Voice Jailbreak Attacks Against GPT-4o

Recently, the concept of artificial assistants has evolved from science fiction into real-world applications. GPT-4o, the newest multimodal large language model (MLLM) across audio, vision, and text, has further blurred the line between fiction and reality by enabling more natural human-computer interactions. However, the advent of GPT-4o's voice mode may also introduce a new attack surface. In this paper, we present the first systematic measurement of jailbreak attacks against the voice mode of GPT-4o. We show that GPT-4o demonstrates good resistance to forbidden questions and text jailbreak prompts when directly transferring them to voice mode. This resistance is primarily due to GPT-4o's internal safeguards and the difficulty of adapting text jailbreak prompts to voice mode. Inspired by GPT-4o's human-like behaviors, we propose VoiceJailbreak, a novel voice jailbreak attack that humanizes GPT-4o and attempts to persuade it through fictional storytelling (setting, character, and plot). VoiceJailbreak is capable of generating simple, audible, yet effective jailbreak prompts, which significantly increases the average attack success rate (ASR) from 0.033 to 0.778 in six forbidden scenarios. We also conduct extensive experiments to explore the impacts of interaction steps, key elements of fictional writing, and different languages on VoiceJailbreak's effectiveness and further enhance the attack performance with advanced fictional writing techniques. We hope our study can assist the research community in building more secure and well-regulated MLLMs.

UnsafeBench: Benchmarking Image Safety Classifiers on Real-World and AI-Generated Images

Image safety classifiers play an important role in identifying and mitigating the spread of unsafe images online (e.g., images including violence, hateful rhetoric, etc.). At the same time, with the advent of text-to-image models and increasing concerns about the safety of AI models, developers are increasingly relying on image safety classifiers to safeguard their models. Yet, the performance of current image safety classifiers remains unknown for real-world and AI-generated images. To bridge this research gap, in this work, we propose UnsafeBench, a benchmarking framework that evaluates the effectiveness and robustness of image safety classifiers. First, we curate a large dataset of 10K real-world and AI-generated images that are annotated as safe or unsafe based on a set of 11 unsafe categories of images (sexual, violent, hateful, etc.). Then, we evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of five popular image safety classifiers, as well as three classifiers that are powered by general-purpose visual language models. Our assessment indicates that existing image safety classifiers are not comprehensive and effective enough in mitigating the multifaceted problem of unsafe images. Also, we find that classifiers trained only on real-world images tend to have degraded performance when applied to AI-generated images. Motivated by these findings, we design and implement a comprehensive image moderation tool called PerspectiveVision, which effectively identifies 11 categories of real-world and AI-generated unsafe images. The best PerspectiveVision model achieves an overall F1-Score of 0.810 on six evaluation datasets, which is comparable with closed-source and expensive state-of-the-art models like GPT-4V. UnsafeBench and PerspectiveVision can aid the research community in better understanding the landscape of image safety classification in the era of generative AI.

Comprehensive Assessment of Jailbreak Attacks Against LLMs

Misuse of the Large Language Models (LLMs) has raised widespread concern. To address this issue, safeguards have been taken to ensure that LLMs align with social ethics. However, recent findings have revealed an unsettling vulnerability bypassing the safeguards of LLMs, known as jailbreak attacks. By applying techniques, such as employing role-playing scenarios, adversarial examples, or subtle subversion of safety objectives as a prompt, LLMs can produce an inappropriate or even harmful response. While researchers have studied several categories of jailbreak attacks, they have done so in isolation. To fill this gap, we present the first large-scale measurement of various jailbreak attack methods. We concentrate on 13 cutting-edge jailbreak methods from four categories, 160 questions from 16 violation categories, and six popular LLMs. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that the optimized jailbreak prompts consistently achieve the highest attack success rates, as well as exhibit robustness across different LLMs. Some jailbreak prompt datasets, available from the Internet, can also achieve high attack success rates on many LLMs, such as ChatGLM3, GPT-3.5, and PaLM2. Despite the claims from many organizations regarding the coverage of violation categories in their policies, the attack success rates from these categories remain high, indicating the challenges of effectively aligning LLM policies and the ability to counter jailbreak attacks. We also discuss the trade-off between the attack performance and efficiency, as well as show that the transferability of the jailbreak prompts is still viable, becoming an option for black-box models. Overall, our research highlights the necessity of evaluating different jailbreak methods. We hope our study can provide insights for future research on jailbreak attacks and serve as a benchmark tool for evaluating them for practitioners.

"Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Models

The misuse of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant attention from the general public and LLM vendors. In response, efforts have been made to align LLMs with human values and intent use. However, a particular type of adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak prompt, has emerged and continuously evolved to bypass the safeguards and elicit harmful content from LLMs. In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study on jailbreak prompts in the wild, with 6,387 prompts collected from four platforms over six months. Leveraging natural language processing technologies and graph-based community detection methods, we discover unique characteristics of jailbreak prompts and their major attack strategies, such as prompt injection and privilege escalation. We also observe that jailbreak prompts increasingly shift from public platforms to private ones, posing new challenges for LLM vendors in proactive detection. To assess the potential harm caused by jailbreak prompts, we create a question set comprising 46,800 samples across 13 forbidden scenarios. Our experiments show that current LLMs and safeguards cannot adequately defend jailbreak prompts in all scenarios. Particularly, we identify two highly effective jailbreak prompts which achieve 0.99 attack success rates on ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and GPT-4, and they have persisted online for over 100 days. Our work sheds light on the severe and evolving threat landscape of jailbreak prompts. We hope our study can facilitate the research community and LLM vendors in promoting safer and regulated LLMs.

Unsafe Diffusion: On the Generation of Unsafe Images and Hateful Memes From Text-To-Image Models

State-of-the-art Text-to-Image models like Stable Diffusion and DALLE$\cdot$2 are revolutionizing how people generate visual content. At the same time, society has serious concerns about how adversaries can exploit such models to generate unsafe images. In this work, we focus on demystifying the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from Text-to-Image models. We first construct a typology of unsafe images consisting of five categories (sexually explicit, violent, disturbing, hateful, and political). Then, we assess the proportion of unsafe images generated by four advanced Text-to-Image models using four prompt datasets. We find that these models can generate a substantial percentage of unsafe images; across four models and four prompt datasets, 14.56% of all generated images are unsafe. When comparing the four models, we find different risk levels, with Stable Diffusion being the most prone to generating unsafe content (18.92% of all generated images are unsafe). Given Stable Diffusion's tendency to generate more unsafe content, we evaluate its potential to generate hateful meme variants if exploited by an adversary to attack a specific individual or community. We employ three image editing methods, DreamBooth, Textual Inversion, and SDEdit, which are supported by Stable Diffusion. Our evaluation result shows that 24% of the generated images using DreamBooth are hateful meme variants that present the features of the original hateful meme and the target individual/community; these generated images are comparable to hateful meme variants collected from the real world. Overall, our results demonstrate that the danger of large-scale generation of unsafe images is imminent. We discuss several mitigating measures, such as curating training data, regulating prompts, and implementing safety filters, and encourage better safeguard tools to be developed to prevent unsafe generation.

In ChatGPT We Trust? Measuring and Characterizing the Reliability of ChatGPT

The way users acquire information is undergoing a paradigm shift with the advent of ChatGPT. Unlike conventional search engines, ChatGPT retrieves knowledge from the model itself and generates answers for users. ChatGPT's impressive question-answering (QA) capability has attracted more than 100 million users within a short period of time but has also raised concerns regarding its reliability. In this paper, we perform the first large-scale measurement of ChatGPT's reliability in the generic QA scenario with a carefully curated set of 5,695 questions across ten datasets and eight domains. We find that ChatGPT's reliability varies across different domains, especially underperforming in law and science questions. We also demonstrate that system roles, originally designed by OpenAI to allow users to steer ChatGPT's behavior, can impact ChatGPT's reliability. We further show that ChatGPT is vulnerable to adversarial examples, and even a single character change can negatively affect its reliability in certain cases. We believe that our study provides valuable insights into ChatGPT's reliability and underscores the need for strengthening the reliability and security of large language models (LLMs).

