ProFL: Performative Robust Optimal Federated Learning

Performative prediction (PP) is a framework that captures distribution shifts that occur during the training of machine learning models due to their deployment. As the trained model is used, its generated data could cause the model to evolve, leading to deviations from the original data distribution. The impact of such model-induced distribution shifts in the federated learning (FL) setup remains unexplored despite being increasingly likely to transpire in real-life use cases. Although Jin et al. (2024) recently extended PP to FL in a straightforward manner, the resulting model only converges to a performative stable point, which may be far from optimal. The methods in Izzo et al. (2021); Miller et al. (2021) can find a performative optimal point in centralized settings, but they require the performative risk to be convex and the training data to be noiseless, assumptions often violated in realistic FL systems. This paper overcomes all of these shortcomings and proposes Performative robust optimal Federated Learning (ProFL), an algorithm that finds performative optimal points in FL from noisy and contaminated data. We present the convergence analysis under the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition, which applies to non-convex objectives. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets validate our proposed algorithms' efficiency.

Addressing Polarization and Unfairness in Performative Prediction

When machine learning (ML) models are used in applications that involve humans (e.g., online recommendation, school admission, hiring, lending), the model itself may trigger changes in the distribution of targeted data it aims to predict. Performative prediction (PP) is a framework that explicitly considers such model-dependent distribution shifts when learning ML models. While significant efforts have been devoted to finding performative stable (PS) solutions in PP for system robustness, their societal implications are less explored and it is unclear whether PS solutions are aligned with social norms such as fairness. In this paper, we set out to examine the fairness property of PS solutions in performative prediction. We first show that PS solutions can incur severe polarization effects and group-wise loss disparity. Although existing fairness mechanisms commonly used in literature can help mitigate unfairness, they may fail and disrupt the stability under model-dependent distribution shifts. We thus propose novel fairness intervention mechanisms that can simultaneously achieve both stability and fairness in PP settings. Both theoretical analysis and experiments are provided to validate the proposed method.

Privacy-Aware Randomized Quantization via Linear Programming

Differential privacy mechanisms such as the Gaussian or Laplace mechanism have been widely used in data analytics for preserving individual privacy. However, they are mostly designed for continuous outputs and are unsuitable for scenarios where discrete values are necessary. Although various quantization mechanisms were proposed recently to generate discrete outputs under differential privacy, the outcomes are either biased or have an inferior accuracy-privacy trade-off. In this paper, we propose a family of quantization mechanisms that is unbiased and differentially private. It has a high degree of freedom and we show that some existing mechanisms can be considered as special cases of ours. To find the optimal mechanism, we formulate a linear optimization that can be solved efficiently using linear programming tools. Experiments show that our proposed mechanism can attain a better privacy-accuracy trade-off compared to baselines.

Automating Data Annotation under Strategic Human Agents: Risks and Potential Solutions

As machine learning (ML) models are increasingly used in social domains to make consequential decisions about humans, they often have the power to reshape data distributions. Humans, as strategic agents, continuously adapt their behaviors in response to the learning system. As populations change dynamically, ML systems may need frequent updates to ensure high performance. However, acquiring high-quality human-annotated samples can be highly challenging and even infeasible in social domains. A common practice to address this issue is using the model itself to annotate unlabeled data samples. This paper investigates the long-term impacts when ML models are retrained with model-annotated samples when they incorporate human strategic responses. We first formalize the interactions between strategic agents and the model and then analyze how they evolve under such dynamic interactions. We find that agents are increasingly likely to receive positive decisions as the model gets retrained, whereas the proportion of agents with positive labels may decrease over time. We thus propose a refined retraining process to stabilize the dynamics. Last, we examine how algorithmic fairness can be affected by these retraining processes and find that enforcing common fairness constraints at every round may not benefit the disadvantaged group in the long run. Experiments on (semi-)synthetic and real data validate the theoretical findings.

Non-stationary Domain Generalization: Theory and Algorithm

Although recent advances in machine learning have shown its success to learn from independent and identically distributed (IID) data, it is vulnerable to out-of-distribution (OOD) data in an open world. Domain generalization (DG) deals with such an issue and it aims to learn a model from multiple source domains that can be generalized to unseen target domains. Existing studies on DG have largely focused on stationary settings with homogeneous source domains. However, in many applications, domains may evolve along a specific direction (e.g., time, space). Without accounting for such non-stationary patterns, models trained with existing methods may fail to generalize on OOD data. In this paper, we study domain generalization in non-stationary environment. We first examine the impact of environmental non-stationarity on model performance and establish the theoretical upper bounds for the model error at target domains. Then, we propose a novel algorithm based on adaptive invariant representation learning, which leverages the non-stationary pattern to train a model that attains good performance on target domains. Experiments on both synthetic and real data validate the proposed algorithm.

