Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

A Mechanism-Based Approach to Mitigating Harms from Persuasive Generative AI

Recent generative AI systems have demonstrated more advanced persuasive capabilities and are increasingly permeating areas of life where they can influence decision-making. Generative AI presents a new risk profile of persuasion due the opportunity for reciprocal exchange and prolonged interactions. This has led to growing concerns about harms from AI persuasion and how they can be mitigated, highlighting the need for a systematic study of AI persuasion. The current definitions of AI persuasion are unclear and related harms are insufficiently studied. Existing harm mitigation approaches prioritise harms from the outcome of persuasion over harms from the process of persuasion. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for the systematic study of AI persuasion. We first put forward definitions of persuasive generative AI. We distinguish between rationally persuasive generative AI, which relies on providing relevant facts, sound reasoning, or other forms of trustworthy evidence, and manipulative generative AI, which relies on taking advantage of cognitive biases and heuristics or misrepresenting information. We also put forward a map of harms from AI persuasion, including definitions and examples of economic, physical, environmental, psychological, sociocultural, political, privacy, and autonomy harm. We then introduce a map of mechanisms that contribute to harmful persuasion. Lastly, we provide an overview of approaches that can be used to mitigate against process harms of persuasion, including prompt engineering for manipulation classification and red teaming. Future work will operationalise these mitigations and study the interaction between different types of mechanisms of persuasion.

An International Consortium for Evaluations of Societal-Scale Risks from Advanced AI

Given rapid progress toward advanced AI and risks from frontier AI systems (advanced AI systems pushing the boundaries of the AI capabilities frontier), the creation and implementation of AI governance and regulatory schemes deserves prioritization and substantial investment. However, the status quo is untenable and, frankly, dangerous. A regulatory gap has permitted AI labs to conduct research, development, and deployment activities with minimal oversight. In response, frontier AI system evaluations have been proposed as a way of assessing risks from the development and deployment of frontier AI systems. Yet, the budding AI risk evaluation ecosystem faces significant coordination challenges, such as a limited diversity of evaluators, suboptimal allocation of effort, and perverse incentives. This paper proposes a solution in the form of an international consortium for AI risk evaluations, comprising both AI developers and third-party AI risk evaluators. Such a consortium could play a critical role in international efforts to mitigate societal-scale risks from advanced AI, including in managing responsible scaling policies and coordinated evaluation-based risk response. In this paper, we discuss the current evaluation ecosystem and its shortcomings, propose an international consortium for advanced AI risk evaluations, discuss issues regarding its implementation, discuss lessons that can be learnt from previous international institutions and existing proposals for international AI governance institutions, and, finally, we recommend concrete steps to advance the establishment of the proposed consortium: (i) solicit feedback from stakeholders, (ii) conduct additional research, (iii) conduct a workshop(s) for stakeholders, (iv) analyze feedback and create final proposal, (v) solicit funding, and (vi) create a consortium.

Strengthening the EU AI Act: Defining Key Terms on AI Manipulation

The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act aims to regulate manipulative and harmful uses of AI, but lacks precise definitions for key concepts. This paper provides technical recommendations to improve the Act's conceptual clarity and enforceability. We review psychological models to define "personality traits," arguing the Act should protect full "psychometric profiles." We urge expanding "behavior" to include "preferences" since preferences causally influence and are influenced by behavior. Clear definitions are provided for "subliminal," "manipulative," and "deceptive" techniques, considering incentives, intent, and covertness. We distinguish "exploiting individuals" from "exploiting groups," emphasising different policy needs. An "informed decision" is defined by four facets: comprehension, accurate information, no manipulation, and understanding AI's influence. We caution the Act's therapeutic use exemption given the lack of regulation of digital therapeutics by the EMA. Overall, the recommendations strengthen definitions of vague concepts in the EU AI Act, enhancing precise applicability to regulate harmful AI manipulation.

Concept Extrapolation: A Conceptual Primer

This article is a primer on concept extrapolation - the ability to take a concept, a feature, or a goal that is defined in one context and extrapolate it safely to a more general context. Concept extrapolation aims to solve model splintering - a ubiquitous occurrence wherein the features or concepts shift as the world changes over time. Through discussing value splintering and value extrapolation the article argues that concept extrapolation is necessary for Artificial Intelligence alignment.

The Influence of Explainable Artificial Intelligence: Nudging Behaviour or Boosting Capability?

This article aims to provide a theoretical account and corresponding paradigm for analysing how explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) influences people's behaviour and cognition. It uses insights from research on behaviour change. Two notable frameworks for thinking about behaviour change techniques are nudges - aimed at influencing behaviour - and boosts - aimed at fostering capability. It proposes that local and concept-based explanations are more adjacent to nudges, while global and counterfactual explanations are more adjacent to boosts. It outlines a method for measuring XAI influence and argues for the benefits of understanding it for optimal, safe and ethical human-AI collaboration.

Solutions to preference manipulation in recommender systems require knowledge of meta-preferences

Iterative machine learning algorithms used to power recommender systems often change people's preferences by trying to learn them. Further a recommender can better predict what a user will do by making its users more predictable. Some preference changes on the part of the user are self-induced and desired whether the recommender caused them or not. This paper proposes that solutions to preference manipulation in recommender systems must take into account certain meta-preferences (preferences over another preference) in order to respect the autonomy of the user and not be manipulative.

Preference Change in Persuasive Robotics

Human-robot interaction exerts influence towards the human, which often changes behavior. This article explores an externality of this changed behavior - preference change. It expands on previous work on preference change in AI systems. Specifically, this article will explore how a robot's adaptive behavior, personalized to the user, can exert influence through social interactions, that in turn change a user's preference. It argues that the risk of this is high given a robot's unique ability to influence behavior compared to other pervasive technologies. Persuasive Robotics thus runs the risk of being manipulative.

Recognising the importance of preference change: A call for a coordinated multidisciplinary research effort in the age of AI

As artificial intelligence becomes more powerful and a ubiquitous presence in daily life, it is imperative to understand and manage the impact of AI systems on our lives and decisions. Modern ML systems often change user behavior (e.g. personalized recommender systems learn user preferences to deliver recommendations that change online behavior). An externality of behavior change is preference change. This article argues for the establishment of a multidisciplinary endeavor focused on understanding how AI systems change preference: Preference Science. We operationalize preference to incorporate concepts from various disciplines, outlining the importance of meta-preferences and preference-change preferences, and proposing a preliminary framework for how preferences change. We draw a distinction between preference change, permissible preference change, and outright preference manipulation. A diversity of disciplines contribute unique insights to this framework.