Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming

We sketch how developers of frontier AI systems could construct a structured rationale -- a 'safety case' -- that an AI system is unlikely to cause catastrophic outcomes through scheming. Scheming is a potential threat model where AI systems could pursue misaligned goals covertly, hiding their true capabilities and objectives. In this report, we propose three arguments that safety cases could use in relation to scheming. For each argument we sketch how evidence could be gathered from empirical evaluations, and what assumptions would need to be met to provide strong assurance. First, developers of frontier AI systems could argue that AI systems are not capable of scheming (Scheming Inability). Second, one could argue that AI systems are not capable of posing harm through scheming (Harm Inability). Third, one could argue that control measures around the AI systems would prevent unacceptable outcomes even if the AI systems intentionally attempted to subvert them (Harm Control). Additionally, we discuss how safety cases might be supported by evidence that an AI system is reasonably aligned with its developers (Alignment). Finally, we point out that many of the assumptions required to make these safety arguments have not been confidently satisfied to date and require making progress on multiple open research problems.

Transformer Circuit Faithfulness Metrics are not Robust

Mechanistic interpretability work attempts to reverse engineer the learned algorithms present inside neural networks. One focus of this work has been to discover 'circuits' -- subgraphs of the full model that explain behaviour on specific tasks. But how do we measure the performance of such circuits? Prior work has attempted to measure circuit 'faithfulness' -- the degree to which the circuit replicates the performance of the full model. In this work, we survey many considerations for designing experiments that measure circuit faithfulness by ablating portions of the model's computation. Concerningly, we find existing methods are highly sensitive to seemingly insignificant changes in the ablation methodology. We conclude that existing circuit faithfulness scores reflect both the methodological choices of researchers as well as the actual components of the circuit - the task a circuit is required to perform depends on the ablation used to test it. The ultimate goal of mechanistic interpretability work is to understand neural networks, so we emphasize the need for more clarity in the precise claims being made about circuits. We open source a library at https://github.com/UFO-101/auto-circuit that includes highly efficient implementations of a wide range of ablation methodologies and circuit discovery algorithms.

Me, Myself, and AI: The Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs

AI assistants such as ChatGPT are trained to respond to users by saying, "I am a large language model". This raises questions. Do such models know that they are LLMs and reliably act on this knowledge? Are they aware of their current circumstances, such as being deployed to the public? We refer to a model's knowledge of itself and its circumstances as situational awareness. To quantify situational awareness in LLMs, we introduce a range of behavioral tests, based on question answering and instruction following. These tests form the $\textbf{Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD)}$, a benchmark comprising 7 task categories and over 13,000 questions. The benchmark tests numerous abilities, including the capacity of LLMs to (i) recognize their own generated text, (ii) predict their own behavior, (iii) determine whether a prompt is from internal evaluation or real-world deployment, and (iv) follow instructions that depend on self-knowledge. We evaluate 16 LLMs on SAD, including both base (pretrained) and chat models. While all models perform better than chance, even the highest-scoring model (Claude 3 Opus) is far from a human baseline on certain tasks. We also observe that performance on SAD is only partially predicted by metrics of general knowledge (e.g. MMLU). Chat models, which are finetuned to serve as AI assistants, outperform their corresponding base models on SAD but not on general knowledge tasks. The purpose of SAD is to facilitate scientific understanding of situational awareness in LLMs by breaking it down into quantitative abilities. Situational awareness is important because it enhances a model's capacity for autonomous planning and action. While this has potential benefits for automation, it also introduces novel risks related to AI safety and control. Code and latest results available at https://situational-awareness-dataset.org .

Can Language Models Explain Their Own Classification Behavior?

Large language models (LLMs) perform well at a myriad of tasks, but explaining the processes behind this performance is a challenge. This paper investigates whether LLMs can give faithful high-level explanations of their own internal processes. To explore this, we introduce a dataset, ArticulateRules, of few-shot text-based classification tasks generated by simple rules. Each rule is associated with a simple natural-language explanation. We test whether models that have learned to classify inputs competently (both in- and out-of-distribution) are able to articulate freeform natural language explanations that match their classification behavior. Our dataset can be used for both in-context and finetuning evaluations. We evaluate a range of LLMs, demonstrating that articulation accuracy varies considerably between models, with a particularly sharp increase from GPT-3 to GPT-4. We then investigate whether we can improve GPT-3's articulation accuracy through a range of methods. GPT-3 completely fails to articulate 7/10 rules in our test, even after additional finetuning on correct explanations. We release our dataset, ArticulateRules, which can be used to test self-explanation for LLMs trained either in-context or by finetuning.

Summing Up the Facts: Additive Mechanisms Behind Factual Recall in LLMs

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.

A Toy Model of Universality: Reverse Engineering How Networks Learn Group Operations

Universality is a key hypothesis in mechanistic interpretability -- that different models learn similar features and circuits when trained on similar tasks. In this work, we study the universality hypothesis by examining how small neural networks learn to implement group composition. We present a novel algorithm by which neural networks may implement composition for any finite group via mathematical representation theory. We then show that networks consistently learn this algorithm by reverse engineering model logits and weights, and confirm our understanding using ablations. By studying networks of differing architectures trained on various groups, we find mixed evidence for universality: using our algorithm, we can completely characterize the family of circuits and features that networks learn on this task, but for a given network the precise circuits learned -- as well as the order they develop -- are arbitrary.