Abstract:Bias in machine learning models has been a chronic problem, especially as these models influence decision-making in human society. In generative AI, such as Large Language Models, the impact of bias is even more profound compared to the classification models. LLMs produce realistic and human-like content that users may unconsciously trust, which could perpetuate harmful stereotypes to the uncontrolled public. It becomes particularly concerning when utilized in journalism or education. While prior studies have explored and quantified bias in individual AI models, no work has yet compared bias similarity across different LLMs. To fill this gap, we take a comprehensive look at ten open- and closed-source LLMs from four model families, assessing the extent of biases through output distribution. Using two datasets-one containing 4k questions and another with one million questions for each of the four bias dimensions -- we measure functional similarity to understand how biases manifest across models. Our findings reveal that 1) fine-tuning does not significantly alter output distributions, which would limit its ability to mitigate bias, 2) LLMs within the same family tree do not produce similar output distributions, implying that addressing bias in one model could have limited implications for others in the same family, and 3) there is a possible risk of training data information leakage, raising concerns about privacy and data security. Our analysis provides insight into LLM behavior and highlights potential risks in real-world deployment.
Abstract:Task-specific fine-tuning is essential for the deployment of large language models (LLMs), but it requires significant computational resources and time. Existing solutions have proposed coreset selection methods to improve data efficiency and reduce model training overhead, but they still have limitations: 1) Overlooking valuable samples at high pruning rates, which degrades the coreset's performance. 2) Requiring high time overhead during coreset selection to fine-tune and evaluate the target LLM. In this paper, we introduce STAFF, a speculative coreset selection method. STAFF leverages a small model from the same family as the target LLM to efficiently estimate data scores and then verifies the scores on the target LLM to accurately identify and allocate more selection budget to important regions while maintaining coverage of easy regions. We evaluate STAFF on three LLMs and three downstream tasks and show that STAFF improves the performance of SOTA methods by up to 54.3% and reduces selection overhead by up to 70.5% at different pruning rates. Furthermore, we observe that the coreset selected by STAFF at low pruning rates (i.e., 20%) can even obtain better fine-tuning performance than the full dataset.
Abstract:Backdoor attack is a severe threat to the trustworthiness of DNN-based language models. In this paper, we first extend the definition of memorization of language models from sample-wise to more fine-grained sentence element-wise (e.g., word, phrase, structure, and style), and then point out that language model backdoors are a type of element-wise memorization. Through further analysis, we find that the strength of such memorization is positively correlated to the frequency of duplicated elements in the training dataset. In conclusion, duplicated sentence elements are necessary for successful backdoor attacks. Based on this, we propose a data-centric defense. We first detect trigger candidates in training data by finding memorizable elements, i.e., duplicated elements, and then confirm real triggers by testing if the candidates can activate backdoor behaviors (i.e., malicious elements). Results show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in defending against different types of NLP backdoors.
Abstract:Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.
Abstract:Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated effectiveness in various fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject a unique pattern, called trigger, into the input to cause misclassification to an attack-chosen target label. While existing works have proposed various methods to mitigate backdoor effects in poisoned models, they tend to be less effective against recent advanced attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel post-training defense technique UNIT that can effectively eliminate backdoor effects for a variety of attacks. In specific, UNIT approximates a unique and tight activation distribution for each neuron in the model. It then proactively dispels substantially large activation values that exceed the approximated boundaries. Our experimental results demonstrate that UNIT outperforms 7 popular defense methods against 14 existing backdoor attacks, including 2 advanced attacks, using only 5\% of clean training data. UNIT is also cost efficient. The code is accessible at https://github.com/Megum1/UNIT.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) are employed across various high-stakes domains, where the reliability of their outputs is crucial. One commonly used method to assess the reliability of LLMs' responses is uncertainty estimation, which gauges the likelihood of their answers being correct. While many studies focus on improving the accuracy of uncertainty estimations for LLMs, our research investigates the fragility of uncertainty estimation and explores potential attacks. We demonstrate that an attacker can embed a backdoor in LLMs, which, when activated by a specific trigger in the input, manipulates the model's uncertainty without affecting the final output. Specifically, the proposed backdoor attack method can alter an LLM's output probability distribution, causing the probability distribution to converge towards an attacker-predefined distribution while ensuring that the top-1 prediction remains unchanged. Our experimental results demonstrate that this attack effectively undermines the model's self-evaluation reliability in multiple-choice questions. For instance, we achieved a 100 attack success rate (ASR) across three different triggering strategies in four models. Further, we investigate whether this manipulation generalizes across different prompts and domains. This work highlights a significant threat to the reliability of LLMs and underscores the need for future defenses against such attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/qcznlp/uncertainty_attack.
