization. One tempting approach is to solve it by Lagrangian-based primal-dual methods. As we show, in contrast to the single-agent setting, however, CMPGs do not satisfy strong duality, rendering such approaches inapplicable and potentially unsafe. To solve the CMPG problem, we propose our algorithm Coordinate-Ascent for CMPGs (CA-CMPG), which provably converges to a Nash policy in tabular, finite-horizon CMPGs. Furthermore, we provide the first sample complexity bounds for learning Nash policies in unknown CMPGs, and, which under additional assumptions, guarantee safe exploration.

Cancellation-Free Regret Bounds for Lagrangian Approaches in Constrained Markov Decision Processes

Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs) are one of the common ways to model safe reinforcement learning problems, where the safety objectives are modeled by constraint functions. Lagrangian-based dual or primal-dual algorithms provide efficient methods for learning in CMDPs. For these algorithms, the currently known regret bounds in the finite-horizon setting allow for a \textit{cancellation of errors}; that is, one can compensate for a constraint violation in one episode with a strict constraint satisfaction in another episode. However, in practical applications, we do not consider such a behavior safe. In this paper, we overcome this weakness by proposing a novel model-based dual algorithm \textsc{OptAug-CMDP} for tabular finite-horizon CMDPs. Our algorithm is motivated by the augmented Lagrangian method and can be performed efficiently. We show that during $K$ episodes of exploring the CMDP, our algorithm obtains a regret of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{K})$ for both the objective and the constraint violation. Unlike existing Lagrangian approaches, our algorithm achieves this regret without the need for the cancellation of errors.

Do you pay for Privacy in Online learning?

Online learning, in the mistake bound model, is one of the most fundamental concepts in learning theory. Differential privacy, instead, is the most widely used statistical concept of privacy in the machine learning community. It is thus clear that defining learning problems that are online differentially privately learnable is of great interest. In this paper, we pose the question on if the two problems are equivalent from a learning perspective, i.e., is privacy for free in the online learning framework?