Text-Diffusion Red-Teaming of Large Language Models: Unveiling Harmful Behaviors with Proximity Constraints

Recent work has proposed automated red-teaming methods for testing the vulnerabilities of a given target large language model (LLM). These methods use red-teaming LLMs to uncover inputs that induce harmful behavior in a target LLM. In this paper, we study red-teaming strategies that enable a targeted security assessment. We propose an optimization framework for red-teaming with proximity constraints, where the discovered prompts must be similar to reference prompts from a given dataset. This dataset serves as a template for the discovered prompts, anchoring the search for test-cases to specific topics, writing styles, or types of harmful behavior. We show that established auto-regressive model architectures do not perform well in this setting. We therefore introduce a black-box red-teaming method inspired by text-diffusion models: Diffusion for Auditing and Red-Teaming (DART). DART modifies the reference prompt by perturbing it in the embedding space, directly controlling the amount of change introduced. We systematically evaluate our method by comparing its effectiveness with established methods based on model fine-tuning and zero- and few-shot prompting. Our results show that DART is significantly more effective at discovering harmful inputs in close proximity to the reference prompt.

Implicit Poisoning Attacks in Two-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Adversarial Policies for Training-Time Attacks

In targeted poisoning attacks, an attacker manipulates an agent-environment interaction to force the agent into adopting a policy of interest, called target policy. Prior work has primarily focused on attacks that modify standard MDP primitives, such as rewards or transitions. In this paper, we study targeted poisoning attacks in a two-agent setting where an attacker implicitly poisons the effective environment of one of the agents by modifying the policy of its peer. We develop an optimization framework for designing optimal attacks, where the cost of the attack measures how much the solution deviates from the assumed default policy of the peer agent. We further study the computational properties of this optimization framework. Focusing on a tabular setting, we show that in contrast to poisoning attacks based on MDP primitives (transitions and (unbounded) rewards), which are always feasible, it is NP-hard to determine the feasibility of implicit poisoning attacks. We provide characterization results that establish sufficient conditions for the feasibility of the attack problem, as well as an upper and a lower bound on the optimal cost of the attack. We propose two algorithmic approaches for finding an optimal adversarial policy: a model-based approach with tabular policies and a model-free approach with parametric/neural policies. We showcase the efficacy of the proposed algorithms through experiments.