Is Knowledge Power? On the (Im)possibility of Learning from Strategic Interaction

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions with each other? We focus this question on the ability of agents to attain the value of their Stackelberg optimal strategy and study the impact of information asymmetry. We study repeated interactions in fully strategic environments where players' actions are decided based on learning algorithms that take into account their observed histories and knowledge of the game. We study the pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of a meta-game where players choose these algorithms as their actions. We demonstrate that if one player has perfect knowledge about the game, then any initial informational gap persists. That is, while there is always a PNE in which the informed agent achieves her Stackelberg value, there is a game where no PNE of the meta-game allows the partially informed player to achieve her Stackelberg value. On the other hand, if both players start with some uncertainty about the game, the quality of information alone does not determine which agent can achieve her Stackelberg value. In this case, the concept of information asymmetry becomes nuanced and depends on the game's structure. Overall, our findings suggest that repeated strategic interactions alone cannot facilitate learning effectively enough to earn an uninformed player her Stackelberg value.

Delegating Data Collection in Decentralized Machine Learning

Motivated by the emergence of decentralized machine learning ecosystems, we study the delegation of data collection. Taking the field of contract theory as our starting point, we design optimal and near-optimal contracts that deal with two fundamental machine learning challenges: lack of certainty in the assessment of model quality and lack of knowledge regarding the optimal performance of any model. We show that lack of certainty can be dealt with via simple linear contracts that achieve 1-1/e fraction of the first-best utility, even if the principal has a small test set. Furthermore, we give sufficient conditions on the size of the principal's test set that achieves a vanishing additive approximation to the optimal utility. To address the lack of a priori knowledge regarding the optimal performance, we give a convex program that can adaptively and efficiently compute the optimal contract.

Impossibility results for fair representations

With the growing awareness to fairness in machine learning and the realization of the central role that data representation has in data processing tasks, there is an obvious interest in notions of fair data representations. The goal of such representations is that a model trained on data under the representation (e.g., a classifier) will be guaranteed to respect some fairness constraints. Such representations are useful when they can be fixed for training models on various different tasks and also when they serve as data filtering between the raw data (known to the representation designer) and potentially malicious agents that use the data under the representation to learn predictive models and make decisions. A long list of recent research papers strive to provide tools for achieving these goals. However, we prove that this is basically a futile effort. Roughly stated, we prove that no representation can guarantee the fairness of classifiers for different tasks trained using it; even the basic goal of achieving label-independent Demographic Parity fairness fails once the marginal data distribution shifts. More refined notions of fairness, like Odds Equality, cannot be guaranteed by a representation that does not take into account the task specific labeling rule with respect to which such fairness will be evaluated (even if the marginal data distribution is known a priory). Furthermore, except for trivial cases, no representation can guarantee Odds Equality fairness for any two different tasks, while allowing accurate label predictions for both. While some of our conclusions are intuitive, we formulate (and prove) crisp statements of such impossibilities, often contrasting impressions conveyed by many recent works on fair representations.