Performative Reinforcement Learning with Linear Markov Decision Process

We study the setting of \emph{performative reinforcement learning} where the deployed policy affects both the reward, and the transition of the underlying Markov decision process. Prior work~\parencite{MTR23} has addressed this problem under the tabular setting and established last-iterate convergence of repeated retraining with iteration complexity explicitly depending on the number of states. In this work, we generalize the results to \emph{linear Markov decision processes} which is the primary theoretical model of large-scale MDPs. The main challenge with linear MDP is that the regularized objective is no longer strongly convex and we want a bound that scales with the dimension of the features, rather than states which can be infinite. Our first result shows that repeatedly optimizing a regularized objective converges to a \emph{performatively stable policy}. In the absence of strong convexity, our analysis leverages a new recurrence relation that uses a specific linear combination of optimal dual solutions for proving convergence. We then tackle the finite sample setting where the learner has access to a set of trajectories drawn from the current policy. We consider a reparametrized version of the primal problem, and construct an empirical Lagrangian which is to be optimized from the samples. We show that, under a \emph{bounded coverage} condition, repeatedly solving a saddle point of this empirical Lagrangian converges to a performatively stable solution, and also construct a primal-dual algorithm that solves the empirical Lagrangian efficiently. Finally, we show several applications of the general framework of performative RL including multi-agent systems.

Counterfactual Effect Decomposition in Multi-Agent Sequential Decision Making

We address the challenge of explaining counterfactual outcomes in multi-agent Markov decision processes. In particular, we aim to explain the total counterfactual effect of an agent's action on the outcome of a realized scenario through its influence on the environment dynamics and the agents' behavior. To achieve this, we introduce a novel causal explanation formula that decomposes the counterfactual effect by attributing to each agent and state variable a score reflecting their respective contributions to the effect. First, we show that the total counterfactual effect of an agent's action can be decomposed into two components: one measuring the effect that propagates through all subsequent agents' actions and another related to the effect that propagates through the state transitions. Building on recent advancements in causal contribution analysis, we further decompose these two effects as follows. For the former, we consider agent-specific effects -- a causal concept that quantifies the counterfactual effect of an agent's action that propagates through a subset of agents. Based on this notion, we use Shapley value to attribute the effect to individual agents. For the latter, we consider the concept of structure-preserving interventions and attribute the effect to state variables based on their "intrinsic" contributions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate the interpretability of our decomposition approach in a Gridworld environment with LLM-assisted agents and a sepsis management simulator.

Reward Design for Justifiable Sequential Decision-Making

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Performative Reinforcement Learning in Gradually Shifting Environments

When Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are deployed in practice, they might impact their environment and change its dynamics. Ongoing research attempts to formally model this phenomenon and to analyze learning algorithms in these models. To this end, we propose a framework where the current environment depends on the deployed policy as well as its previous dynamics. This is a generalization of Performative RL (PRL) [Mandal et al., 2023]. Unlike PRL, our framework allows to model scenarios where the environment gradually adjusts to a deployed policy. We adapt two algorithms from the performative prediction literature to our setting and propose a novel algorithm called Mixed Delayed Repeated Retraining (MDRR). We provide conditions under which these algorithms converge and compare them using three metrics: number of retrainings, approximation guarantee, and number of samples per deployment. Unlike previous approaches, MDRR combines samples from multiple deployments in its training. This makes MDRR particularly suitable for scenarios where the environment's response strongly depends on its previous dynamics, which are common in practice. We experimentally compare the algorithms using a simulation-based testbed and our results show that MDRR converges significantly faster than previous approaches.

Agent-Specific Effects

Establishing causal relationships between actions and outcomes is fundamental for accountable multi-agent decision-making. However, interpreting and quantifying agents' contributions to such relationships pose significant challenges. These challenges are particularly prominent in the context of multi-agent sequential decision-making, where the causal effect of an agent's action on the outcome depends on how the other agents respond to that action. In this paper, our objective is to present a systematic approach for attributing the causal effects of agents' actions to the influence they exert on other agents. Focusing on multi-agent Markov decision processes, we introduce agent-specific effects (ASE), a novel causal quantity that measures the effect of an agent's action on the outcome that propagates through other agents. We then turn to the counterfactual counterpart of ASE (cf-ASE), provide a sufficient set of conditions for identifying cf-ASE, and propose a practical sampling-based algorithm for estimating it. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the utility of cf-ASE through a simulation-based testbed, which includes a sepsis management environment.

