Lookahead Counterfactual Fairness

As machine learning (ML) algorithms are used in applications that involve humans, concerns have arisen that these algorithms may be biased against certain social groups. \textit{Counterfactual fairness} (CF) is a fairness notion proposed in Kusner et al. (2017) that measures the unfairness of ML predictions; it requires that the prediction perceived by an individual in the real world has the same marginal distribution as it would be in a counterfactual world, in which the individual belongs to a different group. Although CF ensures fair ML predictions, it fails to consider the downstream effects of ML predictions on individuals. Since humans are strategic and often adapt their behaviors in response to the ML system, predictions that satisfy CF may not lead to a fair future outcome for the individuals. In this paper, we introduce \textit{lookahead counterfactual fairness} (LCF), a fairness notion accounting for the downstream effects of ML models which requires the individual \textit{future status} to be counterfactually fair. We theoretically identify conditions under which LCF can be satisfied and propose an algorithm based on the theorems. We also extend the concept to path-dependent fairness. Experiments on both synthetic and real data validate the proposed method.

Learning under Imitative Strategic Behavior with Unforeseeable Outcomes

Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may best respond and behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to game the system without changing labels. Although both behaviors have been studied (often as two separate problems) in the literature, most works assume individuals can (i) perfectly foresee the outcomes of their behaviors when they best respond; (ii) change their features arbitrarily as long as it is affordable, and the costs they need to pay are deterministic functions of feature changes. In this paper, we consider a different setting and focus on imitative strategic behaviors with unforeseeable outcomes, i.e., individuals manipulate/improve by imitating the features of those with positive labels, but the induced feature changes are unforeseeable. We first propose a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between individuals and the decision-maker, under which we examine how the decision-maker's ability to anticipate individual behavior affects its objective function and the individual's best response. We show that the objective difference between the two can be decomposed into three interpretable terms, with each representing the decision-maker's preference for a certain behavior. By exploring the roles of each term, we further illustrate how a decision-maker with adjusted preferences can simultaneously disincentivize manipulation, incentivize improvement, and promote fairness.

Counterfactually Fair Representation

The use of machine learning models in high-stake applications (e.g., healthcare, lending, college admission) has raised growing concerns due to potential biases against protected social groups. Various fairness notions and methods have been proposed to mitigate such biases. In this work, we focus on Counterfactual Fairness (CF), a fairness notion that is dependent on an underlying causal graph and first proposed by Kusner \textit{et al.}~\cite{kusner2017counterfactual}; it requires that the outcome an individual perceives is the same in the real world as it would be in a "counterfactual" world, in which the individual belongs to another social group. Learning fair models satisfying CF can be challenging. It was shown in \cite{kusner2017counterfactual} that a sufficient condition for satisfying CF is to \textbf{not} use features that are descendants of sensitive attributes in the causal graph. This implies a simple method that learns CF models only using non-descendants of sensitive attributes while eliminating all descendants. Although several subsequent works proposed methods that use all features for training CF models, there is no theoretical guarantee that they can satisfy CF. In contrast, this work proposes a new algorithm that trains models using all the available features. We theoretically and empirically show that models trained with this method can satisfy CF\footnote{The code repository for this work can be found in \url{https://github.com/osu-srml/CF_Representation_Learning}}.