Vulnerability detection is the process of identifying security vulnerabilities in software applications or systems.
The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases. However, existing benchmarks often lack coverage for subtle corner cases, allowing incorrect solutions to pass. To bridge this gap, we propose CodeHacker, an automated agent framework dedicated to generating targeted adversarial test cases that expose latent vulnerabilities in program submissions. Mimicking the hack mechanism in competitive programming, CodeHacker employs a multi-strategy approach, including stress testing, anti-hash attacks, and logic-specific targeting to break specific code submissions. To ensure the validity and reliability of these attacks, we introduce a Calibration Phase, where the agent iteratively refines its own Validator and Checker via self-generated adversarial probes before evaluating contestant code.Experiments demonstrate that CodeHacker significantly improves the True Negative Rate (TNR) of existing datasets, effectively filtering out incorrect solutions that were previously accepted. Furthermore, generated adversarial cases prove to be superior training data, boosting the performance of RL-trained models on benchmarks like LiveCodeBench.
Cross-silo federated learning allows multiple organizations to collaboratively train machine learning models without sharing raw data, but client updates can still leak sensitive information through inference attacks. Secure aggregation protects privacy by hiding individual updates, yet it complicates contribution evaluation, which is critical for fair rewards and detecting low-quality or malicious participants. Existing marginal-contribution methods, such as the Shapley value, are incompatible with secure aggregation, and practical alternatives, such as Leave-One-Out, are crude and rely on self-evaluation. We introduce two marginal-difference contribution scores compatible with secure aggregation. Fair-Private satisfies standard fairness axioms, while Everybody-Else eliminates self-evaluation and provides resistance to manipulation, addressing a largely overlooked vulnerability. We provide theoretical guarantees for fairness, privacy, robustness, and computational efficiency, and evaluate our methods on multiple medical image datasets and CIFAR10 in cross-silo settings. Our scores consistently outperform existing baselines, better approximate Shapley-induced client rankings, and improve downstream model performance as well as misbehavior detection. These results demonstrate that fairness, privacy, robustness, and practical utility can be achieved jointly in federated contribution evaluation, offering a principled solution for real-world cross-silo deployments.
The proliferation of AI-generated content has facilitated sophisticated face manipulation, severely undermining visual integrity and posing unprecedented challenges to intellectual property. In response, a common proactive defense leverages fragile watermarks to detect, localize, or even recover manipulated regions. However, these methods always assume an adversary unaware of the embedded watermark, overlooking their inherent vulnerability to watermark removal attacks. Furthermore, this fragility is exacerbated in the commonly used dual-watermark strategy that adds a robust watermark for image ownership verification, where mutual interference and limited embedding capacity reduce the fragile watermark's effectiveness. To address the gap, we propose RecoverMark, a watermarking framework that achieves robust manipulation localization, content recovery, and ownership verification simultaneously. Our key insight is twofold. First, we exploit a critical real-world constraint: an adversary must preserve the background's semantic consistency to avoid visual detection, even if they apply global, imperceptible watermark removal attacks. Second, using the image's own content (face, in this paper) as the watermark enhances extraction robustness. Based on these insights, RecoverMark treats the protected face content itself as the watermark and embeds it into the surrounding background. By designing a robust two-stage training paradigm with carefully crafted distortion layers that simulate comprehensive potential attacks and a progressive training strategy, RecoverMark achieves a robust watermark embedding in no fragile manner for image manipulation localization, recovery, and image IP protection simultaneously. Extensive experiments demonstrate the proposed RecoverMark's robustness against both seen and unseen attacks and its generalizability to in-distribution and out-of-distribution data.
Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that are fluent and semantically coherent, and therefore difficult to detect with standard heuristics. A particularly challenging failure mode occurs when an attacker tries to hide the malicious goal of their request by manipulating its framing to induce compliance. Because these attacks maintain malicious intent through a flexible presentation, defenses that rely on structural artifacts or goal-specific signatures can fail. Motivated by this, we introduce a self-supervised framework for disentangling semantic factor pairs in LLM activations at inference. We instantiate the framework for goal and framing and construct GoalFrameBench, a corpus of prompts with controlled goal and framing variations, which we use to train Representation Disentanglement on Activations (ReDAct) module to extract disentangled representations in a frozen LLM. We then propose FrameShield, an anomaly detector operating on the framing representations, which improves model-agnostic detection across multiple LLM families with minimal computational overhead. Theoretical guarantees for ReDAct and extensive empirical validations show that its disentanglement effectively powers FrameShield. Finally, we use disentanglement as an interpretability probe, revealing distinct profiles for goal and framing signals and positioning semantic disentanglement as a building block for both LLM safety and mechanistic interpretability.
Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without sharing raw data. However, shared local model updates remain vulnerable to inference and poisoning attacks. Secure aggregation schemes have been proposed to mitigate these attacks. In this work, we aim to understand how these techniques are implemented in quantum-assisted FL. Quantum Secure Aggregation (QSA) has been proposed, offering information-theoretic privacy by encoding client updates into the global phase of multipartite entangled states. Existing QSA protocols, however, rely on a single global Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state shared among all participating clients. This design poses fundamental challenges: fidelity of large-scale GHZ states deteriorates rapidly with the increasing number of clients; and (ii) the global aggregation prevents the detection of Byzantine clients. We propose Clustered Quantum Secure Aggregation (CQSA), a modular aggregation framework that reconciles the physical constraints of near-term quantum hardware along with the need for Byzantine-robustness in FL. CQSA randomly partitions the clients into small clusters, each performing local quantum aggregation using high-fidelity, low-qubit GHZ states. The server analyzes statistical relationships between cluster-level aggregates employing common statistical measures such as cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to identify malicious contributions. Through theoretical analysis and simulations under depolarizing noise, we demonstrate that CQSA ensures stable model convergence, achieves superior state fidelity over global QSA.
