Layer-Wise Feedback Alignment is Conserved in Deep Neural Networks

In the quest to enhance the efficiency and bio-plausibility of training deep neural networks, Feedback Alignment (FA), which replaces the backward pass weights with random matrices in the training process, has emerged as an alternative to traditional backpropagation. While the appeal of FA lies in its circumvention of computational challenges and its plausible biological alignment, the theoretical understanding of this learning rule remains partial. This paper uncovers a set of conservation laws underpinning the learning dynamics of FA, revealing intriguing parallels between FA and Gradient Descent (GD). Our analysis reveals that FA harbors implicit biases akin to those exhibited by GD, challenging the prevailing narrative that these learning algorithms are fundamentally different. Moreover, we demonstrate that these conservation laws elucidate sufficient conditions for layer-wise alignment with feedback matrices in ReLU networks. We further show that this implies over-parameterized two-layer linear networks trained with FA converge to minimum-norm solutions. The implications of our findings offer avenues for developing more efficient and biologically plausible alternatives to backpropagation through an understanding of the principles governing learning dynamics in deep networks.

No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods and Data Auctions

The growing demand for data and AI-generated digital goods, such as personalized written content and artwork, necessitates effective pricing and feedback mechanisms that account for uncertain utility and costly production. Motivated by these developments, this study presents a novel mechanism design addressing a general repeated-auction setting where the utility derived from a sold good is revealed post-sale. The mechanism's novelty lies in using pairwise comparisons for eliciting information from the bidder, arguably easier for humans than assigning a numerical value. Our mechanism chooses allocations using an epsilon-greedy strategy and relies on pairwise comparisons between realized utility from allocated goods and an arbitrary value, avoiding the learning-to-bid problem explored in previous work. We prove this mechanism to be asymptotically truthful, individually rational, and welfare and revenue maximizing. The mechanism's relevance is broad, applying to any setting with made-to-order goods of variable quality. Experimental results on multi-label toxicity annotation data, an example of negative utilities, highlight how our proposed mechanism could enhance social welfare in data auctions. Overall, our focus on human factors contributes to the development of more human-aware and efficient mechanism design.

Pairwise Ranking Losses of Click-Through Rates Prediction for Welfare Maximization in Ad Auctions

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded $\ell_2$ generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Double Descent Demystified: Identifying, Interpreting & Ablating the Sources of a Deep Learning Puzzle

Double descent is a surprising phenomenon in machine learning, in which as the number of model parameters grows relative to the number of data, test error drops as models grow ever larger into the highly overparameterized (data undersampled) regime. This drop in test error flies against classical learning theory on overfitting and has arguably underpinned the success of large models in machine learning. This non-monotonic behavior of test loss depends on the number of data, the dimensionality of the data and the number of model parameters. Here, we briefly describe double descent, then provide an explanation of why double descent occurs in an informal and approachable manner, requiring only familiarity with linear algebra and introductory probability. We provide visual intuition using polynomial regression, then mathematically analyze double descent with ordinary linear regression and identify three interpretable factors that, when simultaneously all present, together create double descent. We demonstrate that double descent occurs on real data when using ordinary linear regression, then demonstrate that double descent does not occur when any of the three factors are ablated. We use this understanding to shed light on recent observations in nonlinear models concerning superposition and double descent. Code is publicly available.