Provable Hyperparameter Tuning for Structured Pfaffian Settings

Data-driven algorithm design automatically adapts algorithms to specific application domains, achieving better performance. In the context of parameterized algorithms, this approach involves tuning the algorithm parameters using problem instances drawn from the problem distribution of the target application domain. While empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of data-driven algorithm design, providing theoretical guarantees for several parameterized families remains challenging. This is due to the intricate behaviors of their corresponding utility functions, which typically admit piece-wise and discontinuity structures. In this work, we present refined frameworks for providing learning guarantees for parameterized data-driven algorithm design problems in both distributional and online learning settings. For the distributional learning setting, we introduce the Pfaffian GJ framework, an extension of the classical GJ framework, capable of providing learning guarantees for function classes for which the computation involves Pfaffian functions. Unlike the GJ framework, which is limited to function classes with computation characterized by rational functions, our proposed framework can deal with function classes involving Pfaffian functions, which are much more general and widely applicable. We then show that for many parameterized algorithms of interest, their utility function possesses a refined piece-wise structure, which automatically translates to learning guarantees using our proposed framework. For the online learning setting, we provide a new tool for verifying dispersion property of a sequence of loss functions. This sufficient condition allows no-regret learning for sequences of piece-wise structured loss functions where the piece-wise structure involves Pfaffian transition boundaries.

Subsidy design for better social outcomes

Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal utility, which can lead to extremely inefficient overall system performance, often indicated by a high Price of Anarchy. Recent work (Lin et al. 2021) investigated and formalized yet another undesirable behavior of rational agents, that of avoiding freely available information about the game for selfish reasons, leading to worse social outcomes. A central planner can significantly mitigate these issues by injecting a subsidy to reduce certain costs associated with the system and obtain net gains in the system performance. Crucially, the planner needs to determine how to allocate this subsidy effectively. We formally show that designing subsidies that perfectly optimize the social good, in terms of minimizing the Price of Anarchy or preventing the information avoidance behavior, is computationally hard under standard complexity theoretic assumptions. On the positive side, we show that we can learn provably good values of subsidy in repeated games coming from the same domain. This data-driven subsidy design approach avoids solving computationally hard problems for unseen games by learning over polynomially many games. We also show that optimal subsidy can be learned with no-regret given an online sequence of games, under mild assumptions on the cost matrix. Our study focuses on two distinct games: a Bayesian extension of the well-studied fair cost-sharing game, and a component maintenance game with engineering applications.

Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Information

In its most basic form, a Stackelberg game is a two-player game in which a leader commits to a (mixed) strategy, and a follower best-responds. Stackelberg games are perhaps one of the biggest success stories of algorithmic game theory over the last decade, as algorithms for playing in Stackelberg games have been deployed in many real-world domains including airport security, anti-poaching efforts, and cyber-crime prevention. However, these algorithms often fail to take into consideration the additional information available to each player (e.g. traffic patterns, weather conditions, network congestion), a salient feature of reality which may significantly affect both players' optimal strategies. We formalize such settings as Stackelberg games with side information, in which both players observe an external context before playing. The leader then commits to a (possibly context-dependent) strategy, and the follower best-responds to both the leader's strategy and the context. We focus on the online setting in which a sequence of followers arrive over time, and the context may change from round-to-round. In sharp contrast to the non-contextual version, we show that it is impossible for the leader to achieve good performance (measured by regret) in the full adversarial setting (i.e., when both the context and the follower are chosen by an adversary). However, it turns out that a little bit of randomness goes a long way. Motivated by our impossibility result, we show that no-regret learning is possible in two natural relaxations: the setting in which the sequence of followers is chosen stochastically and the sequence of contexts is adversarial, and the setting in which the sequence of contexts is stochastic and the sequence of followers is chosen by an adversary.

Spectrally Transformed Kernel Regression

Unlabeled data is a key component of modern machine learning. In general, the role of unlabeled data is to impose a form of smoothness, usually from the similarity information encoded in a base kernel, such as the $\epsilon$-neighbor kernel or the adjacency matrix of a graph. This work revisits the classical idea of spectrally transformed kernel regression (STKR), and provides a new class of general and scalable STKR estimators able to leverage unlabeled data. Intuitively, via spectral transformation, STKR exploits the data distribution for which unlabeled data can provide additional information. First, we show that STKR is a principled and general approach, by characterizing a universal type of "target smoothness", and proving that any sufficiently smooth function can be learned by STKR. Second, we provide scalable STKR implementations for the inductive setting and a general transformation function, while prior work is mostly limited to the transductive setting. Third, we derive statistical guarantees for two scenarios: STKR with a known polynomial transformation, and STKR with kernel PCA when the transformation is unknown. Overall, we believe that this work helps deepen our understanding of how to work with unlabeled data, and its generality makes it easier to inspire new methods.

