Best of Both Worlds: Regret Minimization versus Minimax Play

In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to the best strategy in hindsight, where $T$ is the number of rounds. We provide the first affirmative answer to this question. In the context of symmetric zero-sum games, both in normal- and extensive form, we show that our results allow us to guarantee to risk at most $O(1)$ loss while being able to gain $\Omega(T)$ from exploitable opponents, thereby combining the benefits of both no-regret algorithms and minimax play.

Full Swap Regret and Discretized Calibration

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by bilinear functions of these embeddings. We provide an efficient learning algorithm for this setting that incurs at most $\tilde{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+3)})$ swap regret after $T$ rounds. To achieve this, we introduce a new online learning problem we call \emph{full swap regret minimization}. In this problem, a learner repeatedly takes a (randomized) action in a bounded convex $d$-dimensional action set $\mathcal{K}$ and then receives a loss from the adversary, with the goal of minimizing their regret with respect to the \emph{worst-case} swap function mapping $\mathcal{K}$ to $\mathcal{K}$. For varied assumptions about the convexity and smoothness of the loss functions, we design algorithms with full swap regret bounds ranging from $O(T^{d/(d+2)})$ to $O(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. Finally, we apply these tools to the problem of online forecasting to minimize calibration error, showing that several notions of calibration can be viewed as specific instances of full swap regret. In particular, we design efficient algorithms for online forecasting that guarantee at most $O(T^{1/3})$ $\ell_2$-calibration error and $O(\max(\sqrt{\epsilon T}, T^{1/3}))$ \emph{discretized-calibration} error (when the forecaster is restricted to predicting multiples of $\epsilon$).

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents

We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows their own payoff function, but is uncertain about the payoff of their opponent (knowing only that it is drawn from some distribution $\mathcal{D}$). What learning algorithm should the agent run in order to maximize their own total utility? We demonstrate how to construct an $\varepsilon$-optimal learning algorithm (obtaining average utility within $\varepsilon$ of the optimal utility) for this problem in time polynomial in the size of the input and $1/\varepsilon$ when either the size of the game or the support of $\mathcal{D}$ is constant. When the learning algorithm is further constrained to be a no-regret algorithm, we demonstrate how to efficiently construct an optimal learning algorithm (asymptotically achieving the optimal utility) in polynomial time, independent of any other assumptions. Both results make use of recently developed machinery that converts the analysis of learning algorithms to the study of the class of corresponding geometric objects known as menus.

Computing Optimal Regularizers for Online Linear Optimization

Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms are a popular class of learning algorithms for online linear optimization (OLO) that guarantee sub-linear regret, but the choice of regularizer can significantly impact dimension-dependent factors in the regret bound. We present an algorithm that takes as input convex and symmetric action sets and loss sets for a specific OLO instance, and outputs a regularizer such that running FTRL with this regularizer guarantees regret within a universal constant factor of the best possible regret bound. In particular, for any choice of (convex, symmetric) action set and loss set we prove that there exists an instantiation of FTRL which achieves regret within a constant factor of the best possible learning algorithm, strengthening the universality result of Srebro et al., 2011. Our algorithm requires preprocessing time and space exponential in the dimension $d$ of the OLO instance, but can be run efficiently online assuming a membership and linear optimization oracle for the action and loss sets, respectively (and is fully polynomial time for the case of constant dimension $d$). We complement this with a lower bound showing that even deciding whether a given regularizer is $\alpha$-strongly-convex with respect to a given norm is NP-hard.

Adversarial Online Learning with Temporal Feedback Graphs

We study a variant of prediction with expert advice where the learner's action at round $t$ is only allowed to depend on losses on a specific subset of the rounds (where the structure of which rounds' losses are visible at time $t$ is provided by a directed "feedback graph" known to the learner). We present a novel learning algorithm for this setting based on a strategy of partitioning the losses across sub-cliques of this graph. We complement this with a lower bound that is tight in many practical settings, and which we conjecture to be within a constant factor of optimal. For the important class of transitive feedback graphs, we prove that this algorithm is efficiently implementable and obtains the optimal regret bound (up to a universal constant).

