Fixed Point Computation: Beating Brute Force with Smoothed Analysis

We propose a new algorithm that finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate fixed point of a smooth function from the $n$-dimensional $\ell_2$ unit ball to itself. We use the general framework of finding approximate solutions to a variational inequality, a problem that subsumes fixed point computation and the computation of a Nash Equilibrium. The algorithm's runtime is bounded by $e^{O(n)}/\varepsilon$, under the smoothed-analysis framework. This is the first known algorithm in such a generality whose runtime is faster than $(1/\varepsilon)^{O(n)}$, which is a time that suffices for an exhaustive search. We complement this result with a lower bound of $e^{\Omega(n)}$ on the query complexity for finding an $O(1)$-approximate fixed point on the unit ball, which holds even in the smoothed-analysis model, yet without the assumption that the function is smooth. Existing lower bounds are only known for the hypercube, and adapting them to the ball does not give non-trivial results even for finding $O(1/\sqrt{n})$-approximate fixed points.

Charting the Shapes of Stories with Game Theory

Stories are records of our experiences and their analysis reveals insights into the nature of being human. Successful analyses are often interdisciplinary, leveraging mathematical tools to extract structure from stories and insights from structure. Historically, these tools have been restricted to one dimensional charts and dynamic social networks; however, modern AI offers the possibility of identifying more fully the plot structure, character incentives, and, importantly, counterfactual plot lines that the story could have taken but did not take. In this work, we use AI to model the structure of stories as game-theoretic objects, amenable to quantitative analysis. This allows us to not only interrogate each character's decision making, but also possibly peer into the original author's conception of the characters' world. We demonstrate our proposed technique on Shakespeare's famous Romeo and Juliet. We conclude with a discussion of how our analysis could be replicated in broader contexts, including real-life scenarios.

How much is a noisy image worth? Data Scaling Laws for Ambient Diffusion

The quality of generative models depends on the quality of the data they are trained on. Creating large-scale, high-quality datasets is often expensive and sometimes impossible, e.g. in certain scientific applications where there is no access to clean data due to physical or instrumentation constraints. Ambient Diffusion and related frameworks train diffusion models with solely corrupted data (which are usually cheaper to acquire) but ambient models significantly underperform models trained on clean data. We study this phenomenon at scale by training more than $80$ models on data with different corruption levels across three datasets ranging from $30,000$ to $\approx 1.3$M samples. We show that it is impossible, at these sample sizes, to match the performance of models trained on clean data when only training on noisy data. Yet, a combination of a small set of clean data (e.g.~$10\%$ of the total dataset) and a large set of highly noisy data suffices to reach the performance of models trained solely on similar-size datasets of clean data, and in particular to achieve near state-of-the-art performance. We provide theoretical evidence for our findings by developing novel sample complexity bounds for learning from Gaussian Mixtures with heterogeneous variances. Our theoretical model suggests that, for large enough datasets, the effective marginal utility of a noisy sample is exponentially worse than that of a clean sample. Providing a small set of clean samples can significantly reduce the sample size requirements for noisy data, as we also observe in our experiments.

Maximizing utility in multi-agent environments by anticipating the behavior of other learners

Learning algorithms are often used to make decisions in sequential decision-making environments. In multi-agent settings, the decisions of each agent can affect the utilities/losses of the other agents. Therefore, if an agent is good at anticipating the behavior of the other agents, in particular how they will make decisions in each round as a function of their experience that far, it could try to judiciously make its own decisions over the rounds of the interaction so as to influence the other agents to behave in a way that ultimately benefits its own utility. In this paper, we study repeated two-player games involving two types of agents: a learner, which employs an online learning algorithm to choose its strategy in each round; and an optimizer, which knows the learner's utility function and the learner's online learning algorithm. The optimizer wants to plan ahead to maximize its own utility, while taking into account the learner's behavior. We provide two results: a positive result for repeated zero-sum games and a negative result for repeated general-sum games. Our positive result is an algorithm for the optimizer, which exactly maximizes its utility against a learner that plays the Replicator Dynamics -- the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU). Additionally, we use this result to provide an algorithm for the optimizer against MWU, i.e.~for the discrete-time setting, which guarantees an average utility for the optimizer that is higher than the value of the one-shot game. Our negative result shows that, unless P=NP, there is no Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for maximizing the utility of an optimizer against a learner that best-responds to the history in each round. Yet, this still leaves open the question of whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that optimizes the utility up to $o(T)$.

Improved bounds for calibration via stronger sign preservation games

A set of probabilistic forecasts is calibrated if each prediction of the forecaster closely approximates the empirical distribution of outcomes on the subset of timesteps where that prediction was made. We study the fundamental problem of online calibrated forecasting of binary sequences, which was initially studied by Foster & Vohra (1998). They derived an algorithm with $O(T^{2/3})$ calibration error after $T$ time steps, and showed a lower bound of $\Omega(T^{1/2})$. These bounds remained stagnant for two decades, until Qiao & Valiant (2021) improved the lower bound to $\Omega(T^{0.528})$ by introducing a combinatorial game called sign preservation and showing that lower bounds for this game imply lower bounds for calibration. We introduce a strengthening of Qiao & Valiant's game that we call sign preservation with reuse (SPR). We prove that the relationship between SPR and calibrated forecasting is bidirectional: not only do lower bounds for SPR translate into lower bounds for calibration, but algorithms for SPR also translate into new algorithms for calibrated forecasting. In particular, any strategy that improves the trivial upper bound for the value of the SPR game would imply a forecasting algorithm with calibration error exponent less than 2/3, improving Foster & Vohra's upper bound for the first time. Using similar ideas, we then prove a slightly stronger lower bound than that of Qiao & Valiant, namely $\Omega(T^{0.54389})$. Our lower bound is obtained by an oblivious adversary, marking the first $\omega(T^{1/2})$ calibration lower bound for oblivious adversaries.

