Vulnerability detection is the process of identifying security vulnerabilities in software applications or systems.
Smart contracts govern billions of dollars in decentralized finance (DeFi), yet automated vulnerability detection remains challenging because many vulnerabilities are tightly coupled with project-specific business logic. We observe that recurring vulnerabilities across diverse DeFi business models often share the same underlying economic mechanisms, which we term DeFi semantics, and that capturing these shared abstractions can enable more systematic auditing. Building on this insight, we propose Knowdit, a knowledge-driven, agentic framework for smart contract vulnerability detection. Knowdit first constructs an auditing knowledge graph from historical human audit reports, linking fine-grained DeFi semantics with recurring vulnerability patterns. Given a new project, a multi-agent framework leverages this knowledge through an iterative loop of specification generation, harness synthesis, fuzz execution, and finding reflection, driven by a shared working memory for continuous refinement. We evaluate Knowdit on 12 recent Code4rena projects with 75 ground-truth vulnerabilities. Knowdit detects all 14 high-severity and 77\% of medium-severity vulnerabilities with only 2 false positives, significantly outperforming all baselines. Applied to six real-world projects, Knowdit further discovers 12 high- and 10 medium-severity previously unknown vulnerabilities, proving its outstanding performance.
In complex environments, infrared object detection exhibits broad applicability and stability across diverse scenarios. However, infrared object detection is vulnerable to both common corruptions and adversarial examples, leading to potential security risks. To improve the robustness of infrared object detection, current methods mostly adopt a data-driven ideology, which only superficially drives the network to fit the training data without specifically considering the unique characteristics of infrared images, resulting in limited robustness. In this paper, we revisit infrared physical knowledge and find that relative thermal radiation relations between different classes can be regarded as a reliable knowledge source under the complex scenarios of adversarial examples and common corruptions. Thus, we theoretically model thermal radiation relations based on the rank order of gray values for different classes, and further quantify the stability of various inter-class thermal radiation relations. Based on the above theoretical framework, we propose Knowledge-Guided Adversarial Training (KGAT) for infrared object detection, in which infrared physical knowledge is embedded into the adversarial training process, and the predicted results are optimized to be consistent with the actual physical laws. Extensive experiments on three infrared datasets and six mainstream infrared object detection models demonstrate that KGAT effectively enhances both clean accuracy and robustness against adversarial attacks and common corruptions.
As users increasingly turn to LLMs for practical and personal advice, they become vulnerable to subtle steering toward hidden incentives misaligned with their own interests. While existing NLP research has benchmarked manipulation detection, these efforts often rely on simulated debates and remain fundamentally decoupled from actual human belief shifts in real-world scenarios. We introduce PUPPET, a theoretical taxonomy and resource that bridges this gap by focusing on the moral direction of hidden incentives in everyday, advice-giving contexts. We provide an evaluation dataset of N=1,035 human-LLM interactions, where we measure users' belief shifts. Our analysis reveals a critical disconnect in current safety paradigms: while models can be trained to detect manipulative strategies, they do not correlate with the magnitude of resulting belief change. As such, we define the task of belief shift prediction and show that while state-of-the-art LLMs achieve moderate correlation (r=0.3-0.5), they systematically underestimate the intensity of human belief susceptibility. This work establishes a theoretically grounded and behaviorally validated foundation for AI social safety efforts by studying incentive-driven manipulation in LLMs during everyday, practical user queries.