Colony-forming unit (CFU) detection is critical in pharmaceutical manufacturing, serving as a key component of Environmental Monitoring programs and ensuring compliance with stringent quality standards. Manual counting is labor-intensive and error-prone, while deep learning (DL) approaches, though accurate, remain vulnerable to sample quality variations and artifacts. Building on our earlier CNN-based framework (Beznik et al., 2020), we evaluated YOLOv5, YOLOv7, and YOLOv8 for CFU detection; however, these achieved only 97.08 percent accuracy, insufficient for pharmaceutical-grade requirements. A custom Detectron2 model trained on GSK's dataset of over 50,000 Petri dish images achieved 99 percent detection rate with 2 percent false positives and 0.6 percent false negatives. Despite high validation accuracy, Detectron2 performance degrades on outlier cases including contaminated plates, plastic artifacts, or poor optical clarity. To address this, we developed a multi-agent framework combining DL with vision-language models (VLMs). The VLM agent first classifies plates as valid or invalid. For valid samples, both DL and VLM agents independently estimate colony counts. When predictions align within 5 percent, results are automatically recorded in Postgres and SAP; otherwise, samples are routed for expert review. Expert feedback enables continuous retraining and self-improvement. Initial DL-based automation reduced human verification by 50 percent across vaccine manufacturing sites. With VLM integration, this increased to 85 percent, delivering significant operational savings. The proposed system provides a scalable, auditable, and regulation-ready solution for microbiological quality control, advancing automation in biopharmaceutical production.
Collaborative perception (CP) enables data sharing among connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) to enhance driving safety. However, CP systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks where malicious agents forge false objects via feature-level perturbations. Current defensive systems use threshold-based consensus verification by comparing collaborative and ego detection results. Yet, these defenses remain vulnerable to more sophisticated attack strategies that could exploit two critical weaknesses: (i) lack of robustness against attacks with systematic timing and target region optimization, and (ii) inadvertent disclosure of vulnerability knowledge through implicit confidence information in shared collaboration data. In this paper, we propose MVIG attack, a novel adaptive adversarial CP framework learning to capture vulnerability knowledge disclosed by different defensive CP systems from a unified mutual view information graph (MVIG) representation. Our approach combines MVIG representation with temporal graph learning to generate evolving fabrication risk maps and employs entropy-aware vulnerability search to optimize attack location, timing and persistence, enabling adaptive attacks with generalizability across various defensive configurations. Extensive evaluations on OPV2V and Adv-OPV2V datasets demonstrate that MVIG attack reduces defense success rates by up to 62\% against state-of-the-art defenses while achieving 47\% lower detection for persistent attacks at 29.9 FPS, exposing critical security gaps in CP systems. Code will be released at https://github.com/yihangtao/MVIG.git
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) can be vulnerable to adversarial images that subtly bias their outputs toward plausible yet incorrect responses. We introduce a general, efficient, and training-free defense that combines image transformations with agentic data consolidation to recover correct model behavior. A key component of our approach is a two-stage detection mechanism that quickly filters out the majority of clean inputs. We first assess image consistency under content-preserving transformations at negligible computational cost. For more challenging cases, we examine discrepancies in a text-embedding space. Only when necessary do we invoke a powerful LLM to resolve attack-induced divergences. A key idea is to consolidate multiple responses, leveraging both their similarities and their differences. We show that our method achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while maintaining notable efficiency: most clean images skip costly processing, and even in the presence of numerous adversarial examples, the overhead remains minimal.
Distributed Federated Learning (DFL) enables decentralized model training across large-scale systems without a central parameter server. However, DFL faces three critical challenges: privacy leakage from honest-but-curious neighbors, slow convergence due to the lack of central coordination, and vulnerability to Byzantine adversaries aiming to degrade model accuracy. To address these issues, we propose a novel DFL framework that integrates Byzantine robustness, privacy preservation, and convergence acceleration. Within this framework, each device trains a local model using a Bayesian approach and independently selects an optimal subset of neighbors for posterior exchange. We formulate this neighbor selection as an optimization problem to minimize the global loss function under security and privacy constraints. Solving this problem is challenging because devices only possess partial network information, and the complex coupling between topology, security, and convergence remains unclear. To bridge this gap, we first analytically characterize the trade-offs between dynamic connectivity, Byzantine detection, privacy levels, and convergence speed. Leveraging these insights, we develop a fully distributed Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm. This approach enables devices to make autonomous connection decisions based on local observations. Simulation results demonstrate that our method achieves superior robustness and efficiency with significantly lower overhead compared to traditional security and privacy schemes.
Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) enables the efficient sharing of wireless resources to support emerging applications, but it also gives rise to new sensing-based security vulnerabilities. Here, potential communication security threats whereby confidential messages intended for legitimate users are intercepted, but also unauthorized receivers (Eves) can passively exploit target echoes to infer sensing parameters without users being aware. Despite these risks, the joint protection of sensing and communication security in ISAC systems remains unexplored. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a two-layer dual-secure ISAC framework that simultaneously protects sensing and communication against passive sensing Eves and communication Eves, without requiring their channel state information (CSI). Specifically, transmit beamformers are jointly designed to inject artificial noise (AN) to introduce interference to communication Eves, while deliberately distorting the reference signal available to sensing Eves to impair their sensing capability. Furthermore, the proposed design generates artificial ghosts (AGs) with fake angle-range-velocity profiles observable by all receivers. Legitimate receivers can suppress these AGs, whereas sensing Eves cannot, thereby significantly reducing their probability of correctly detecting the true targets. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed framework effectively enhances both communication and sensing security, while preserving the performance of communication users and legitimate sensing receivers.