Is Efficient PAC Learning Possible with an Oracle That Responds 'Yes' or 'No'?

The empirical risk minimization (ERM) principle has been highly impactful in machine learning, leading both to near-optimal theoretical guarantees for ERM-based learning algorithms as well as driving many of the recent empirical successes in deep learning. In this paper, we investigate the question of whether the ability to perform ERM, which computes a hypothesis minimizing empirical risk on a given dataset, is necessary for efficient learning: in particular, is there a weaker oracle than ERM which can nevertheless enable learnability? We answer this question affirmatively, showing that in the realizable setting of PAC learning for binary classification, a concept class can be learned using an oracle which only returns a single bit indicating whether a given dataset is realizable by some concept in the class. The sample complexity and oracle complexity of our algorithm depend polynomially on the VC dimension of the hypothesis class, thus showing that there is only a polynomial price to pay for use of our weaker oracle. Our results extend to the agnostic learning setting with a slight strengthening of the oracle, as well as to the partial concept, multiclass and real-valued learning settings. In the setting of partial concept classes, prior to our work no oracle-efficient algorithms were known, even with a standard ERM oracle. Thus, our results address a question of Alon et al. (2021) who asked whether there are algorithmic principles which enable efficient learnability in this setting.

Near-Optimal Learning and Planning in Separated Latent MDPs

We study computational and statistical aspects of learning Latent Markov Decision Processes (LMDPs). In this model, the learner interacts with an MDP drawn at the beginning of each epoch from an unknown mixture of MDPs. To sidestep known impossibility results, we consider several notions of separation of the constituent MDPs. The main thrust of this paper is in establishing a nearly-sharp *statistical threshold* for the horizon length necessary for efficient learning. On the computational side, we show that under a weaker assumption of separability under the optimal policy, there is a quasi-polynomial algorithm with time complexity scaling in terms of the statistical threshold. We further show a near-matching time complexity lower bound under the exponential time hypothesis.

Tractable Local Equilibria in Non-Concave Games

While Online Gradient Descent and other no-regret learning procedures are known to efficiently converge to coarse correlated equilibrium in games where each agent's utility is concave in their own strategy, this is not the case when the utilities are non-concave, a situation that is common in machine learning applications where the agents' strategies are parameterized by deep neural networks, or the agents' utilities are computed by a neural network, or both. Indeed, non-concave games present a host of game-theoretic and optimization challenges: (i) Nash equilibria may fail to exist; (ii) local Nash equilibria exist but are intractable; and (iii) mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria have infinite support in general, and are intractable. To sidestep these challenges we propose a new solution concept, termed $(\varepsilon, \Phi(\delta))$-local equilibrium, which generalizes local Nash equilibrium in non-concave games, as well as (coarse) correlated equilibrium in concave games. Importantly, we show that two instantiations of this solution concept capture the convergence guarantees of Online Gradient Descent and no-regret learning, which we show efficiently converge to this type of equilibrium in non-concave games with smooth utilities.

From External to Swap Regret 2.0: An Efficient Reduction and Oblivious Adversary for Large Action Spaces

We provide a novel reduction from swap-regret minimization to external-regret minimization, which improves upon the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour [BM07] and Stolz-Lugosi [SL05] in that it does not require finiteness of the space of actions. We show that, whenever there exists a no-external-regret algorithm for some hypothesis class, there must also exist a no-swap-regret algorithm for that same class. For the problem of learning with expert advice, our result implies that it is possible to guarantee that the swap regret is bounded by {\epsilon} after $\log(N)^{O(1/\epsilon)}$ rounds and with $O(N)$ per iteration complexity, where $N$ is the number of experts, while the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour and Stolz-Lugosi require $O(N/\epsilon^2)$ rounds and at least $\Omega(N^2)$ per iteration complexity. Our result comes with an associated lower bound, which -- in contrast to that in [BM07] -- holds for oblivious and $\ell_1$-constrained adversaries and learners that can employ distributions over experts, showing that the number of rounds must be $\tilde\Omega(N/\epsilon^2)$ or exponential in $1/\epsilon$. Our reduction implies that, if no-regret learning is possible in some game, then this game must have approximate correlated equilibria, of arbitrarily good approximation. This strengthens the folklore implication of no-regret learning that approximate coarse correlated equilibria exist. Importantly, it provides a sufficient condition for the existence of correlated equilibrium which vastly extends the requirement that the action set is finite, thus answering a question left open by [DG22; Ass+23]. Moreover, it answers several outstanding questions about equilibrium computation and/or learning in games.

Smooth Nash Equilibria: Algorithms and Complexity

A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a smoothness parameter $\sigma$. In a $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a $\sigma$-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by $\sigma$) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria: strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play $\sigma$-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when $\sigma$ as well as an approximation parameter $\epsilon$ and the number of players are all constants, there is a constant-time randomized algorithm to find a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either $\sigma$ or $\epsilon$ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable.