Bidding Games on Markov Decision Processes with Quantitative Reachability Objectives

Graph games are fundamental in strategic reasoning of multi-agent systems and their environments. We study a new family of graph games which combine stochastic environmental uncertainties and auction-based interactions among the agents, formalized as bidding games on (finite) Markov decision processes (MDP). Normally, on MDPs, a single decision-maker chooses a sequence of actions, producing a probability distribution over infinite paths. In bidding games on MDPs, two players -- called the reachability and safety players -- bid for the privilege of choosing the next action at each step. The reachability player's goal is to maximize the probability of reaching a target vertex, whereas the safety player's goal is to minimize it. These games generalize traditional bidding games on graphs, and the existing analysis techniques do not extend. For instance, the central property of traditional bidding games is the existence of a threshold budget, which is a necessary and sufficient budget to guarantee winning for the reachability player. For MDPs, the threshold becomes a relation between the budgets and probabilities of reaching the target. We devise value-iteration algorithms that approximate thresholds and optimal policies for general MDPs, and compute the exact solutions for acyclic MDPs, and show that finding thresholds is at least as hard as solving simple-stochastic games.

Predictive Monitoring of Black-Box Dynamical Systems

We study the problem of predictive runtime monitoring of black-box dynamical systems with quantitative safety properties. The black-box setting stipulates that the exact semantics of the dynamical system and the controller are unknown, and that we are only able to observe the state of the controlled (aka, closed-loop) system at finitely many time points. We present a novel framework for predicting future states of the system based on the states observed in the past. The numbers of past states and of predicted future states are parameters provided by the user. Our method is based on a combination of Taylor's expansion and the backward difference operator for numerical differentiation. We also derive an upper bound on the prediction error under the assumption that the system dynamics and the controller are smooth. The predicted states are then used to predict safety violations ahead in time. Our experiments demonstrate practical applicability of our method for complex black-box systems, showing that it is computationally lightweight and yet significantly more accurate than the state-of-the-art predictive safety monitoring techniques.

Fairness Shields: Safeguarding against Biased Decision Makers

As AI-based decision-makers increasingly influence human lives, it is a growing concern that their decisions are often unfair or biased with respect to people's sensitive attributes, such as gender and race. Most existing bias prevention measures provide probabilistic fairness guarantees in the long run, and it is possible that the decisions are biased on specific instances of short decision sequences. We introduce fairness shielding, where a symbolic decision-maker -- the fairness shield -- continuously monitors the sequence of decisions of another deployed black-box decision-maker, and makes interventions so that a given fairness criterion is met while the total intervention costs are minimized. We present four different algorithms for computing fairness shields, among which one guarantees fairness over fixed horizons, and three guarantee fairness periodically after fixed intervals. Given a distribution over future decisions and their intervention costs, our algorithms solve different instances of bounded-horizon optimal control problems with different levels of computational costs and optimality guarantees. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of these shields in ensuring fairness while maintaining cost efficiency across various scenarios.

Auction-Based Scheduling

Many sequential decision-making tasks require satisfaction of multiple, partially contradictory objectives. Existing approaches are monolithic, namely all objectives are fulfilled using a single policy, which is a function that selects a sequence of actions. We present auction-based scheduling, a modular framework for multi-objective decision-making problems. Each objective is fulfilled using a separate policy, and the policies can be independently created, modified, and replaced. Understandably, different policies with conflicting goals may choose conflicting actions at a given time. In order to resolve conflicts, and compose policies, we employ a novel auction-based mechanism. We allocate a bounded budget to each policy, and at each step, the policies simultaneously bid from their available budgets for the privilege of being scheduled and choosing an action. Policies express their scheduling urgency using their bids and the bounded budgets ensure long-run scheduling fairness. We lay the foundations of auction-based scheduling using path planning problems on finite graphs with two temporal objectives. We present decentralized algorithms to synthesize a pair of policies, their initially allocated budgets, and bidding strategies. We consider three categories of decentralized synthesis problems, parameterized by the assumptions that the policies make on each other: (a) strong synthesis, with no assumptions and strongest guarantees, (b) assume-admissible synthesis, with weakest rationality assumptions, and (c) assume-guarantee synthesis, with explicit contract-based assumptions. For reachability objectives, we show that, surprisingly, decentralized assume-admissible synthesis is always possible when the out-degrees of all vertices are at most two.