MGTBench: Benchmarking Machine-Generated Text Detection

Nowadays large language models (LLMs) have shown revolutionary power in a variety of natural language processing (NLP) tasks such as text classification, sentiment analysis, language translation, and question-answering. In this way, detecting machine-generated texts (MGTs) is becoming increasingly important as LLMs become more advanced and prevalent. These models can generate human-like language that can be difficult to distinguish from text written by a human, which raises concerns about authenticity, accountability, and potential bias. However, existing detection methods against MGTs are evaluated under different model architectures, datasets, and experimental settings, resulting in a lack of a comprehensive evaluation framework across different methodologies In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing the first benchmark framework for MGT detection, named MGTBench. Extensive evaluations on public datasets with curated answers generated by ChatGPT (the most representative and powerful LLMs thus far) show that most of the current detection methods perform less satisfactorily against MGTs. An exceptional case is ChatGPT Detector, which is trained with ChatGPT-generated texts and shows great performance in detecting MGTs. Nonetheless, we note that only a small fraction of adversarial-crafted perturbations on MGTs can evade the ChatGPT Detector, thus highlighting the need for more robust MGT detection methods. We envision that MGTBench will serve as a benchmark tool to accelerate future investigations involving the evaluation of state-of-the-art MGT detection methods on their respective datasets and the development of more advanced MGT detection methods. Our source code and datasets are available at https://github.com/xinleihe/MGTBench.

Prompt Stealing Attacks Against Text-to-Image Generation Models

Text-to-Image generation models have revolutionized the artwork design process and enabled anyone to create high-quality images by entering text descriptions called prompts. Creating a high-quality prompt that consists of a subject and several modifiers can be time-consuming and costly. In consequence, a trend of trading high-quality prompts on specialized marketplaces has emerged. In this paper, we propose a novel attack, namely prompt stealing attack, which aims to steal prompts from generated images by text-to-image generation models. Successful prompt stealing attacks direct violate the intellectual property and privacy of prompt engineers and also jeopardize the business model of prompt trading marketplaces. We first perform a large-scale analysis on a dataset collected by ourselves and show that a successful prompt stealing attack should consider a prompt's subject as well as its modifiers. We then propose the first learning-based prompt stealing attack, PromptStealer, and demonstrate its superiority over two baseline methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We also make some initial attempts to defend PromptStealer. In general, our study uncovers a new attack surface in the ecosystem created by the popular text-to-image generation models. We hope our results can help to mitigate the threat. To facilitate research in this field, we will share our dataset and code with the community.

Backdoor Attacks in the Supply Chain of Masked Image Modeling

Masked image modeling (MIM) revolutionizes self-supervised learning (SSL) for image pre-training. In contrast to previous dominating self-supervised methods, i.e., contrastive learning, MIM attains state-of-the-art performance by masking and reconstructing random patches of the input image. However, the associated security and privacy risks of this novel generative method are unexplored. In this paper, we perform the first security risk quantification of MIM through the lens of backdoor attacks. Different from previous work, we are the first to systematically threat modeling on SSL in every phase of the model supply chain, i.e., pre-training, release, and downstream phases. Our evaluation shows that models built with MIM are vulnerable to existing backdoor attacks in release and downstream phases and are compromised by our proposed method in pre-training phase. For instance, on CIFAR10, the attack success rate can reach 99.62%, 96.48%, and 98.89% in the downstream phase, release phase, and pre-training phase, respectively. We also take the first step to investigate the success factors of backdoor attacks in the pre-training phase and find the trigger number and trigger pattern play key roles in the success of backdoor attacks while trigger location has only tiny effects. In the end, our empirical study of the defense mechanisms across three detection-level on model supply chain phases indicates that different defenses are suitable for backdoor attacks in different phases. However, backdoor attacks in the release phase cannot be detected by all three detection-level methods, calling for more effective defenses in future research.

Nonconvex Sparse Logistic Regression with Weakly Convex Regularization

In this work we propose to fit a sparse logistic regression model by a weakly convex regularized nonconvex optimization problem. The idea is based on the finding that a weakly convex function as an approximation of the $\ell_0$ pseudo norm is able to better induce sparsity than the commonly used $\ell_1$ norm. For a class of weakly convex sparsity inducing functions, we prove the nonconvexity of the corresponding sparse logistic regression problem, and study its local optimality conditions and the choice of the regularization parameter to exclude trivial solutions. Despite the nonconvexity, a method based on proximal gradient descent is used to solve the general weakly convex sparse logistic regression, and its convergence behavior is studied theoretically. Then the general framework is applied to a specific weakly convex function, and a necessary and sufficient local optimality condition is provided. The solution method is instantiated in this case as an iterative firm-shrinkage algorithm, and its effectiveness is demonstrated in numerical experiments by both randomly generated and real datasets.