Last-Iterate Convergence of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix games are based on the smoothed best-response dynamics, while the learning dynamics for stochastic games build upon those for matrix games, with additional incorporation of the minimax value iteration. To our knowledge, our theoretical results present the first finite-sample analysis of such learning dynamics with last-iterate guarantees. In the matrix game setting, the results imply a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-1})$ to find the Nash distribution and a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. In the stochastic game setting, the results also imply a sample complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. To establish these results, the main challenge is to handle stochastic approximation algorithms with multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates that evolve on (possibly) different time scales. To overcome this challenge, we developed a coupled Lyapunov-based approach, which may be of independent interest to the broader community studying the convergence behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

Principled RLHF from Heterogeneous Feedback via Personalization and Preference Aggregation

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has been an effective technique for aligning AI systems with human values, with remarkable successes in fine-tuning large-language models recently. Most existing RLHF paradigms make the underlying assumption that human preferences are relatively homogeneous, and can be encoded by a single reward model. In this paper, we focus on addressing the issues due to the inherent heterogeneity in human preferences, as well as their potential strategic behavior in providing feedback. Specifically, we propose two frameworks to address heterogeneous human feedback in principled ways: personalization-based one and aggregation-based one. For the former, we propose two approaches based on representation learning and clustering, respectively, for learning multiple reward models that trades off the bias (due to preference heterogeneity) and variance (due to the use of fewer data for learning each model by personalization). We then establish sample complexity guarantees for both approaches. For the latter, we aim to adhere to the single-model framework, as already deployed in the current RLHF paradigm, by carefully aggregating diverse and truthful preferences from humans. We propose two approaches based on reward and preference aggregation, respectively: the former utilizes both utilitarianism and Leximin approaches to aggregate individual reward models, with sample complexity guarantees; the latter directly aggregates the human feedback in the form of probabilistic opinions. Under the probabilistic-opinion-feedback model, we also develop an approach to handle strategic human labelers who may bias and manipulate the aggregated preferences with untruthful feedback. Based on the ideas in mechanism design, our approach ensures truthful preference reporting, with the induced aggregation rule maximizing social welfare functions.

Do LLM Agents Have Regret? A Case Study in Online Learning and Games

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of \emph{regret}. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel \emph{unsupervised} training loss of \emph{regret-loss}, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale $Q$-learning, the fast-timescale iterates are updated in spirit to the stochastic gradient descent and the slow-timescale iterates (which we use to compute the policies) are updated by taking a convex combination between its previous iterate and the latest fast-timescale iterate. Introducing the slow timescale as well as its update equation marks as our main algorithmic novelty. In the special case of linear function approximation, we establish, to the best of our knowledge, the first last-iterate finite-sample bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics of these types. The result implies a polynomial sample complexity to find a Nash equilibrium in such stochastic games. To establish the results, we model our proposed algorithm as a two-timescale stochastic approximation and derive the finite-sample bound through a Lyapunov-based approach. The key novelty lies in constructing a valid Lyapunov function to capture the evolution of the slow-timescale iterates. Specifically, through a change of variable, we show that the update equation of the slow-timescale iterates resembles the classical smoothed best-response dynamics, where the regularized Nash gap serves as a valid Lyapunov function. This insight enables us to construct a valid Lyapunov function via a generalized variant of the Moreau envelope of the regularized Nash gap. The construction of our Lyapunov function might be of broad independent interest in studying the behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

Fleet Policy Learning via Weight Merging and An Application to Robotic Tool-Use

Fleets of robots ingest massive amounts of streaming data generated by interacting with their environments, far more than those that can be stored or transmitted with ease. At the same time, we hope that teams of robots can co-acquire diverse skills through their experiences in varied settings. How can we enable such fleet-level learning without having to transmit or centralize fleet-scale data? In this paper, we investigate distributed learning of policies as a potential solution. To efficiently merge policies in the distributed setting, we propose fleet-merge, an instantiation of distributed learning that accounts for the symmetries that can arise in learning policies that are parameterized by recurrent neural networks. We show that fleet-merge consolidates the behavior of policies trained on 50 tasks in the Meta-World environment, with the merged policy achieving good performance on nearly all training tasks at test time. Moreover, we introduce a novel robotic tool-use benchmark, fleet-tools, for fleet policy learning in compositional and contact-rich robot manipulation tasks, which might be of broader interest, and validate the efficacy of fleet-merge on the benchmark.

Partially Observable Multi-agent RL with (Quasi-)Efficiency: The Blessing of Information Sharing

We study provable multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in the general framework of partially observable stochastic games (POSGs). To circumvent the known hardness results and the use of computationally intractable oracles, we advocate leveraging the potential \emph{information-sharing} among agents, a common practice in empirical MARL, and a standard model for multi-agent control systems with communications. We first establish several computation complexity results to justify the necessity of information-sharing, as well as the observability assumption that has enabled quasi-efficient single-agent RL with partial observations, for computational efficiency in solving POSGs. We then propose to further \emph{approximate} the shared common information to construct an {approximate model} of the POSG, in which planning an approximate equilibrium (in terms of solving the original POSG) can be quasi-efficient, i.e., of quasi-polynomial-time, under the aforementioned assumptions. Furthermore, we develop a partially observable MARL algorithm that is both statistically and computationally quasi-efficient. We hope our study may open up the possibilities of leveraging and even designing different \emph{information structures}, for developing both sample- and computation-efficient partially observable MARL.

