FabricDiffusion: High-Fidelity Texture Transfer for 3D Garments Generation from In-The-Wild Clothing Images

We introduce FabricDiffusion, a method for transferring fabric textures from a single clothing image to 3D garments of arbitrary shapes. Existing approaches typically synthesize textures on the garment surface through 2D-to-3D texture mapping or depth-aware inpainting via generative models. Unfortunately, these methods often struggle to capture and preserve texture details, particularly due to challenging occlusions, distortions, or poses in the input image. Inspired by the observation that in the fashion industry, most garments are constructed by stitching sewing patterns with flat, repeatable textures, we cast the task of clothing texture transfer as extracting distortion-free, tileable texture materials that are subsequently mapped onto the UV space of the garment. Building upon this insight, we train a denoising diffusion model with a large-scale synthetic dataset to rectify distortions in the input texture image. This process yields a flat texture map that enables a tight coupling with existing Physically-Based Rendering (PBR) material generation pipelines, allowing for realistic relighting of the garment under various lighting conditions. We show that FabricDiffusion can transfer various features from a single clothing image including texture patterns, material properties, and detailed prints and logos. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model significantly outperforms state-to-the-art methods on both synthetic data and real-world, in-the-wild clothing images while generalizing to unseen textures and garment shapes.

Towards Principled Superhuman AI for Multiplayer Symmetric Games

Multiplayer games, when the number of players exceeds two, present unique challenges that fundamentally distinguish them from the extensively studied two-player zero-sum games. These challenges arise from the non-uniqueness of equilibria and the risk of agents performing highly suboptimally when adopting equilibrium strategies. While a line of recent works developed learning systems successfully achieving human-level or even superhuman performance in popular multiplayer games such as Mahjong, Poker, and Diplomacy, two critical questions remain unaddressed: (1) What is the correct solution concept that AI agents should find? and (2) What is the general algorithmic framework that provably solves all games within this class? This paper takes the first step towards solving these unique challenges of multiplayer games by provably addressing both questions in multiplayer symmetric normal-form games. We also demonstrate that many meta-algorithms developed in prior practical systems for multiplayer games can fail to achieve even the basic goal of obtaining agent's equal share of the total reward.

Directional Smoothness and Gradient Methods: Convergence and Adaptivity

We develop new sub-optimality bounds for gradient descent (GD) that depend on the conditioning of the objective along the path of optimization, rather than on global, worst-case constants. Key to our proofs is directional smoothness, a measure of gradient variation that we use to develop upper-bounds on the objective. Minimizing these upper-bounds requires solving implicit equations to obtain a sequence of strongly adapted step-sizes; we show that these equations are straightforward to solve for convex quadratics and lead to new guarantees for two classical step-sizes. For general functions, we prove that the Polyak step-size and normalized GD obtain fast, path-dependent rates despite using no knowledge of the directional smoothness. Experiments on logistic regression show our convergence guarantees are tighter than the classical theory based on L-smoothness.

Is RLHF More Difficult than Standard RL?

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Breaking the Curse of Multiagency: Provably Efficient Decentralized Multi-Agent RL with Function Approximation

A unique challenge in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is the curse of multiagency, where the description length of the game as well as the complexity of many existing learning algorithms scale exponentially with the number of agents. While recent works successfully address this challenge under the model of tabular Markov Games, their mechanisms critically rely on the number of states being finite and small, and do not extend to practical scenarios with enormous state spaces where function approximation must be used to approximate value functions or policies. This paper presents the first line of MARL algorithms that provably resolve the curse of multiagency under function approximation. We design a new decentralized algorithm -- V-Learning with Policy Replay, which gives the first polynomial sample complexity results for learning approximate Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCEs) of Markov Games under decentralized linear function approximation. Our algorithm always outputs Markov CCEs, and achieves an optimal rate of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-2})$ for finding $\epsilon$-optimal solutions. Also, when restricted to the tabular case, our result improves over the current best decentralized result $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-3})$ for finding Markov CCEs. We further present an alternative algorithm -- Decentralized Optimistic Policy Mirror Descent, which finds policy-class-restricted CCEs using a polynomial number of samples. In exchange for learning a weaker version of CCEs, this algorithm applies to a wider range of problems under generic function approximation, such as linear quadratic games and MARL problems with low ''marginal'' Eluder dimension.