System prompt configuration can make the difference between near-total phishing blindness and near-perfect detection in LLM email agents. We present PhishNChips, a study of 11 models under 10 prompt strategies, showing that prompt-model interaction is a first-order security variable: a single model's phishing bypass rate ranges from under 1% to 97% depending on how it is configured, while the false-positive cost of the same prompt varies sharply across models. We then show that optimizing prompts around highly predictive signals can improve benchmark performance, reaching up to 93.7% recall at 3.8% false positive rate, but also creates a brittle attack surface. In particular, domain-matching strategies perform well when legitimate emails mostly have matched sender and URL domains, yet degrade sharply when attackers invert that signal by registering matching infrastructure. Response-trace analysis shows that 98% of successful bypasses reason in ways consistent with the inverted signal: the models are following the instruction, but the instruction's core assumption has become false. A counter-intuitive corollary follows: making prompts more specific can degrade already-capable models by replacing broader multi-signal reasoning with exploitable single-signal dependence. We characterize the resulting tension between detection, usability, and adversarial robustness as a navigable tradeoff, introduce Safetility, a deployability-aware metric that penalizes false positives, and argue that closing the adversarial gap likely requires tool augmentation with external ground truth.
What should a developer inspect before deploying an LLM agent: the model, the tool code, the deployment configuration, or all three? In practice, many security failures in agent systems arise not from model weights alone, but from the surrounding software stack: tool functions that pass untrusted inputs to dangerous operations, exposed credentials in deployment artifacts, and over-privileged Model Context Protocol (MCP) configurations. We present Agent Audit, a security analysis system for LLM agent applications. Agent Audit analyzes Python agent code and deployment artifacts through an agent-aware pipeline that combines dataflow analysis, credential detection, structured configuration parsing, and privilege-risk checks. The system reports findings in terminal, JSON, and SARIF formats, enabling direct integration with local development workflows and CI/CD pipelines. On a benchmark of 22 samples with 42 annotated vulnerabilities, Agent Audit detects 40 vulnerabilities with 6 false positives, substantially improving recall over common SAST baselines while maintaining sub-second scan times. Agent Audit is open source and installable via pip, making security auditing accessible for agent systems. In the live demonstration, attendees scan vulnerable agent repositories and observe how Agent Audit identifies security risks in tool functions, prompts, and more. Findings are linked to source locations and configuration paths, and can be exported into VS Code and GitHub Code Scanning for interactive inspection.
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has become an essential component of smart transportation systems, enabling seamless interaction among vehicles and infrastructure. In recent years, it has played a progressively significant role in enhancing mobility, safety, and transportation efficiency. However, this connectivity introduces severe security vulnerabilities, particularly Denial-of-Service (DoS) and spoofing attacks targeting the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which could severely inhibit communication between the critical components of a vehicle, leading to system malfunctions, loss of control, or even endangering passengers' safety. To address this problem, this paper presents CANGuard, a novel spatio-temporal deep learning architecture that combines Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and an attention mechanism to effectively identify such attacks. The model is trained and evaluated on the CICIoV2024 dataset, achieving competitive performance across accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score and outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. A comprehensive ablation study confirms the individual and combined contributions of the CNN, GRU, and attention components. Additionally, a SHAP analysis is conducted to interpret the decision-making process of the model and determine which features have the most significant impact on intrusion detection. The proposed approach demonstrates strong potential for practical and scalable security enhancements in modern IoV environments, thereby ensuring safer and more secure CAN bus communications.
