Fine-tuning is Not Fine: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in GNNs with Limited Clean Data

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable performance through their message-passing mechanism. However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of GNNs to backdoor attacks, which can lead the model to misclassify graphs with attached triggers as the target class. The effectiveness of recent promising defense techniques, such as fine-tuning or distillation, is heavily contingent on having comprehensive knowledge of the sufficient training dataset. Empirical studies have shown that fine-tuning methods require a clean dataset of 20% to reduce attack accuracy to below 25%, while distillation methods require a clean dataset of 15%. However, obtaining such a large amount of clean data is commonly impractical. In this paper, we propose a practical backdoor mitigation framework, denoted as GRAPHNAD, which can capture high-quality intermediate-layer representations in GNNs to enhance the distillation process with limited clean data. To achieve this, we address the following key questions: How to identify the appropriate attention representations in graphs for distillation? How to enhance distillation with limited data? By adopting the graph attention transfer method, GRAPHNAD can effectively align the intermediate-layer attention representations of the backdoored model with that of the teacher model, forcing the backdoor neurons to transform into benign ones. Besides, we extract the relation maps from intermediate-layer transformation and enforce the relation maps of the backdoored model to be consistent with that of the teacher model, thereby ensuring model accuracy while further reducing the influence of backdoors. Extensive experimental results show that by fine-tuning a teacher model with only 3% of the clean data, GRAPHNAD can reduce the attack success rate to below 5%.

Structure-Preference Enabled Graph Embedding Generation under Differential Privacy

Graph embedding generation techniques aim to learn low-dimensional vectors for each node in a graph and have recently gained increasing research attention. Publishing low-dimensional node vectors enables various graph analysis tasks, such as structural equivalence and link prediction. Yet, improper publication opens a backdoor to malicious attackers, who can infer sensitive information of individuals from the low-dimensional node vectors. Existing methods tackle this issue by developing deep graph learning models with differential privacy (DP). However, they often suffer from large noise injections and cannot provide structural preferences consistent with mining objectives. Recently, skip-gram based graph embedding generation techniques are widely used due to their ability to extract customizable structures. Based on skip-gram, we present SE-PrivGEmb, a structure-preference enabled graph embedding generation under DP. For arbitrary structure preferences, we design a unified noise tolerance mechanism via perturbing non-zero vectors. This mechanism mitigates utility degradation caused by high sensitivity. By carefully designing negative sampling probabilities in skip-gram, we theoretically demonstrate that skip-gram can preserve arbitrary proximities, which quantify structural features in graphs. Extensive experiments show that our method outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods under structural equivalence and link prediction tasks.

New Paradigm of Adversarial Training: Breaking Inherent Trade-Off between Accuracy and Robustness via Dummy Classes

Adversarial Training (AT) is one of the most effective methods to enhance the robustness of DNNs. However, existing AT methods suffer from an inherent trade-off between adversarial robustness and clean accuracy, which seriously hinders their real-world deployment. While this problem has been widely studied within the current AT paradigm, existing AT methods still typically experience a reduction in clean accuracy by over 10% to date, without significant improvements in robustness compared with simple baselines like PGD-AT. This inherent trade-off raises a question: whether the current AT paradigm, which assumes to learn the corresponding benign and adversarial samples as the same class, inappropriately combines clean and robust objectives that may be essentially inconsistent. In this work, we surprisingly reveal that up to 40% of CIFAR-10 adversarial samples always fail to satisfy such an assumption across various AT methods and robust models, explicitly indicating the improvement room for the current AT paradigm. Accordingly, to relax the tension between clean and robust learning derived from this overstrict assumption, we propose a new AT paradigm by introducing an additional dummy class for each original class, aiming to accommodate the hard adversarial samples with shifted distribution after perturbation. The robustness w.r.t. these adversarial samples can be achieved by runtime recovery from the predicted dummy classes to their corresponding original ones, eliminating the compromise with clean learning. Building on this new paradigm, we propose a novel plug-and-play AT technology named DUmmy Classes-based Adversarial Training (DUCAT). Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet demonstrate that the DUCAT concurrently improves clean accuracy and adversarial robustness compared with state-of-the-art benchmarks, effectively breaking the existing inherent trade-off.

Alignment-Aware Model Extraction Attacks on Large Language Models

Model extraction attacks (MEAs) on large language models (LLMs) have received increasing research attention lately. Existing attack methods on LLMs inherit the extraction strategies from those designed for deep neural networks (DNNs) yet neglect the inconsistency of training tasks between MEA and LLMs' alignments. As such, they result in poor attack performances. To tackle this issue, we present Locality Reinforced Distillation (LoRD), a novel model extraction attack algorithm specifically for LLMs. In particular, we design a policy-gradient-style training task, which utilizes victim models' responses as a signal to guide the crafting of preference for the local model. Theoretical analysis has shown that i) LoRD's convergence procedure in MEAs is consistent with the alignments of LLMs, and ii) LoRD can reduce query complexity while mitigating watermark protection through exploration-based stealing. Extensive experiments on domain-specific extractions demonstrate the superiority of our method by examining the extraction of various state-of-the-art commercial LLMs.

Why Are My Prompts Leaked? Unraveling Prompt Extraction Threats in Customized Large Language Models

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at \url{https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval}.

DPSUR: Accelerating Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent Using Selective Update and Release

Machine learning models are known to memorize private data to reduce their training loss, which can be inadvertently exploited by privacy attacks such as model inversion and membership inference. To protect against these attacks, differential privacy (DP) has become the de facto standard for privacy-preserving machine learning, particularly those popular training algorithms using stochastic gradient descent, such as DPSGD. Nonetheless, DPSGD still suffers from severe utility loss due to its slow convergence. This is partially caused by the random sampling, which brings bias and variance to the gradient, and partially by the Gaussian noise, which leads to fluctuation of gradient updates. Our key idea to address these issues is to apply selective updates to the model training, while discarding those useless or even harmful updates. Motivated by this, this paper proposes DPSUR, a Differentially Private training framework based on Selective Updates and Release, where the gradient from each iteration is evaluated based on a validation test, and only those updates leading to convergence are applied to the model. As such, DPSUR ensures the training in the right direction and thus can achieve faster convergence than DPSGD. The main challenges lie in two aspects -- privacy concerns arising from gradient evaluation, and gradient selection strategy for model update. To address the challenges, DPSUR introduces a clipping strategy for update randomization and a threshold mechanism for gradient selection. Experiments conducted on MNIST, FMNIST, CIFAR-10, and IMDB datasets show that DPSUR significantly outperforms previous works in terms of convergence speed and model utility.