SoK: Decentralized AI (DeAI)

The centralization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses significant challenges, including single points of failure, inherent biases, data privacy concerns, and scalability issues. These problems are especially prevalent in closed-source large language models (LLMs), where user data is collected and used without transparency. To mitigate these issues, blockchain-based decentralized AI (DeAI) has emerged as a promising solution. DeAI combines the strengths of both blockchain and AI technologies to enhance the transparency, security, decentralization, and trustworthiness of AI systems. However, a comprehensive understanding of state-of-the-art DeAI development, particularly for active industry solutions, is still lacking. In this work, we present a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) for blockchain-based DeAI solutions. We propose a taxonomy to classify existing DeAI protocols based on the model lifecycle. Based on this taxonomy, we provide a structured way to clarify the landscape of DeAI protocols and identify their similarities and differences. We analyze the functionalities of blockchain in DeAI, investigating how blockchain features contribute to enhancing the security, transparency, and trustworthiness of AI processes, while also ensuring fair incentives for AI data and model contributors. In addition, we identify key insights and research gaps in developing DeAI protocols, highlighting several critical avenues for future research.

Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices

Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy, integrity, and susceptibility to mediator or user strategic behavior. It is unclear if the cooperative AI techniques we study are robust to real-world incentives and attack vectors. However, decentralized commitment devices that utilize cryptography have been deployed in the wild, and numerous studies have shown their ability to coordinate algorithmic agents facing adversarial opponents with significant economic incentives, currently in the order of several million to billions of dollars. In this paper, we use examples in the decentralization and, in particular, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) (arXiv:1904.05234) literature to illustrate the potential security issues in cooperative AI. We call for expanded research into decentralized commitments to advance cooperative AI capabilities for secure coordination in open environments and empirical testing frameworks to evaluate multi-agent coordination ability given real-world commitment constraints.

Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources

We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting resource prices to handle persistent demand shifts versus being robust to local noise in the observed block demand. In the general case with more than one resource, our optimal policies correctly handle cross-effects (complementarity and substitutability) in resource demands. We also show how these cross-effects can be used to inform resource design, i.e. combining resources into bundles that have low demand-side cross-effects can yield simpler and more efficient price-update rules. Our framework is also practical, we demonstrate how it can be used to refine or inform the design of heuristic fee update rules such as EIP-1559 or EIP-4844 with two case studies. We then estimate a uni-dimensional version of our model using real market data from the Ethereum blockchain and empirically compare the performance of our optimal policies to EIP-1559.