Forking Paths in Neural Text Generation

Estimating uncertainty in Large Language Models (LLMs) is important for properly evaluating LLMs, and ensuring safety for users. However, prior approaches to uncertainty estimation focus on the final answer in generated text, ignoring intermediate steps that might dramatically impact the outcome. We hypothesize that there exist key forking tokens, such that re-sampling the system at those specific tokens, but not others, leads to very different outcomes. To test this empirically, we develop a novel approach to representing uncertainty dynamics across individual tokens of text generation, and applying statistical models to test our hypothesis. Our approach is highly flexible: it can be applied to any dataset and any LLM, without fine tuning or accessing model weights. We use our method to analyze LLM responses on 7 different tasks across 4 domains, spanning a wide range of typical use cases. We find many examples of forking tokens, including surprising ones such as punctuation marks, suggesting that LLMs are often just a single token away from saying something very different.

Relations, Negations, and Numbers: Looking for Logic in Generative Text-to-Image Models

Despite remarkable progress in multi-modal AI research, there is a salient domain in which modern AI continues to lag considerably behind even human children: the reliable deployment of logical operators. Here, we examine three forms of logical operators: relations, negations, and discrete numbers. We asked human respondents (N=178 in total) to evaluate images generated by a state-of-the-art image-generating AI (DALL-E 3) prompted with these `logical probes', and find that none reliably produce human agreement scores greater than 50\%. The negation probes and numbers (beyond 3) fail most frequently. In a 4th experiment, we assess a `grounded diffusion' pipeline that leverages targeted prompt engineering and structured intermediate representations for greater compositional control, but find its performance is judged even worse than that of DALL-E 3 across prompts. To provide further clarity on potential sources of success and failure in these text-to-image systems, we supplement our 4 core experiments with multiple auxiliary analyses and schematic diagrams, directly quantifying, for example, the relationship between the N-gram frequency of relational prompts and the average match to generated images; the success rates for 3 different prompt modification strategies in the rendering of negation prompts; and the scalar variability / ratio dependence (`approximate numeracy') of prompts involving integers. We conclude by discussing the limitations inherent to `grounded' multimodal learning systems whose grounding relies heavily on vector-based semantics (e.g. DALL-E 3), or under-specified syntactical constraints (e.g. `grounded diffusion'), and propose minimal modifications (inspired by development, based in imagery) that could help to bridge the lingering compositional gap between scale and structure. All data and code is available at https://github.com/ColinConwell/T2I-Probology

One fish, two fish, but not the whole sea: Alignment reduces language models' conceptual diversity

Researchers in social science and psychology have recently proposed using large language models (LLMs) as replacements for humans in behavioral research. In addition to arguments about whether LLMs accurately capture population-level patterns, this has raised questions about whether LLMs capture human-like conceptual diversity. Separately, it is debated whether post-training alignment (RLHF or RLAIF) affects models' internal diversity. Inspired by human studies, we use a new way of measuring the conceptual diversity of synthetically-generated LLM "populations" by relating the internal variability of simulated individuals to the population-level variability. We use this approach to evaluate non-aligned and aligned LLMs on two domains with rich human behavioral data. While no model reaches human-like diversity, aligned models generally display less diversity than their instruction fine-tuned counterparts. Our findings highlight potential trade-offs between increasing models' value alignment and decreasing the diversity of their conceptual representations.

MMToM-QA: Multimodal Theory of Mind Question Answering

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's minds, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data, which can include visual cues, linguistic narratives, or both. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Large Language Models Fail on Trivial Alterations to Theory-of-Mind Tasks

Intuitive psychology is a pillar of common-sense reasoning. The replication of this reasoning in machine intelligence is an important stepping-stone on the way to human-like artificial intelligence. Several recent tasks and benchmarks for examining this reasoning in Large-Large Models have focused in particular on belief attribution in Theory-of-Mind tasks. These tasks have shown both successes and failures. We consider in particular a recent purported success case, and show that small variations that maintain the principles of ToM turn the results on their head. We argue that in general, the zero-hypothesis for model evaluation in intuitive psychology should be skeptical, and that outlying failure cases should outweigh average success rates. We also consider what possible future successes on Theory-of-Mind tasks by more powerful LLMs would mean for ToM tasks with people.

Type theory in human-like learning and inference

Humans can generate reasonable answers to novel queries (Schulz, 2012): if I asked you what kind of food you want to eat for lunch, you would respond with a food, not a time. The thought that one would respond "After 4pm" to "What would you like to eat" is either a joke or a mistake, and seriously entertaining it as a lunch option would likely never happen in the first place. While understanding how people come up with new ideas, thoughts, explanations, and hypotheses that obey the basic constraints of a novel search space is of central importance to cognitive science, there is no agreed-on formal model for this kind of reasoning. We propose that a core component of any such reasoning system is a type theory: a formal imposition of structure on the kinds of computations an agent can perform, and how they're performed. We motivate this proposal with three empirical observations: adaptive constraints on learning and inference (i.e. generating reasonable hypotheses), how people draw distinctions between improbability and impossibility, and people's ability to reason about things at varying levels of abstraction.

Testing Relational Understanding in Text-Guided Image Generation

Relations are basic building blocks of human cognition. Classic and recent work suggests that many relations are early developing, and quickly perceived. Machine models that aspire to human-level perception and reasoning should reflect the ability to recognize and reason generatively about relations. We report a systematic empirical examination of a recent text-guided image generation model (DALL-E 2), using a set of 15 basic physical and social relations studied or proposed in the literature, and judgements from human participants (N = 169). Overall, we find that only ~22% of images matched basic relation prompts. Based on a quantitative examination of people's judgments, we suggest that current image generation models do not yet have a grasp of even basic relations involving simple objects and agents. We examine reasons for model successes and failures, and suggest possible improvements based on computations observed in biological intelligence.

A Compositional Object-Based Approach to Learning Physical Dynamics

We present the Neural Physics Engine (NPE), a framework for learning simulators of intuitive physics that naturally generalize across variable object count and different scene configurations. We propose a factorization of a physical scene into composable object-based representations and a neural network architecture whose compositional structure factorizes object dynamics into pairwise interactions. Like a symbolic physics engine, the NPE is endowed with generic notions of objects and their interactions; realized as a neural network, it can be trained via stochastic gradient descent to adapt to specific object properties and dynamics of different worlds. We evaluate the efficacy of our approach on simple rigid body dynamics in two-dimensional worlds. By comparing to less structured architectures, we show that the NPE's compositional representation of the structure in physical interactions improves its ability to predict movement, generalize across variable object count and different scene configurations, and infer latent properties of objects such as mass.