Despite their great success, deep neural networks rely on high-dimensional, non-robust representations, making them vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations, even in transfer scenarios. To address this, both training-time defenses (e.g., adversarial training and robust architecture design) and post-attack defenses (e.g., input purification and adversarial detection) have been extensively studied. Recently, a limited body of work has preliminarily explored a pre-attack defense paradigm, termed preemptive robustification, which introduces subtle modifications to benign samples prior to attack to proactively resist adversarial perturbations. Unfortunately, their practical applicability remains questionable due to several limitations, including (1) reliance on well-trained classifiers as surrogates to provide robustness priors, (2) substantial computational overhead arising from iterative optimization or trained generators for robustification, and (3) limited interpretability of the optimization- or generation-based robustification processes. Inspired by recent studies revealing a positive correlation between texture intensity and the robustness of benign samples, we show that image sharpening alone can efficiently robustify images. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first surrogate-free, optimization-free, generator-free, and human-interpretable robustification approach. Extensive experiments demonstrate that sharpening yields remarkable robustness gains with low computational cost, especially in transfer scenarios.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, yet the safety of the reasoning process itself remains largely unaddressed. Existing work on LLM safety focuses on content safety--detecting harmful, biased, or factually incorrect outputs -- and treats the reasoning chain as an opaque intermediate artifact. We identify reasoning safety as an orthogonal and equally critical security dimension: the requirement that a model's reasoning trajectory be logically consistent, computationally efficient, and resistant to adversarial manipulation. We make three contributions. First, we formally define reasoning safety and introduce a nine-category taxonomy of unsafe reasoning behaviors, covering input parsing errors, reasoning execution errors, and process management errors. Second, we conduct a large-scale prevalence study annotating 4111 reasoning chains from both natural reasoning benchmarks and four adversarial attack methods (reasoning hijacking and denial-of-service), confirming that all nine error types occur in practice and that each attack induces a mechanistically interpretable signature. Third, we propose a Reasoning Safety Monitor: an external LLM-based component that runs in parallel with the target model, inspects each reasoning step in real time via a taxonomy-embedded prompt, and dispatches an interrupt signal upon detecting unsafe behavior. Evaluation on a 450-chain static benchmark shows that our monitor achieves up to 84.88\% step-level localization accuracy and 85.37\% error-type classification accuracy, outperforming hallucination detectors and process reward model baselines by substantial margins. These results demonstrate that reasoning-level monitoring is both necessary and practically achievable, and establish reasoning safety as a foundational concern for the secure deployment of large reasoning models.
In this paper, we address the challenging problem of single-scene, fully unsupervised video anomaly detection (VAD), where raw videos containing both normal and abnormal events are used directly for training and testing without any labels. This differs sharply from prior work that either requires extensive labeling (fully or weakly supervised) or depends on normal-only videos (one-class classification), which are vulnerable to distribution shifts and contamination. We propose an entropy-guided autoencoder that detects anomalies through reconstruction error by reconstructing normal frames well while making anomalies reconstruct poorly. The key idea is to combine the standard reconstruction loss with a novel Minimal Latent Entropy (MLE) loss in the autoencoder. Reconstruction loss alone maps normal and abnormal inputs to distinct latent clusters due to their inherent differences, but also risks reconstructing anomalies too well to detect. Therefore, MLE loss addresses this by minimizing the entropy of latent embeddings, encouraging them to concentrate around high-density regions. Since normal frames dominate the raw video, sparse anomalous embeddings are pulled into the normal cluster, so the decoder emphasizes normal patterns and produces poor reconstructions for anomalies. This dual-loss design produces a clear reconstruction gap that enables effective anomaly detection. Extensive experiments on two widely used benchmarks and a challenging self-collected driving dataset demonstrate that our method achieves robust and superior performance over baselines.
The integration of machine learning (ML) algorithms into Internet of Things (IoT) applications has introduced significant advantages alongside vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, especially within IoT-based intrusion detection systems (IDS). While theoretical adversarial attacks have been extensively studied, practical implementation constraints have often been overlooked. This research addresses this gap by evaluating the feasibility of evasion attacks on IoT network-based IDSs, employing a novel black-box adversarial attack. Our study aims to bridge theoretical vulnerabilities with real-world applicability, enhancing understanding and defense against sophisticated threats in modern IoT ecosystems. Additionally, we propose a defense scheme tailored to mitigate the impact of evasion attacks, thereby reinforcing the resilience of ML-based IDSs. Our findings demonstrate successful evasion attacks against IDSs, underscoring their susceptibility to advanced techniques. In contrast, we proposed a defense mechanism that exhibits robust performance by effectively detecting the majority of adversarial traffic, showcasing promising outcomes compared to current state-of-the-art defenses. By addressing these critical cybersecurity challenges, our research contributes to advancing IoT security and provides insights for developing more resilient IDS.