Algorithmic Decision-Making under Agents with Persistent Improvement

This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort strategically and improve to receive favorable decisions. Unlike prior works that assume agents benefit from their efforts immediately, we consider realistic scenarios where the impacts of these efforts are persistent and agents benefit from efforts by making improvements gradually. We first develop a dynamic model to characterize persistent improvements and based on this construct a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between agents and the decision-maker. We analytically characterize the equilibrium strategies and identify conditions under which agents have incentives to improve. With the dynamics, we then study how the decision-maker can design an optimal policy to incentivize the largest improvements inside the agent population. We also extend the model to settings where 1) agents may be dishonest and game the algorithm into making favorable but erroneous decisions; 2) honest efforts are forgettable and not sufficient to guarantee persistent improvements. With the extended models, we further examine conditions under which agents prefer honest efforts over dishonest behavior and the impacts of forgettable efforts.

Learning under Imitative Strategic Behavior with Unforeseeable Outcomes

Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may best respond and behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to game the system without changing labels. Although both behaviors have been studied (often as two separate problems) in the literature, most works assume individuals can (i) perfectly foresee the outcomes of their behaviors when they best respond; (ii) change their features arbitrarily as long as it is affordable, and the costs they need to pay are deterministic functions of feature changes. In this paper, we consider a different setting and focus on imitative strategic behaviors with unforeseeable outcomes, i.e., individuals manipulate/improve by imitating the features of those with positive labels, but the induced feature changes are unforeseeable. We first propose a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between individuals and the decision-maker, under which we examine how the decision-maker's ability to anticipate individual behavior affects its objective function and the individual's best response. We show that the objective difference between the two can be decomposed into three interpretable terms, with each representing the decision-maker's preference for a certain behavior. By exploring the roles of each term, we further illustrate how a decision-maker with adjusted preferences can simultaneously disincentivize manipulation, incentivize improvement, and promote fairness.

Non-linear Welfare-Aware Strategic Learning

This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future data. Existing results on strategic learning have largely focused on the linear setting where agents with linear labeling functions best respond to a (noisy) linear decision policy. Instead, this work focuses on general non-linear settings where agents respond to the decision policy with only "local information" of the policy. Moreover, we simultaneously consider the objectives of maximizing decision-maker welfare (model prediction accuracy), social welfare (agent improvement caused by strategic behaviors), and agent welfare (the extent that ML underestimates the agents). We first generalize the agent best response model in previous works to the non-linear setting, then reveal the compatibility of welfare objectives. We show the three welfare can attain the optimum simultaneously only under restrictive conditions which are challenging to achieve in non-linear settings. The theoretical results imply that existing works solely maximizing the welfare of a subset of parties inevitably diminish the welfare of the others. We thus claim the necessity of balancing the welfare of each party in non-linear settings and propose an irreducible optimization algorithm suitable for general strategic learning. Experiments on synthetic and real data validate the proposed algorithm.

Counterfactually Fair Representation

The use of machine learning models in high-stake applications (e.g., healthcare, lending, college admission) has raised growing concerns due to potential biases against protected social groups. Various fairness notions and methods have been proposed to mitigate such biases. In this work, we focus on Counterfactual Fairness (CF), a fairness notion that is dependent on an underlying causal graph and first proposed by Kusner \textit{et al.}~\cite{kusner2017counterfactual}; it requires that the outcome an individual perceives is the same in the real world as it would be in a "counterfactual" world, in which the individual belongs to another social group. Learning fair models satisfying CF can be challenging. It was shown in \cite{kusner2017counterfactual} that a sufficient condition for satisfying CF is to \textbf{not} use features that are descendants of sensitive attributes in the causal graph. This implies a simple method that learns CF models only using non-descendants of sensitive attributes while eliminating all descendants. Although several subsequent works proposed methods that use all features for training CF models, there is no theoretical guarantee that they can satisfy CF. In contrast, this work proposes a new algorithm that trains models using all the available features. We theoretically and empirically show that models trained with this method can satisfy CF\footnote{The code repository for this work can be found in \url{https://github.com/osu-srml/CF_Representation_Learning}}.

Loss Balancing for Fair Supervised Learning

Supervised learning models have been used in various domains such as lending, college admission, face recognition, natural language processing, etc. However, they may inherit pre-existing biases from training data and exhibit discrimination against protected social groups. Various fairness notions have been proposed to address unfairness issues. In this work, we focus on Equalized Loss (EL), a fairness notion that requires the expected loss to be (approximately) equalized across different groups. Imposing EL on the learning process leads to a non-convex optimization problem even if the loss function is convex, and the existing fair learning algorithms cannot properly be adopted to find the fair predictor under the EL constraint. This paper introduces an algorithm that can leverage off-the-shelf convex programming tools (e.g., CVXPY) to efficiently find the global optimum of this non-convex optimization. In particular, we propose the ELminimizer algorithm, which finds the optimal fair predictor under EL by reducing the non-convex optimization to a sequence of convex optimization problems. We theoretically prove that our algorithm finds the global optimal solution under certain conditions. Then, we support our theoretical results through several empirical studies.