Monitoring Algorithmic Fairness under Partial Observations

As AI and machine-learned software are used increasingly for making decisions that affect humans, it is imperative that they remain fair and unbiased in their decisions. To complement design-time bias mitigation measures, runtime verification techniques have been introduced recently to monitor the algorithmic fairness of deployed systems. Previous monitoring techniques assume full observability of the states of the (unknown) monitored system. Moreover, they can monitor only fairness properties that are specified as arithmetic expressions over the probabilities of different events. In this work, we extend fairness monitoring to systems modeled as partially observed Markov chains (POMC), and to specifications containing arithmetic expressions over the expected values of numerical functions on event sequences. The only assumptions we make are that the underlying POMC is aperiodic and starts in the stationary distribution, with a bound on its mixing time being known. These assumptions enable us to estimate a given property for the entire distribution of possible executions of the monitored POMC, by observing only a single execution. Our monitors observe a long run of the system and, after each new observation, output updated PAC-estimates of how fair or biased the system is. The monitors are computationally lightweight and, using a prototype implementation, we demonstrate their effectiveness on several real-world examples.

Monitoring Algorithmic Fairness

Machine-learned systems are in widespread use for making decisions about humans, and it is important that they are fair, i.e., not biased against individuals based on sensitive attributes. We present runtime verification of algorithmic fairness for systems whose models are unknown, but are assumed to have a Markov chain structure. We introduce a specification language that can model many common algorithmic fairness properties, such as demographic parity, equal opportunity, and social burden. We build monitors that observe a long sequence of events as generated by a given system, and output, after each observation, a quantitative estimate of how fair or biased the system was on that run until that point in time. The estimate is proven to be correct modulo a variable error bound and a given confidence level, where the error bound gets tighter as the observed sequence gets longer. Our monitors are of two types, and use, respectively, frequentist and Bayesian statistical inference techniques. While the frequentist monitors compute estimates that are objectively correct with respect to the ground truth, the Bayesian monitors compute estimates that are correct subject to a given prior belief about the system's model. Using a prototype implementation, we show how we can monitor if a bank is fair in giving loans to applicants from different social backgrounds, and if a college is fair in admitting students while maintaining a reasonable financial burden on the society. Although they exhibit different theoretical complexities in certain cases, in our experiments, both frequentist and Bayesian monitors took less than a millisecond to update their verdicts after each observation.

Runtime Monitoring of Dynamic Fairness Properties

A machine-learned system that is fair in static decision-making tasks may have biased societal impacts in the long-run. This may happen when the system interacts with humans and feedback patterns emerge, reinforcing old biases in the system and creating new biases. While existing works try to identify and mitigate long-run biases through smart system design, we introduce techniques for monitoring fairness in real time. Our goal is to build and deploy a monitor that will continuously observe a long sequence of events generated by the system in the wild, and will output, with each event, a verdict on how fair the system is at the current point in time. The advantages of monitoring are two-fold. Firstly, fairness is evaluated at run-time, which is important because unfair behaviors may not be eliminated a priori, at design-time, due to partial knowledge about the system and the environment, as well as uncertainties and dynamic changes in the system and the environment, such as the unpredictability of human behavior. Secondly, monitors are by design oblivious to how the monitored system is constructed, which makes them suitable to be used as trusted third-party fairness watchdogs. They function as computationally lightweight statistical estimators, and their correctness proofs rely on the rigorous analysis of the stochastic process that models the assumptions about the underlying dynamics of the system. We show, both in theory and experiments, how monitors can warn us (1) if a bank's credit policy over time has created an unfair distribution of credit scores among the population, and (2) if a resource allocator's allocation policy over time has made unfair allocations. Our experiments demonstrate that the monitors introduce very low overhead. We believe that runtime monitoring is an important and mathematically rigorous new addition to the fairness toolbox.