Learning Rationalizable Equilibria in Multiplayer Games

A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing algorithms require a number of samples exponential in the number of players to learn rationalizable equilibria under bandit feedback. This paper develops the first line of efficient algorithms for learning rationalizable Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE) and Correlated Equilibria (CE) whose sample complexities are polynomial in all problem parameters including the number of players. To achieve this result, we also develop a new efficient algorithm for the simpler task of finding one rationalizable action profile (not necessarily an equilibrium), whose sample complexity substantially improves over the best existing results of Wu et al. (2021). Our algorithms incorporate several novel techniques to guarantee rationalizability and no (swap-)regret simultaneously, including a correlated exploration scheme and adaptive learning rates, which may be of independent interest. We complement our results with a sample complexity lower bound showing the sharpness of our guarantees.

Neural Adaptive SCEne Tracing

Neural rendering with implicit neural networks has recently emerged as an attractive proposition for scene reconstruction, achieving excellent quality albeit at high computational cost. While the most recent generation of such methods has made progress on the rendering (inference) times, very little progress has been made on improving the reconstruction (training) times. In this work, we present Neural Adaptive Scene Tracing (NAScenT), the first neural rendering method based on directly training a hybrid explicit-implicit neural representation. NAScenT uses a hierarchical octree representation with one neural network per leaf node and combines this representation with a two-stage sampling process that concentrates ray samples where they matter most near object surfaces. As a result, NAScenT is capable of reconstructing challenging scenes including both large, sparsely populated volumes like UAV captured outdoor environments, as well as small scenes with high geometric complexity. NAScenT outperforms existing neural rendering approaches in terms of both quality and training time.

Learning Markov Games with Adversarial Opponents: Efficient Algorithms and Fundamental Limits

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games focus exclusively on the former objective, it remains open whether we can achieve both objectives simultaneously. To address this problem, this work studies no-regret learning in Markov games with adversarial opponents when competing against the best fixed policy in hindsight. Along this direction, we present a new complete set of positive and negative results: When the policies of the opponents are revealed at the end of each episode, we propose new efficient algorithms achieving $\sqrt{K}$-regret bounds when either (1) the baseline policy class is small or (2) the opponent's policy class is small. This is complemented with an exponential lower bound when neither conditions are true. When the policies of the opponents are not revealed, we prove a statistical hardness result even in the most favorable scenario when both above conditions are true. Our hardness result is much stronger than the existing hardness results which either only involve computational hardness, or require further restrictions on the algorithms.

NeAT: Neural Adaptive Tomography

In this paper, we present Neural Adaptive Tomography (NeAT), the first adaptive, hierarchical neural rendering pipeline for multi-view inverse rendering. Through a combination of neural features with an adaptive explicit representation, we achieve reconstruction times far superior to existing neural inverse rendering methods. The adaptive explicit representation improves efficiency by facilitating empty space culling and concentrating samples in complex regions, while the neural features act as a neural regularizer for the 3D reconstruction. The NeAT framework is designed specifically for the tomographic setting, which consists only of semi-transparent volumetric scenes instead of opaque objects. In this setting, NeAT outperforms the quality of existing optimization-based tomography solvers while being substantially faster.

V-Learning -- A Simple, Efficient, Decentralized Algorithm for Multiagent RL

A major challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) is the curse of multiagents, where the size of the joint action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. This remains to be a bottleneck for designing efficient MARL algorithms even in a basic scenario with finitely many states and actions. This paper resolves this challenge for the model of episodic Markov games. We design a new class of fully decentralized algorithms -- V-learning, which provably learns Nash equilibria (in the two-player zero-sum setting), correlated equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria (in the multiplayer general-sum setting) in a number of samples that only scales with $\max_{i\in[m]} A_i$, where $A_i$ is the number of actions for the $i^{\rm th}$ player. This is in sharp contrast to the size of the joint action space which is $\prod_{i=1}^m A_i$. V-learning (in its basic form) is a new class of single-agent RL algorithms that convert any adversarial bandit algorithm with suitable regret guarantees into a RL algorithm. Similar to the classical Q-learning algorithm, it performs incremental updates to the value functions. Different from Q-learning, it only maintains the estimates of V-values instead of Q-values. This key difference allows V-learning to achieve the claimed guarantees in the MARL setting by simply letting all agents run V-learning independently.