Markov Decision Processes with Time-Varying Geometric Discounting

Canonical models of Markov decision processes (MDPs) usually consider geometric discounting based on a constant discount factor. While this standard modeling approach has led to many elegant results, some recent studies indicate the necessity of modeling time-varying discounting in certain applications. This paper studies a model of infinite-horizon MDPs with time-varying discount factors. We take a game-theoretic perspective -- whereby each time step is treated as an independent decision maker with their own (fixed) discount factor -- and we study the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the resulting game as well as the related algorithmic problems. We present a constructive proof of the existence of an SPE and demonstrate the EXPTIME-hardness of computing an SPE. We also turn to the approximate notion of $\epsilon$-SPE and show that an $\epsilon$-SPE exists under milder assumptions. An algorithm is presented to compute an $\epsilon$-SPE, of which an upper bound of the time complexity, as a function of the convergence property of the time-varying discount factor, is provided.

Sequential Principal-Agent Problems with Communication: Efficient Computation and Learning

We study a sequential decision making problem between a principal and an agent with incomplete information on both sides. In this model, the principal and the agent interact in a stochastic environment, and each is privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit information from the agent and to provide signals about her own information. The principal and the agent communicate their signals to each other, and select their actions independently based on this communication. Each player receives a payoff based on the state and their joint actions, and the environment moves to a new state. The interaction continues over a finite time horizon, and both players act to optimize their own total payoffs over the horizon. Our model encompasses as special cases stochastic games of incomplete information and POMDPs, as well as sequential Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design problems. We study both computation of optimal policies and learning in our setting. While the general problems are computationally intractable, we study algorithmic solutions under a conditional independence assumption on the underlying state-observation distributions. We present an polynomial-time algorithm to compute the principal's optimal policy up to an additive approximation. Additionally, we show an efficient learning algorithm in the case where the transition probabilities are not known beforehand. The algorithm guarantees sublinear regret for both players.

Learning Embeddings for Sequential Tasks Using Population of Agents

We present an information-theoretic framework to learn fixed-dimensional embeddings for tasks in reinforcement learning. We leverage the idea that two tasks are similar to each other if observing an agent's performance on one task reduces our uncertainty about its performance on the other. This intuition is captured by our information-theoretic criterion which uses a diverse population of agents to measure similarity between tasks in sequential decision-making settings. In addition to qualitative assessment, we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques based on task embeddings by quantitative comparisons against strong baselines on two application scenarios: predicting an agent's performance on a test task by observing its performance on a small quiz of tasks, and selecting tasks with desired characteristics from a given set of options.

Implicit Poisoning Attacks in Two-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Adversarial Policies for Training-Time Attacks

In targeted poisoning attacks, an attacker manipulates an agent-environment interaction to force the agent into adopting a policy of interest, called target policy. Prior work has primarily focused on attacks that modify standard MDP primitives, such as rewards or transitions. In this paper, we study targeted poisoning attacks in a two-agent setting where an attacker implicitly poisons the effective environment of one of the agents by modifying the policy of its peer. We develop an optimization framework for designing optimal attacks, where the cost of the attack measures how much the solution deviates from the assumed default policy of the peer agent. We further study the computational properties of this optimization framework. Focusing on a tabular setting, we show that in contrast to poisoning attacks based on MDP primitives (transitions and (unbounded) rewards), which are always feasible, it is NP-hard to determine the feasibility of implicit poisoning attacks. We provide characterization results that establish sufficient conditions for the feasibility of the attack problem, as well as an upper and a lower bound on the optimal cost of the attack. We propose two algorithmic approaches for finding an optimal adversarial policy: a model-based approach with tabular policies and a model-free approach with parametric/neural policies. We showcase the efficacy of the proposed algorithms through experiments.

Towards Computationally Efficient Responsibility Attribution in Decentralized Partially Observable MDPs

Responsibility attribution is a key concept of accountable multi-agent decision making. Given a sequence of actions, responsibility attribution mechanisms quantify the impact of each participating agent to the final outcome. One such popular mechanism is based on actual causality, and it assigns (causal) responsibility based on the actions that were found to be pivotal for the considered outcome. However, the inherent problem of pinpointing actual causes and consequently determining the exact responsibility assignment has shown to be computationally intractable. In this paper, we aim to provide a practical algorithmic solution to the problem of responsibility attribution under a computational budget. We first formalize the problem in the framework of Decentralized Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (Dec-POMDPs) augmented by a specific class of Structural Causal Models (SCMs). Under this framework, we introduce a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) type of method which efficiently approximates the agents' degrees of responsibility. This method utilizes the structure of a novel search tree and a pruning technique, both tailored to the problem of responsibility attribution. Other novel components of our method are (a) a child selection policy based on linear scalarization and (b) a backpropagation procedure that accounts for a minimality condition that is typically used to define actual causality. We experimentally evaluate the efficacy of our algorithm through a simulation-based test-bed, which includes three team-based card games.