Abstract:Finetuning provides a scalable and cost-effective means of customizing language models for specific tasks or response styles, with greater reliability than prompting or in-context learning. In contrast, the conventional wisdom is that injecting knowledge via finetuning results in brittle performance and poor generalization. We argue that the dichotomy of "task customization" (e.g., instruction tuning) and "knowledge injection" (e.g., teaching new facts) is a distinction without a difference. We instead identify concrete factors that explain the heterogeneous effectiveness observed with finetuning. To this end, we conduct a large-scale experimental study of finetuning the frontier Gemini v1.5 model family on a spectrum of datasets that are artificially engineered to interpolate between the strengths and failure modes of finetuning. Our findings indicate that question-answer training data formats provide much stronger knowledge generalization than document/article-style training data, numerical information can be harder for finetuning to retain than categorical information, and models struggle to apply finetuned knowledge during multi-step reasoning even when trained on similar examples -- all factors that render "knowledge injection" to be especially difficult, even after controlling for considerations like data augmentation and information volume. On the other hand, our findings also indicate that it is not fundamentally more difficult to finetune information about a real-world event than information about what a model's writing style should be.
Abstract:The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These systems pose novel and under-explored risks. In this report, we provide a structured taxonomy of these risks by identifying three key failure modes (miscoordination, conflict, and collusion) based on agents' incentives, as well as seven key risk factors (information asymmetries, network effects, selection pressures, destabilising dynamics, commitment problems, emergent agency, and multi-agent security) that can underpin them. We highlight several important instances of each risk, as well as promising directions to help mitigate them. By anchoring our analysis in a range of real-world examples and experimental evidence, we illustrate the distinct challenges posed by multi-agent systems and their implications for the safety, governance, and ethics of advanced AI.
Abstract:A canonical desideratum for prediction problems is that performance guarantees should hold not just on average over the population, but also for meaningful subpopulations within the overall population. But what constitutes a meaningful subpopulation? In this work, we take the perspective that relevant subpopulations should be defined with respect to the clusters that naturally emerge from the distribution of individuals for which predictions are being made. In this view, a population refers to a mixture model whose components constitute the relevant subpopulations. We suggest two formalisms for capturing per-subgroup guarantees: first, by attributing each individual to the component from which they were most likely drawn, given their features; and second, by attributing each individual to all components in proportion to their relative likelihood of having been drawn from each component. Using online calibration as a case study, we study a \variational algorithm that provides guarantees for each of these formalisms by handling all plausible underlying subpopulation structures simultaneously, and achieve an $O(T^{1/2})$ rate even when the subpopulations are not well-separated. In comparison, the more natural cluster-then-predict approach that first recovers the structure of the subpopulations and then makes predictions suffers from a $O(T^{2/3})$ rate and requires the subpopulations to be separable. Along the way, we prove that providing per-subgroup calibration guarantees for underlying clusters can be easier than learning the clusters: separation between median subgroup features is required for the latter but not the former.
Abstract:The content selection problem of digital services is often modeled as a decision-process where a service chooses, over multiple rounds, an arm to pull from a set of arms that each return a certain reward. This classical model does not account for the possibility that users disengage when dissatisfied and thus fails to capture an important trade-off between choosing content that promotes future engagement versus immediate reward. In this work, we introduce a model for the content selection problem where dissatisfied users may disengage and where the content that maximizes immediate reward does not necessarily maximize the odds of future user engagement. We show that when the relationship between each arm's expected reward and effect on user satisfaction are linearly related, an optimal content selection policy can be computed efficiently with dynamic programming under natural assumptions about the complexity of the users' engagement patterns. Moreover, we show that in an online learning setting where users with unknown engagement patterns arrive, there is a variant of Hedge that attains a $\tfrac 12$-competitive ratio regret bound. We also use our model to identify key primitives that determine how digital services should weigh engagement against revenue. For example, when it is more difficult for users to rejoin a service they are disengaged from, digital services naturally see a reduced payoff but user engagement may -- counterintuitively -- increase.
Abstract:When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions with each other? We focus this question on the ability of agents to attain the value of their Stackelberg optimal strategy and study the impact of information asymmetry. We study repeated interactions in fully strategic environments where players' actions are decided based on learning algorithms that take into account their observed histories and knowledge of the game. We study the pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of a meta-game where players choose these algorithms as their actions. We demonstrate that if one player has perfect knowledge about the game, then any initial informational gap persists. That is, while there is always a PNE in which the informed agent achieves her Stackelberg value, there is a game where no PNE of the meta-game allows the partially informed player to achieve her Stackelberg value. On the other hand, if both players start with some uncertainty about the game, the quality of information alone does not determine which agent can achieve her Stackelberg value. In this case, the concept of information asymmetry becomes nuanced and depends on the game's structure. Overall, our findings suggest that repeated strategic interactions alone cannot facilitate learning effectively enough to earn an uninformed player her Stackelberg value.
Abstract:We initiate the study of the truthfulness of calibration measures in sequential prediction. A calibration measure is said to be truthful if the forecaster (approximately) minimizes the expected penalty by predicting the conditional expectation of the next outcome, given the prior distribution of outcomes. Truthfulness is an important property of calibration measures, ensuring that the forecaster is not incentivized to exploit the system with deliberate poor forecasts. This makes it an essential desideratum for calibration measures, alongside typical requirements, such as soundness and completeness. We conduct a taxonomy of existing calibration measures and their truthfulness. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that all of them are far from being truthful. That is, under existing calibration measures, there are simple distributions on which a polylogarithmic (or even zero) penalty is achievable, while truthful prediction leads to a polynomial penalty. Our main contribution is the introduction of a new calibration measure termed the Subsampled Smooth Calibration Error (SSCE) under which truthful prediction is optimal up to a constant multiplicative factor.
Abstract:Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.
Abstract:A common explanation for negative user impacts of content recommender systems is misalignment between the platform's objective and user welfare. In this work, we show that misalignment in the platform's objective is not the only potential cause of unintended impacts on users: even when the platform's objective is fully aligned with user welfare, the platform's learning algorithm can induce negative downstream impacts on users. The source of these user impacts is that different pieces of content may generate observable user reactions (feedback information) at different rates; these feedback rates may correlate with content properties, such as controversiality or demographic similarity of the creator, that affect the user experience. Since differences in feedback rates can impact how often the learning algorithm engages with different content, the learning algorithm may inadvertently promote content with certain such properties. Using the multi-armed bandit framework with probabilistic feedback, we examine the relationship between feedback rates and a learning algorithm's engagement with individual arms for different no-regret algorithms. We prove that no-regret algorithms can exhibit a wide range of dependencies: if the feedback rate of an arm increases, some no-regret algorithms engage with the arm more, some no-regret algorithms engage with the arm less, and other no-regret algorithms engage with the arm approximately the same number of times. From a platform design perspective, our results highlight the importance of looking beyond regret when measuring an algorithm's performance, and assessing the nature of a learning algorithm's engagement with different types of content as well as their resulting downstream impacts.
Abstract:A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a smoothness parameter $\sigma$. In a $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a $\sigma$-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by $\sigma$) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria: strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play $\sigma$-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when $\sigma$ as well as an approximation parameter $\epsilon$ and the number of players are all constants, there is a constant-time randomized algorithm to find a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either $\sigma$ or $\epsilon$ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable.
Abstract:Motivated by the emergence of decentralized machine learning ecosystems, we study the delegation of data collection. Taking the field of contract theory as our starting point, we design optimal and near-optimal contracts that deal with two fundamental machine learning challenges: lack of certainty in the assessment of model quality and lack of knowledge regarding the optimal performance of any model. We show that lack of certainty can be dealt with via simple linear contracts that achieve 1-1/e fraction of the first-best utility, even if the principal has a small test set. Furthermore, we give sufficient conditions on the size of the principal's test set that achieves a vanishing additive approximation to the optimal utility. To address the lack of a priori knowledge regarding the optimal performance, we give a convex program that can adaptively and efficiently compute the optimal contract.