Tackling Combinatorial Distribution Shift: A Matrix Completion Perspective

Obtaining rigorous statistical guarantees for generalization under distribution shift remains an open and active research area. We study a setting we call combinatorial distribution shift, where (a) under the test- and training-distributions, the labels $z$ are determined by pairs of features $(x,y)$, (b) the training distribution has coverage of certain marginal distributions over $x$ and $y$ separately, but (c) the test distribution involves examples from a product distribution over $(x,y)$ that is {not} covered by the training distribution. Focusing on the special case where the labels are given by bilinear embeddings into a Hilbert space $H$: $\mathbb{E}[z \mid x,y ]=\langle f_{\star}(x),g_{\star}(y)\rangle_{{H}}$, we aim to extrapolate to a test distribution domain that is $not$ covered in training, i.e., achieving bilinear combinatorial extrapolation. Our setting generalizes a special case of matrix completion from missing-not-at-random data, for which all existing results require the ground-truth matrices to be either exactly low-rank, or to exhibit very sharp spectral cutoffs. In this work, we develop a series of theoretical results that enable bilinear combinatorial extrapolation under gradual spectral decay as observed in typical high-dimensional data, including novel algorithms, generalization guarantees, and linear-algebraic results. A key tool is a novel perturbation bound for the rank-$k$ singular value decomposition approximations between two matrices that depends on the relative spectral gap rather than the absolute spectral gap, a result that may be of broader independent interest.

Multi-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Networked Separable Interactions

We study a new class of Markov games (MGs), \textit{Multi-player Zero-sum Markov Games} with {\it Networked separable interactions} (MZNMGs), to model the local interaction structure in non-cooperative multi-agent sequential decision-making. We define an MZNMG as a model where {the payoffs of the auxiliary games associated with each state are zero-sum and} have some separable (i.e., polymatrix) structure across the neighbors over some interaction network. We first identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an MG can be presented as an MZNMG, and show that the set of Markov coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) collapses to the set of Markov Nash equilibrium (NE) in these games, in that the {product of} per-state marginalization of the former for all players yields the latter. Furthermore, we show that finding approximate Markov \emph{stationary} CCE in infinite-horizon discounted MZNMGs is \texttt{PPAD}-hard, unless the underlying network has a ``star topology''. Then, we propose fictitious-play-type dynamics, the classical learning dynamics in normal-form games, for MZNMGs, and establish convergence guarantees to Markov stationary NE under a star-shaped network structure. Finally, in light of the hardness result, we focus on computing a Markov \emph{non-stationary} NE and provide finite-iteration guarantees for a series of value-iteration-based algorithms. We also provide numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical results.

Last-Iterate Convergent Policy Gradient Primal-Dual Methods for Constrained MDPs

We study the problem of computing an optimal policy of an infinite-horizon discounted constrained Markov decision process (constrained MDP). Despite the popularity of Lagrangian-based policy search methods used in practice, the oscillation of policy iterates in these methods has not been fully understood, bringing out issues such as violation of constraints and sensitivity to hyper-parameters. To fill this gap, we employ the Lagrangian method to cast a constrained MDP into a constrained saddle-point problem in which max/min players correspond to primal/dual variables, respectively, and develop two single-time-scale policy-based primal-dual algorithms with non-asymptotic convergence of their policy iterates to an optimal constrained policy. Specifically, we first propose a regularized policy gradient primal-dual (RPG-PD) method that updates the policy using an entropy-regularized policy gradient, and the dual via a quadratic-regularized gradient ascent, simultaneously. We prove that the policy primal-dual iterates of RPG-PD converge to a regularized saddle point with a sublinear rate, while the policy iterates converge sublinearly to an optimal constrained policy. We further instantiate RPG-PD in large state or action spaces by including function approximation in policy parametrization, and establish similar sublinear last-iterate policy convergence. Second, we propose an optimistic policy gradient primal-dual (OPG-PD) method that employs the optimistic gradient method to update primal/dual variables, simultaneously. We prove that the policy primal-dual iterates of OPG-PD converge to a saddle point that contains an optimal constrained policy, with a linear rate. To the best of our knowledge, this work appears to be the first non-asymptotic policy last-iterate convergence result for single-time-scale algorithms in constrained MDPs.

Self-Supervised Reinforcement Learning that Transfers using Random Features

Model-free reinforcement learning algorithms have exhibited great potential in solving single-task sequential decision-making problems with high-dimensional observations and long horizons, but are known to be hard to generalize across tasks. Model-based RL, on the other hand, learns task-agnostic models of the world that naturally enables transfer across different reward functions, but struggles to scale to complex environments due to the compounding error. To get the best of both worlds, we propose a self-supervised reinforcement learning method that enables the transfer of behaviors across tasks with different rewards, while circumventing the challenges of model-based RL. In particular, we show self-supervised pre-training of model-free reinforcement learning with a number of random features as rewards allows implicit modeling of long-horizon environment dynamics. Then, planning techniques like model-predictive control using these implicit models enable fast adaptation to problems with new reward functions. Our method is self-supervised in that it can be trained on offline datasets without reward labels, but can then be quickly deployed on new tasks. We validate that our proposed method enables transfer across tasks on a variety of manipulation and locomotion domains in simulation, opening the door to generalist decision-making agents.