DePrompt: Desensitization and Evaluation of Personal Identifiable Information in Large Language Model Prompts

Prompt serves as a crucial link in interacting with large language models (LLMs), widely impacting the accuracy and interpretability of model outputs. However, acquiring accurate and high-quality responses necessitates precise prompts, which inevitably pose significant risks of personal identifiable information (PII) leakage. Therefore, this paper proposes DePrompt, a desensitization protection and effectiveness evaluation framework for prompt, enabling users to safely and transparently utilize LLMs. Specifically, by leveraging large model fine-tuning techniques as the underlying privacy protection method, we integrate contextual attributes to define privacy types, achieving high-precision PII entity identification. Additionally, through the analysis of key features in prompt desensitization scenarios, we devise adversarial generative desensitization methods that retain important semantic content while disrupting the link between identifiers and privacy attributes. Furthermore, we present utility evaluation metrics for prompt to better gauge and balance privacy and usability. Our framework is adaptable to prompts and can be extended to text usability-dependent scenarios. Through comparison with benchmarks and other model methods, experimental evaluations demonstrate that our desensitized prompt exhibit superior privacy protection utility and model inference results.

Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced the performance of numerous applications, from intelligent conversations to text generation. However, their inherent security vulnerabilities have become an increasingly significant challenge, especially with respect to jailbreak attacks. Attackers can circumvent the security mechanisms of these LLMs, breaching security constraints and causing harmful outputs. Focusing on multi-turn semantic jailbreak attacks, we observe that existing methods lack specific considerations for the role of multiturn dialogues in attack strategies, leading to semantic deviations during continuous interactions. Therefore, in this paper, we establish a theoretical foundation for multi-turn attacks by considering their support in jailbreak attacks, and based on this, propose a context-based contextual fusion black-box jailbreak attack method, named Context Fusion Attack (CFA). This method approach involves filtering and extracting key terms from the target, constructing contextual scenarios around these terms, dynamically integrating the target into the scenarios, replacing malicious key terms within the target, and thereby concealing the direct malicious intent. Through comparisons on various mainstream LLMs and red team datasets, we have demonstrated CFA's superior success rate, divergence, and harmfulness compared to other multi-turn attack strategies, particularly showcasing significant advantages on Llama3 and GPT-4.