Rate-Preserving Reductions for Blackwell Approachability

Abernethy et al. (2011) showed that Blackwell approachability and no-regret learning are equivalent, in the sense that any algorithm that solves a specific Blackwell approachability instance can be converted to a sublinear regret algorithm for a specific no-regret learning instance, and vice versa. In this paper, we study a more fine-grained form of such reductions, and ask when this translation between problems preserves not only a sublinear rate of convergence, but also preserves the optimal rate of convergence. That is, in which cases does it suffice to find the optimal regret bound for a no-regret learning instance in order to find the optimal rate of convergence for a corresponding approachability instance? We show that the reduction of Abernethy et al. (2011) does not preserve rates: their reduction may reduce a $d$-dimensional approachability instance $I_1$ with optimal convergence rate $R_1$ to a no-regret learning instance $I_2$ with optimal regret-per-round of $R_2$, with $R_{2}/R_{1}$ arbitrarily large (in particular, it is possible that $R_1 = 0$ and $R_{2} > 0$). On the other hand, we show that it is possible to tightly reduce any approachability instance to an instance of a generalized form of regret minimization we call improper $\phi$-regret minimization (a variant of the $\phi$-regret minimization of Gordon et al. (2008) where the transformation functions may map actions outside of the action set). Finally, we characterize when linear transformations suffice to reduce improper $\phi$-regret minimization problems to standard classes of regret minimization problems in a rate preserving manner. We prove that some improper $\phi$-regret minimization instances cannot be reduced to either subclass of instance in this way, suggesting that approachability can capture some problems that cannot be phrased in the language of online learning.

Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions. In this work, we propose a novel concave formulation for pure-strategy bidding in first-price auctions, and use it to analyze natural Gradient-Ascent-based algorithms for this problem. Importantly, our analysis goes beyond regret, which was the typical focus of past work, and also accounts for the strategic backdrop of online-advertising markets where bidding algorithms are deployed -- we prove that our algorithms cannot be exploited by a strategic seller and that they incentivize truth-telling for the buyer. Concretely, we show that our algorithms achieve $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret when the highest competing bids are generated adversarially, and show that no online algorithm can do better. We further prove that the regret improves to $O(\log T)$ when the competition is stationary and stochastic. Moving beyond regret, we show that a strategic seller cannot exploit our algorithms to extract more revenue on average than is possible under the optimal mechanism, i.e., the seller cannot do much better than posting the monopoly reserve price in each auction. Finally, we prove that our algorithm is also incentive compatible -- it is a (nearly) dominant strategy for the buyer to report her values truthfully to the algorithm as a whole.

Contracting with a Learning Agent

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty and over time. While appealing in theory, players seldom use complex dynamic strategies in practice, often preferring to circumvent complexity and approach uncertainty through learning. We initiate the study of repeated contracts with a learning agent, focusing on agents who achieve no-regret outcomes. Optimizing against a no-regret agent is a known open problem in general games; we achieve an optimal solution to this problem for a canonical contract setting, in which the agent's choice among multiple actions leads to success/failure. The solution has a surprisingly simple structure: for some $\alpha > 0$, initially offer the agent a linear contract with scalar $\alpha$, then switch to offering a linear contract with scalar $0$. This switch causes the agent to ``free-fall'' through their action space and during this time provides the principal with non-zero reward at zero cost. Despite apparent exploitation of the agent, this dynamic contract can leave \emph{both} players better off compared to the best static contract. Our results generalize beyond success/failure, to arbitrary non-linear contracts which the principal rescales dynamically. Finally, we quantify the dependence of our results on knowledge of the time horizon, and are the first to address this consideration in the study of strategizing against learning agents.

Optimal cross-learning for contextual bandits with unknown context distributions

We consider the problem of designing contextual bandit algorithms in the ``cross-learning'' setting of Balseiro et al., where the learner observes the loss for the action they play in all possible contexts, not just the context of the current round. We specifically consider the setting where losses are chosen adversarially and contexts are sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. In this setting, we resolve an open problem of Balseiro et al. by providing an efficient algorithm with a nearly tight (up to logarithmic factors) regret bound of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{TK})$, independent of the number of contexts. As a consequence, we obtain the first nearly tight regret bounds for the problems of learning to bid in first-price auctions (under unknown value distributions) and sleeping bandits with a stochastic action set. At the core of our algorithm is a novel technique for coordinating the execution of a learning algorithm over multiple epochs in such a way to remove correlations between estimation of the unknown distribution and the actions played by the algorithm. This technique may be of independent interest for other learning problems involving estimation of an unknown context distribution.

U-Calibration: Forecasting for an Unknown Agent

We consider the problem of evaluating forecasts of binary events whose predictions are consumed by rational agents who take an action in response to a prediction, but whose utility is unknown to the forecaster. We show that optimizing forecasts for a single scoring rule (e.g., the Brier score) cannot guarantee low regret for all possible agents. In contrast, forecasts that are well-calibrated guarantee that all agents incur sublinear regret. However, calibration is not a necessary criterion here (it is possible for miscalibrated forecasts to provide good regret guarantees for all possible agents), and calibrated forecasting procedures have provably worse convergence rates than forecasting procedures targeting a single scoring rule. Motivated by this, we present a new metric for evaluating forecasts that we call U-calibration, equal to the maximal regret of the sequence of forecasts when evaluated under any bounded scoring rule. We show that sublinear U-calibration error is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to achieve sublinear regret guarantees. We additionally demonstrate how to compute the U-calibration error efficiently and provide an online algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ U-calibration error (on par with optimal rates for optimizing for a single scoring rule, and bypassing lower bounds for the traditionally calibrated learning procedures). Finally, we discuss generalizations to the multiclass prediction setting.