Abstract:Model Inversion (MI) attacks, which reconstruct the training dataset of neural networks, pose significant privacy concerns in machine learning. Recent MI attacks have managed to reconstruct realistic label-level private data, such as the general appearance of a target person from all training images labeled on him. Beyond label-level privacy, in this paper we show sample-level privacy, the private information of a single target sample, is also important but under-explored in the MI literature due to the limitations of existing evaluation metrics. To address this gap, this study introduces a novel metric tailored for training-sample analysis, namely, the Diversity and Distance Composite Score (DDCS), which evaluates the reconstruction fidelity of each training sample by encompassing various MI attack attributes. This, in turn, enhances the precision of sample-level privacy assessments. Leveraging DDCS as a new evaluative lens, we observe that many training samples remain resilient against even the most advanced MI attack. As such, we further propose a transfer learning framework that augments the generative capabilities of MI attackers through the integration of entropy loss and natural gradient descent. Extensive experiments verify the effectiveness of our framework on improving state-of-the-art MI attacks over various metrics including DDCS, coverage and FID. Finally, we demonstrate that DDCS can also be useful for MI defense, by identifying samples susceptible to MI attacks in an unsupervised manner.
Abstract:In recent years, speech generation technology has advanced rapidly, fueled by generative models and large-scale training techniques. While these developments have enabled the production of high-quality synthetic speech, they have also raised concerns about the misuse of this technology, particularly for generating synthetic misinformation. Current research primarily focuses on distinguishing machine-generated speech from human-produced speech, but the more urgent challenge is detecting misinformation within spoken content. This task requires a thorough analysis of factors such as speaker identity, topic, and synthesis. To address this need, we conduct an initial investigation into synthetic spoken misinformation detection by introducing an open-source dataset, SpMis. SpMis includes speech synthesized from over 1,000 speakers across five common topics, utilizing state-of-the-art text-to-speech systems. Although our results show promising detection capabilities, they also reveal substantial challenges for practical implementation, underscoring the importance of ongoing research in this critical area.