Abstract:With the emergence of the Software 3.0 era, there is a growing trend of compressing and integrating large models into software systems, with significant societal implications. Regrettably, in numerous instances, model compression techniques impact the fairness performance of these models and thus the ethical behavior of DNN-powered software. One of the most notable example is the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH), a prevailing model pruning approach. This paper demonstrates that fairness issue of LTHbased pruning arises from both its subnetwork selection and training procedures, highlighting the inadequacy of existing remedies. To address this, we propose a novel pruning framework, Ballot, which employs a novel conflict-detection-based subnetwork selection to find accurate and fair subnetworks, coupled with a refined training process to attain a high-performance model, thereby improving the fairness of DNN-powered software. By means of this procedure, Ballot improves the fairness of pruning by 38.00%, 33.91%, 17.96%, and 35.82% compared to state-of-the-art baselines, namely Magnitude Pruning, Standard LTH, SafeCompress, and FairScratch respectively, based on our evaluation of five popular datasets and three widely used models. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Ballot-506E.
Abstract:We present a simple yet effective method to improve the robustness of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) against adversarial examples by post-processing an adversarially trained model. Our technique, MeanSparse, cascades the activation functions of a trained model with novel operators that sparsify mean-centered feature vectors. This is equivalent to reducing feature variations around the mean, and we show that such reduced variations merely affect the model's utility, yet they strongly attenuate the adversarial perturbations and decrease the attacker's success rate. Our experiments show that, when applied to the top models in the RobustBench leaderboard, it achieves a new robustness record of 72.08% (from 71.07%) and 59.64% (from 59.56%) on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively, in term of AutoAttack accuracy. Code is available at https://github.com/SPIN-UMass/MeanSparse
Abstract:The robustness of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) is vital to modern AI-driven systems. It can be quantified by formal verification by providing a certified lower bound, within which any perturbation does not alter the original input's classification result. It is challenging due to nonlinear components, such as MaxPool. At present, many verification methods are sound but risk losing some precision to enhance efficiency and scalability, and thus, a certified lower bound is a crucial criterion for evaluating the performance of verification tools. In this paper, we present MaxLin, a robustness verifier for MaxPool-based CNNs with tight linear approximation. By tightening the linear approximation of the MaxPool function, we can certify larger certified lower bounds of CNNs. We evaluate MaxLin with open-sourced benchmarks, including LeNet and networks trained on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet datasets. The results show that MaxLin outperforms state-of-the-art tools with up to 110.60% improvement regarding the certified lower bound and 5.13 $\times$ speedup for the same neural networks. Our code is available at https://github.com/xiaoyuanpigo/maxlin.
Abstract:Self-supervised learning models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks that are effective in self-supervised learning often involve noticeable triggers, like colored patches, which are vulnerable to human inspection. In this paper, we propose an imperceptible and effective backdoor attack against self-supervised models. We first find that existing imperceptible triggers designed for supervised learning are not as effective in compromising self-supervised models. We then identify this ineffectiveness is attributed to the overlap in distributions between the backdoor and augmented samples used in self-supervised learning. Building on this insight, we design an attack using optimized triggers that are disentangled to the augmented transformation in the self-supervised learning, while also remaining imperceptible to human vision. Experiments on five datasets and seven SSL algorithms demonstrate our attack is highly effective and stealthy. It also has strong resistance to existing backdoor defenses. Our code can be found at https://github.com/Zhang-Henry/IMPERATIVE.