Learning to Relax: Setting Solver Parameters Across a Sequence of Linear System Instances

Solving a linear system $Ax=b$ is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter $\omega$ has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm -- using only the number of iterations as feedback -- can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed $\omega$ as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best $\omega$ for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

Meta-Learning Adversarial Bandit Algorithms

We study online meta-learning with bandit feedback, with the goal of improving performance across multiple tasks if they are similar according to some natural similarity measure. As the first to target the adversarial online-within-online partial-information setting, we design meta-algorithms that combine outer learners to simultaneously tune the initialization and other hyperparameters of an inner learner for two important cases: multi-armed bandits (MAB) and bandit linear optimization (BLO). For MAB, the meta-learners initialize and set hyperparameters of the Tsallis-entropy generalization of Exp3, with the task-averaged regret improving if the entropy of the optima-in-hindsight is small. For BLO, we learn to initialize and tune online mirror descent (OMD) with self-concordant barrier regularizers, showing that task-averaged regret varies directly with an action space-dependent measure they induce. Our guarantees rely on proving that unregularized follow-the-leader combined with two levels of low-dimensional hyperparameter tuning is enough to learn a sequence of affine functions of non-Lipschitz and sometimes non-convex Bregman divergences bounding the regret of OMD.

Reliable Learning for Test-time Attacks and Distribution Shift

Machine learning algorithms are often used in environments which are not captured accurately even by the most carefully obtained training data, either due to the possibility of `adversarial' test-time attacks, or on account of `natural' distribution shift. For test-time attacks, we introduce and analyze a novel robust reliability guarantee, which requires a learner to output predictions along with a reliability radius $\eta$, with the meaning that its prediction is guaranteed to be correct as long as the adversary has not perturbed the test point farther than a distance $\eta$. We provide learners that are optimal in the sense that they always output the best possible reliability radius on any test point, and we characterize the reliable region, i.e. the set of points where a given reliability radius is attainable. We additionally analyze reliable learners under distribution shift, where the test points may come from an arbitrary distribution Q different from the training distribution P. For both cases, we bound the probability mass of the reliable region for several interesting examples, for linear separators under nearly log-concave and s-concave distributions, as well as for smooth boundary classifiers under smooth probability distributions.

Learning with Explanation Constraints

While supervised learning assumes the presence of labeled data, we may have prior information about how models should behave. In this paper, we formalize this notion as learning from explanation constraints and provide a learning theoretic framework to analyze how such explanations can improve the learning of our models. For what models would explanations be helpful? Our first key contribution addresses this question via the definition of what we call EPAC models (models that satisfy these constraints in expectation over new data), and we analyze this class of models using standard learning theoretic tools. Our second key contribution is to characterize these restrictions (in terms of their Rademacher complexities) for a canonical class of explanations given by gradient information for linear models and two layer neural networks. Finally, we provide an algorithmic solution for our framework, via a variational approximation that achieves better performance and satisfies these constraints more frequently, when compared to simpler augmented Lagrangian methods to incorporate these explanations. We demonstrate the benefits of our approach over a large array of synthetic and real-world experiments.

Learning Revenue Maximizing Menus of Lotteries and Two-Part Tariffs

We study learnability of two important classes of mechanisms, menus of lotteries and two-part tariffs. A menu of lotteries is a list of entries where each entry is a pair consisting of probabilities of allocating each item and a price. Menus of lotteries is an especially important family of randomized mechanisms that are known to achieve revenue beyond any deterministic mechanism. A menu of two-part tariffs, on the other hand, is a pricing scheme (that consists of an up-front fee and a per unit fee) that is commonly used in the real world, e.g., for car or bike sharing services. We study learning high-revenue menus of lotteries and two-part tariffs from buyer valuation data in both distributional settings, where we have access to buyers' valuation samples up-front, and online settings, where buyers arrive one at a time and no distributional assumption is made about their values. Our main contribution is proposing the first online learning algorithms for menus of lotteries and two-part tariffs with strong regret bound guarantees. Furthermore, we provide algorithms with improved running times over prior work for the distributional settings. The key difficulty when deriving learning algorithms for these settings is that the relevant revenue functions have sharp transition boundaries. In stark contrast with the recent literature on learning such unstructured functions, we show that simple discretization-based techniques are sufficient for learning in these settings.

Nash Equilibria and Pitfalls of Adversarial Training in Adversarial Robustness Games

Adversarial training is a standard technique for training adversarially robust models. In this paper, we study adversarial training as an alternating best-response strategy in a 2-player zero-sum game. We prove that even in a simple scenario of a linear classifier and a statistical model that abstracts robust vs. non-robust features, the alternating best response strategy of such game may not converge. On the other hand, a unique pure Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is provably robust. We support our theoretical results with experiments, showing the non-convergence of adversarial training and the robustness of Nash equilibrium.