Abstract:Outcome-reward reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, standard RL assigns credit only at the level of the final answer, penalizing entire reasoning traces when the outcome is incorrect and uniformly reinforcing all steps when it is correct. As a result, correct intermediate steps may be discouraged in failed traces, while spurious steps may be reinforced in successful ones. We refer to this failure mode as the problem of credit assignment. While a natural remedy is to train a process reward model, accurately optimizing such models to identify corrective reasoning steps remains challenging. We introduce Intervention Training (InT), a training paradigm in which the model performs fine-grained credit assignment on its own reasoning traces by proposing short, targeted corrections that steer trajectories toward higher reward. Using reference solutions commonly available in mathematical reasoning datasets and exploiting the fact that verifying a model-generated solution is easier than generating a correct one from scratch, the model identifies the first error in its reasoning and proposes a single-step intervention to redirect the trajectory toward the correct solution. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to the on-policy rollout up to the point of error concatenated with the intervention, localizing error to the specific step that caused failure. We show that the resulting model serves as a far better initialization for RL training. After running InT and subsequent fine-tuning with RL, we improve accuracy by nearly 14% over a 4B-parameter base model on IMO-AnswerBench, outperforming larger open-source models such as gpt-oss-20b.
Abstract:Targeted data poisoning attacks pose an increasingly serious threat due to their ease of deployment and high success rates. These attacks aim to manipulate the prediction for a single test sample in classification models. Unlike indiscriminate attacks that aim to decrease overall test performance, targeted attacks present a unique threat to individual test instances. This threat model raises a fundamental question: what factors make certain test samples more susceptible to successful poisoning than others? We investigate how attack difficulty varies across different test instances and identify key characteristics that influence vulnerability. This paper introduces three predictive criteria for targeted data poisoning difficulty: ergodic prediction accuracy (analyzed through clean training dynamics), poison distance, and poison budget. Our experimental results demonstrate that these metrics effectively predict the varying difficulty of real-world targeted poisoning attacks across diverse scenarios, offering practitioners valuable insights for vulnerability assessment and understanding data poisoning attacks.
Abstract:Test-time scaling offers a promising path to improve LLM reasoning by utilizing more compute at inference time; however, the true promise of this paradigm lies in extrapolation (i.e., improvement in performance on hard problems as LLMs keep "thinking" for longer, beyond the maximum token budget they were trained on). Surprisingly, we find that most existing reasoning models do not extrapolate well. We show that one way to enable extrapolation is by training the LLM to perform in-context exploration: training the LLM to effectively spend its test time budget by chaining operations (such as generation, verification, refinement, etc.), or testing multiple hypotheses before it commits to an answer. To enable in-context exploration, we identify three key ingredients as part of our recipe e3: (1) chaining skills that the base LLM has asymmetric competence in, e.g., chaining verification (easy) with generation (hard), as a way to implement in-context search; (2) leveraging "negative" gradients from incorrect traces to amplify exploration during RL, resulting in longer search traces that chains additional asymmetries; and (3) coupling task difficulty with training token budget during training via a specifically-designed curriculum to structure in-context exploration. Our recipe e3 produces the best known 1.7B model according to AIME'25 and HMMT'25 scores, and extrapolates to 2x the training token budget. Our e3-1.7B model not only attains high pass@1 scores, but also improves pass@k over the base model.




Abstract:Training models to effectively use test-time compute is crucial for improving the reasoning performance of LLMs. Current methods mostly do so via fine-tuning on search traces or running RL with 0/1 outcome reward, but do these approaches efficiently utilize test-time compute? Would these approaches continue to scale as the budget improves? In this paper, we try to answer these questions. We formalize the problem of optimizing test-time compute as a meta-reinforcement learning (RL) problem, which provides a principled perspective on spending test-time compute. This perspective enables us to view the long output stream from the LLM as consisting of several episodes run at test time and leads us to use a notion of cumulative regret over output tokens as a way to measure the efficacy of test-time compute. Akin to how RL algorithms can best tradeoff exploration and exploitation over training, minimizing cumulative regret would also provide the best balance between exploration and exploitation in the token stream. While we show that state-of-the-art models do not minimize regret, one can do so by maximizing a dense reward bonus in conjunction with the outcome 0/1 reward RL. This bonus is the ''progress'' made by each subsequent block in the output stream, quantified by the change in the likelihood of eventual success. Using these insights, we develop Meta Reinforcement Fine-Tuning, or MRT, a new class of fine-tuning methods for optimizing test-time compute. MRT leads to a 2-3x relative gain in performance and roughly a 1.5x gain in token efficiency for math reasoning compared to outcome-reward RL.
Abstract:Copyright infringement may occur when a generative model produces samples substantially similar to some copyrighted data that it had access to during the training phase. The notion of access usually refers to including copyrighted samples directly in the training dataset, which one may inspect to identify an infringement. We argue that such visual auditing largely overlooks a concealed copyright infringement, where one constructs a disguise that looks drastically different from the copyrighted sample yet still induces the effect of training Latent Diffusion Models on it. Such disguises only require indirect access to the copyrighted material and cannot be visually distinguished, thus easily circumventing the current auditing tools. In this paper, we provide a better understanding of such disguised copyright infringement by uncovering the disguises generation algorithm, the revelation of the disguises, and importantly, how to detect them to augment the existing toolbox. Additionally, we introduce a broader notion of acknowledgment for comprehending such indirect access.




Abstract:Machine learning models have achieved great success in supervised learning tasks for end-to-end training, which requires a large amount of labeled data that is not always feasible. Recently, many practitioners have shifted to self-supervised learning methods that utilize cheap unlabeled data to learn a general feature extractor via pre-training, which can be further applied to personalized downstream tasks by simply training an additional linear layer with limited labeled data. However, such a process may also raise concerns regarding data poisoning attacks. For instance, indiscriminate data poisoning attacks, which aim to decrease model utility by injecting a small number of poisoned data into the training set, pose a security risk to machine learning models, but have only been studied for end-to-end supervised learning. In this paper, we extend the exploration of the threat of indiscriminate attacks on downstream tasks that apply pre-trained feature extractors. Specifically, we propose two types of attacks: (1) the input space attacks, where we modify existing attacks to directly craft poisoned data in the input space. However, due to the difficulty of optimization under constraints, we further propose (2) the feature targeted attacks, where we mitigate the challenge with three stages, firstly acquiring target parameters for the linear head; secondly finding poisoned features by treating the learned feature representations as a dataset; and thirdly inverting the poisoned features back to the input space. Our experiments examine such attacks in popular downstream tasks of fine-tuning on the same dataset and transfer learning that considers domain adaptation. Empirical results reveal that transfer learning is more vulnerable to our attacks. Additionally, input space attacks are a strong threat if no countermeasures are posed, but are otherwise weaker than feature targeted attacks.
Abstract:Deep neural networks (DNNs) are often used for text classification tasks as they usually achieve high levels of accuracy. However, DNNs can be computationally intensive with billions of parameters and large amounts of labeled data, which can make them expensive to use, to optimize and to transfer to out-of-distribution (OOD) cases in practice. In this paper, we propose a non-parametric alternative to DNNs that's easy, light-weight and universal in text classification: a combination of a simple compressor like gzip with a $k$-nearest-neighbor classifier. Without any training, pre-training or fine-tuning, our method achieves results that are competitive with non-pretrained deep learning methods on six in-distributed datasets. It even outperforms BERT on all five OOD datasets, including four low-resource languages. Our method also performs particularly well in few-shot settings where labeled data are too scarce for DNNs to achieve a satisfying accuracy.